The Kurdish nationalist movement and external influences by Disney, Donald Bruce, Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1980-12
The Kurdish nationalist movement and external influences
Disney, Donald Bruce, Jr.














THE KURDISH NATIONALIST MOVEMENT
AND EXTERNAL INFLUENCES
by
Donald Bruce Disney, Jr.
December 1980
The sis Advisor: J. W. Amos, II





Unclassified "wi.fy * N°*





2. OOVT ACCCUION MO. J MKCl»lCNT'S CATALOG NUMBER.
4 TiTlE ,«.*Ju»mH)
The Kurdish Nationalist Movement
and External Influences
s. TY*e of neponT * rewoo covcncd
Master's Thesis;
December 1980
* »I»ro»l»INQ owe. «I»OKT NUMIIR
• contract o« chant HumUtnf)7. AuTmO*><*>
Donald Bruce Disney, Jr., LCDR, USN
tO. *«OG*AM CLEMENT. RBOjECT. T as*
AREA * «OMK UNIT NUDUM* RfBFORMINO OWOANI2ATION NAME AND >QD*tii
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940





II. MUMBER O' WAGES
238
TT MONITORING AGENCY NAME A AOORESSfll if>'M*ml Ifmm Controlling Ottlc*)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93940




l«. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of Ihlt *•»•»!)
Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
17 DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT at (»• •*•„•«( rnrnfm** In #I»c* 20, // dittfmt rrmm Mfrt)
IE. SUFFLCMCNTARY NOTES
'» KEY *O*0l (Continue em remem »!<*• It r\eceeeiy em* itemttty m, ilect IHMHMMP
J
Kurds, Kurdish Nationalism, Kurdish Revolts, Kurdish Political
Parties, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh Ezzedin, Abdul Rahman
Qassemlu, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, UK, U.S., U.S.S.R., Israel,
PLO, Armenians
20. ABSTRACT ,'CMilnu* em -•»•«•• •<<>• II n«c«*««ry «••) <«Rnt<fr »r »l«e« WBBBCl
The Kurdish National Movement and External Influences is a
historic examination of the Kurds, the Kurdish national movement,
and the effects of external actors on the movement. It discusses
who the Kurds are, where they are located and how many of them
there are. The primary topics covered are Kurdish revolts,
leaders, Kurdish political evolution, and the roles which local





COITION OF l MOV •• IS OBSOLETE
S/N 102-0 14- A«0 I unclassified
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS FAOt (trmmn Dmtm Snt—cl)

f+cumr* ct,*Mi>'C*Tiow qw Twit m*Qifw*mm n»«« ««•»•«
development. The primary countries discussed, as actors, are:
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. Kurdish links to other groups, such as the Armenians,
and the Palestine Liberation Organization are also described.
Finally an assessment as to the effects of external actors on






Approved for public release; distribution unlimited,
The Kurdish Nationalist Movement
and External Influences
by
Donald Bruce Disney, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., United States Naval Academy, 1971
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of






The Kurdish National Movement and External Influences is a
historic examination of the Kurds, the Kurdish national movement,
and the effects of external actors on the movement. It discusses
who the Kurds are, where they are located and how many of them
there are. The primary topics covered are Kurdish revolts,
leaders, Kurdish political evolution, and the roles which local
and non-Middle-Eastern countries have played in Kurdish national
development. The primary countries discussed, as actors, are:
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Israel, the United States, and the Soviet
Union. Kurdish links to other groups, such as the Armenians,
and the Palestine Liberation Organization are also described.
Finally an assessment as to the effects of external actors on





I. THE KURDS TO 1918 12
A. EARLY HISTORY 12
B. THE KURDS AND ISLAMIC EMPIRES TO 1880 13
C. THE RISE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM 17
D. CONCLUSIONS 24
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION I 25
II. KURDISH REVOLTS: 1918-1944 28
A. TRIBAL-FEUDAL REVOLTS 29
1. Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinjah 29
2. Dilo Kurds in Iraq - 1920 30
3. Seyyid Abdullah, July 1925 • 31
4. Nisibin, Turkey - 1928 31
B. RELIGIO-POLITICAL REVOLTS 33
1. Sheikh Said of Palu (Genj) 33
2. Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan 36
C. TRIBAL-NATIONALIST REVOLTS 37
1. Simko in Persia 37
2. Sheikh Mahmud Revisited -- 38
3. Jelali and Haideranlu in Turkey 1927"' 40
4. Bazan of Zibar 41
D. NATIONALIST REVOLTS 42
1. Ishan Nuri in Turkey - 1930 42
2. Sayyid Riza in Turkey, 1937 44
5

3. Revolts in Iraq 1941-1943 45
4. Revolt in Iran 1941-1942 46
E. CONCLUSIONS 47
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION II : 49
III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1918-1944 57
A. POLITICAL MANEUVERS PRECEDING THE TREATY
OF SEVRES 57
B. THE TREATY OF SEVRES TO THE TREATY OF
LAUSANNE 60
C. POST-LAUSANNE EUROPEAN ACTIONS TO 1944 66
1. The Mosul Question 67
2. The Tripartite Treaty: Iraq, Turkey, and
United Kingdom - 5 June 1926 69
3. World War II Efforts 70
D. REGIONAL ACTORS: EFFORTS AT CONTROL 73
E. KURDISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 77
1. The Khoybun 77
2. The Pan-Iranian League 79
3. The Hewa Party 79
4. The Shursh Group 80
5. The Komala 81
F. CONCLUSIONS 82
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION III 84
IV. THE KURDS FROM 1945-1958 92
A. THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC 92
1. Political Prelude 92
2. Mullah Mustafa's 1945 Revolt 96
3. Formation of the Republic 97
6

4. Demise of the Mahabad Republic 99
5. Assessment and Regional Shocks 103
B. COLD WAR PROPAGANDA EFFORTS 105
C. KURDISH POST-MAHABAD POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 107
1. Formation of the UDPK 107
2. Iranian and Turkish Kurds 108
3. Regional Power Actions 109
D. CONCLUSIONS 111
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION IV 114
V. THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1958-1980 121
A. THE GATHERING STORM: 14 July 1958 -
September 1961 122
1. Initial Cooperation 122
2. The Barzanis Return to the North 125
3. The Road to Revolt 127
B. THE KURDISH REVOLT September 1961 -
April 1975 129
1. The First Phase - September 1961 -
29 June 1966 129
2. The Ceasefire 142
3. The Second Phase March 1969-March 1974 144
4. The Third Phase March 1974-April 1975 150
C. DEVELOPMENTS FROM APRIL 1975-1980 153
1. Kurdish Political Developments 153
2. Iraqi Ba'th Policies 156
D. CONCLUSIONS 159
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION V 163

VI. CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS 181
A. CONCLUSIONS 181
1. Kurdish Nationalism 181
2. The Impact of External Influences 186
3. The Hypothesis 193
B. PROGNOSIS 194
FOOTNOTES FOR SECTION VI 199
APPENDIX A MAP OF KURDISTAN 205
APPENDIX B PERTINENT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS 206
APPENDIX C TABLE OF REVOLTS 223
APPENDIX D POLITICAL PARTY EVOLUTION 2 27
BIBLIOGRAPHY 23 2
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 238

INTRODUCTION
The Kurds, as a tribally organized nation, have existed
in the Middle East since ancient times. Centered predominantly
in the area of modern Iraq, Iran, and Turkey, with smaller
groups in Syria and the USSR, they have interacted with
the various migratory flows and imperial regimes throughout
the region's history.
With the rise of nationalism in the Ottoman Empire in
the late 19th century, the first Kurdish modern revolt occurred
under the leadership of Sheikh Ubeidullah. This was followed
by the development of early Kurdish political groups and
other expressions of nationalism in the early 20th century.
After World War I, Kurdish nationalist aspirations were
encouraged by the Treaty of Sevres but were to be deflated
by the actions of Turkey, Iraq, Great Britain and the Soviet
Union.
The 1920' s and 1930' s saw a multiplicity of Kurdish
revolts and the growth of an urbanized political intelligentsia
as the Kurds interacted with the new assertive nation-states
among which they were divided. At the end of World War II,
the Soviet-sponsored Mahabad Republic came into being.
It was ended after the Soviet withdrawal from, and Iranian
occupation of the area in 1946.

During the post-World War II period the Kurds were fairly
quiescent due to efforts of regional powers to control them.
They were subjected, however, to a propaganda campaign between
the United States and the Soviet Union through most of the
period. In 1961 Mulla Mustafa Barzani rose in revolt in
Iraq and was not fully defeated until 1975. The period
from 1975 to 1980 saw a splintering of Kurdish political
parties, suppression of Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, and a renewed
Kurdish revolt in Iran after the fall of the Shah.
Throughout most of Kurdish modern history, external influ-
ences ranged from overt aid to the Kurds in revolt, to use
of the Kurds against a neighboring country, to cooperative
regional efforts to control Kurdish movements. While the
Kurdish tribal element has remained strong and has provided
most of the insurgents in the field, an extensive political
organization has also developed to represent the movement.
It has consisted of parties within each country which maintained
links with each other and which also maintained links to
Kurdish political groups abroad. These overseas groups also
have established ties to extraregional actors to obtain
support for the Kurdish movement
.
The hypothesis examined in this thesis was: The importance
of Kurdish nationalism and its vitality are dependent upon
the greater conflict of which it is a part; to wit: the
status of governments in, and disputes between the regional
actors as well as the power roles of external actors in the
10

Northern Tier and Persian Gulf region. The methodology employed
was a historic examination of Kurdish national revolts coupled
with a study of the systemic interactions between Kurdish
tribalism, Kurdish political parties, aspects of modernization,
and the roles of external actors . Primary external actors
considered were Turkey, Iran, Iraq, the United States, the
Soviet Union, and Israel.
11

I. THE KURDS TO 1913
A. EARLY HISTORY
As is the case of many of the peoples of the Middle East,
the origins of the Kurds are shrouded by the mists of history.
Their language has been analyzed and determined to be of the
New Iranian branch of the Indo-European family which indicated
strong links to the Iranian languages. Kurds have claimed that
the name translated as "lion" and they trace their origins to
the kingdoms of Guti or Gutium which existed in the third millen-
2ium B.C., under the Assyrians. Other sources have claimed that
they were descended from the Medes who were the military vanguard
3
of the Achaenemid dynasty , while in a Sumerian inscription of
2000 B.C., a country known as Kardaka or Qar-da was mentioned.
In 400-401 B.C. Xenophon mentioned the Kardukai, a mountain people
4
who attacked his forces during their march towards the sea.
After their submission to the Arab advance of Islam in the
seventh century A.D., this racially homogeneous group of tribes
received the name "Kurds" from Arab historians. While they
accepted Islam and were of Aryan stock, the Kurds continued to
fight with both Aryan and Semitic groups who encroached on their
territory. They were jealous of their autonomy and resisted
caliphal authority. This resistance culminated in the establish-




Much of this early history, however, is overshadowed by the
exploits of Salah-al-Din Ayyubi (Saladin) , a Kurd from the moun-
tains of. Ravad, who became a famous legendary hero to the Kurds.
In 1171 he attacked and destroyed the Egyptian Fatimid dynasty;
restoring it to the Abbasid caliphate, and in 1187 he defeated
the armies of the local crusaders of the kingdom of Jerusalem at
the battle of Hittin. The deeds of Saladin were important in
that they reinforced one of the basic tenents of Kurdish nation-
alism; that of a long-standing tradition of martial prowess.
Kurdistan, which today encompasses parts of eastern Turkey, north-
eastern Syria, northeastern Iraq, northwestern Iran, and a small
contiguous portion of the southeastern Soviet Union, was destined
to become a buffer region during the periods of the Ottoman and
Persian empires.
B. THE KURDS AND ISLAMIC EMPIRES TO 188
The various Turkic and Mongol migrations wwere deleterious
to the Kurds, but because of the unattractive nature of the area
in which they lived, they were not severaly troubled as long as
the tribal chieftans retained their own authority and could retain
direct control over their tribal areas. If these various groups
of outsiders were of the Sunni sect of Islam, and did not directly
interfere with tribal authority, they were normally tolerated.
Alliances were made between the Kurdish tribes and Mongols, Turks,
and Persians on several occasions. These alliances, in the eyes
of the Kurdish tribal leaders, were more for aggrandizement of
the tribe when opportunities were presented, than for any wide-
13

spread belief or support of the goals of the other partners.
Since they were located at the edges of the empires, far from
the seats of authority in Persia or Asia Minor, the Kurdish chiefs
were well able to take advantage of the lack of centralization
and the lack of communication, to reinforce their own authority.
The bulk of the Kurds, due to racial and cultural factors,
had considered themselves to be a part of the Persian nation.
However, with Safavid Shah Ismail's forced conversion of Persia
to the Shi ' ite sect of Islam in 1501, the loyalties of the major-
ity of the Kurds shifted to the seat of Sunni power in
gConstantinople; The Ottoman empire. During the ensuing wars
of territorial conquest and religion between the Ottoman Empire
and the Safavid dynasty of Persia, parts of Kurdistan changed
hands on numerous occasions. Major campaigns were fought from
1524-1576, and 1623-1642. 9
Several key factors emerged from these wars. First, the
frontier between Persia and the Ottoman empire was agreed upon
in the Treaty of Erzerum in 1639. This frontier was roughly as
it is today and represented the first formal division of
Kurdistan. Second, by their division between two empires, the
Kurds became troublesome minority groups to the central authori-
ties. Third, in Persia, another complicating minority factor
was added by the Sunni faith of the Kurds; not only were they
tribally different from the Persians, but their sect was opposed
to the official Shia sect in Persia. Fourth, many of the tribes
maintained cross-border loyalties (and hostilities) with other
14

Kurdish tribes which were of concern to the central governments.
Lastly, the constant wooing of the Kurds by the Ottomans and
Safavids during the wars, made the Kurds realize their political
importance and set a pattern for future Kurdish behavior.
When the Turkish or the Iranian governments tried to
impose upon them taxes or military service to which they
were unwilling to submit, or encroached on what they
considered to be their rights, they revolted. If their
revolt was successful, they tried to make the best
bargain from their momentary success; if not, they
crossed the unguarded border into a neighboring state
and took shelter with the Kurdish tribes living in that
country, remaining there until more auspicious times. -^
Subsequent to the Treaty of Erzerum, tribalism and feudalism
remained predominant in the organization of the Kurds. Also at
about this time the role of the Sufi or Dervish Sheikhs and
Sayyids as leaders became enlarged. The Sufi orders had
developed originally in the 12th century from a desire of indi-
12
viduals to personalize their faith and they gained many adher-
ents among the Kurds. With more support, Sufi Sheikhs gained in
importance and were able to organize their groups along tribal
lines. Of these groups, the Naqsh bendis, Qaderis and Barzanis
were probably the best known among Kurds, and added a more dis-
tinctive religious element to Kurdish primordialism (and later
nationalism) than had been provided by Islam. The effects of the
Sufi orders on the Kurds have been multivaried: a demonstration
of faith, a proof of the rightness of faith and an ability to
sustain no pain or suffering, a religious power passed from Sheikh
to Sheikh in defiance of orthodox Islam and a mechanism to main-
13
tain the identity of the Kurds as a distinct culture group.
15

During the eighteenth century, the Kurds were embroiled
again in several conflicts between Persia and the Ottomans, and
they also fought on both sides in Persia during the Afghan inva-
14
sion in the early 1700 's. During all of these conflicts a
sense of tribal loyalty and aspirations appeared to predominate
over other issues of loyalty to religion or empire. At the very
end of the eighteenth century and at the beginning of the nine-
teenth, a new factor entered into the existence of the Kurds.
This was the entrance of the Russian empire in the Middle East.
Both Persia (1804-1813) and the Ottoman empire (1805-1812)
fought protracted wars with the Russians in which operations were
sporadically conducted in Kurdistan. Sultan Mahmud II of the
Ottoman empire, partially as a result of his defeats at the hands
of the Russians, embarked on reform policies in the early nine-
teenth century. Portions of these reforms were aimed at increasing
control over outlying areas and in restricting the powers of
the tribal chiefs and were not appreciated by the Kurdish Derebeys.
In 1832, Kurdish tribes, led by Badr Khan, Sa'id Bey, Isma'il
Bey and Mohammed Pasha revolted and overran large parts of
eastern Turkey. Thanks to the efforts of Rashid Pasha and Osman
Pasha, who were loyal to the Sultan, and due to little cooperation
between the still tribally oriented Kurdish chiefs, these
rebellions were controlled and Kurdistan was returned to the
16
authority of the Sultan in 1836.
The influence of the Russians was again felt in the Russo-
Turkish war of 1853-55. This was the first attempt by the
16

Russians to appeal to the Kurds and gain their support. The Kurds
were promised a limited autonomy and a Kurdish regiment was organ-
17ized under Russian officers. Again in 1877, when the Turks and
Russians were at war, the sons of Badr Khan revolted and were only
defeated by the Ottomans after hostilities had been concluded with
the Russians.
The key point in these revolts was that there did not appear
to be any sense of overall Kurdish nationalism involved, the
Khans were more interested in autonomy for themselves in their own
districts than some form of a united, independent Kurdistan. As
was mentioned by Robert F. Zeidner:
The failure of the Kurdish tribes to establish any form
of coherent national union during this era of semi-
autonomy is indicative of disruptive tendencies inherent
in their tribal structure. Whereas a number of loose
confederations of tribes have waxed and waned throughout
Kurdish history, the loyalties of the individual nomad
never transcended the limits of the tribe.
"
It is felt, however, that further Russian overtures toward
the Kurds during the Russo-Turkish war of 1876-78 might have
heightened the idea of a Kurdish national autonomy and influ-
19
enced Sheikh Ubeidullah in his actions of 1880.
C. THE RISE OF KURDISH NATIONALISM
Boyd C. Shafer proposed a definition of nationalism in which
the following elements were necessary: a defined unit of terri-
tory; common culture characteristics such as language customs,
traditions, and manners; belief in a common history and a common
origin; pride in the achievements of the nation and sorrow in its
tragedies; disregard for other groups; love or esteem for fellow
17

nationals; devotion to the national entity; common dominant socio-
economic institutions; a common independent government or the
20desire for one; and a hope for a great and glorious future.
Prior to the 1880 's, the Kurds had demonstrated that they were
affected by at least the first five of these elements of nation-
alism. Developements in the last half of the nineteenth century
would tend to further reinforce these and would also foster in
some Kurds a growing awareness of and need for a devotion to the
national entity, a desire for a common independent government,
and a hope for the future. While it was true that most Kurds
still remained tribally oriented, and that much information of
their origins was obscured or arguable, they did believe in a
common origin. As Richard Cottam has argued, the important point
was that accuracy about historical matters was not as crucial as
21
their acceptance by the Kurds
.
From 1880 until 1918, several major events occurred which
gave impetus to a desire for Kurdish nationalism. These were,
the rebellion led by Sheikh Ubeidullah in 1880, the foundation of
a Kurdish newspaper in the 1890' s, the Young Turk movement and
the constitutional movement in Turkey in 1908, the founding of a
Kurdish political club in Constantinople in 1908, the Hamidye
Kurdish regiments of Sulton Abdul Hamid II, and the actions of
Kurdish forces in the Balkan Wars of 1912-13 and World War I.
Sheikh Ubeidullah, who in 1878 had written a letter to the
22
British insisting that the Kurdish nation was a people apart,
was a Kurdish leader in the Shamdinan region of Turkey. In 1880,
18

as a reprisal for alleged Persian cruelties against the tribes
there, he allied with Hamza Agha of the Mangur (Persian Kurdish)
tribe and led some 20,000 Kurdish tribal cavalry into the Lake
Reziah (formerly Lake Urmiah) region of Persia. This was the
first instance in modern times of Kurdish cross-border support
for members of the same nationality. There is strong evidence
that Ubeidullah was religiously motivated, in that he intended to
annex this portion of Kurdish Persia and form an autonomous
Kurdistan under nominal Ottoman (Sunni) suzerainty. In this
action, Ubeidullah was also given some aid by the Ottoman govern-
23
ment against Persia. Although Ubeidullah delayed in his final
attack and his tribally organized forces fell apart, this invasion did
appear, at least in his mind, to be a genuinely Kurdish nation-
alist action.
With a subsequent agreement by the regional actors, Persia
and the Ottomans, to resolve regional disputes in 1881, Ubeidullah
was forced to submit to the Sultan and was exiled to Mecca, where
24he died in 1883. It is interesting to note that this rebellion
also attracted the interest of the Russians who still considered
the Kurds as a potentially useful force against their Ottoman and
Persian neightbors. In 1889, a number of Kurdish chiefs including
Jafar Agha, Abdul Razzaq (of the Badr Khan family) , and Sayyid
Taha (grandson of Ubeidullah) , were invited to visit Russia by
25
Nicholas II, where they received gifts and encouragement.
Another outcome of the rebellion was that the Ottomans devel-
oped a new tribal and Kurdish policy. Numerous Kurds were
19

recruited into Sultan Abdul Hamid II s Hamidye regiments
. These
regiments were utilized both to oppress the Christian Armenian
and Assyrian minorities of the Ottoman empire and to police the
26Kurdish areas. While the Ottomans obviously used these forces
in an attempt to curb Kurdish aspirations and to reassert Ottoman
authority, their use in Kurdish areas set a precedent for future
Kurdish demands for their own police units and authorities within
Kurdistan.
During this period, the appeal of nationalism was making it-
self felt throughout the Ottoman Empire . While educated Ottoman
elites were forming the bases of their later Pan-Ottoman and Pan-
Turanist ideologies, the minorities of the empire were not idle.
In 1892, members of the Kurdish Badr Khan family began the publi-
cation of the newspaper Kurdistan which had a circulation as
27
widespread as Cairo and London. The publication of this paper
was in response to the tenent of nationalism in which preservation
of the language is believed to be a key factor. Some students of
nationalism have opined that of all the factors, language is the
28
most important. In addition, a precedent to Kurdistan already
existed in the patriotic poems of Hajji Qadir of Koi who had been
29
active approximately fifty years prior to its publication.
Other literary efforts which were undertaken to spread the use of
the Kurdish language were the publication of books on Kurdish
folk literature; the memorization of poems of the tenth century
Kurd, Eli Termuki; the spread of the folk tales of seventeenth
century Ahmed Khane; and the romantic-nostalgic history of the
Kurds by Cheref Oudini (Sharrafeddin) , known as the Cheref Nameh .
20

The movement of the Young Turks to gain power in the Ottoman
Empire also drew support from Kurdish nationalist leaders who
were hopeful of receiving more autonomy under a constitutional
regime. They had initially been encouraged in this by the ideas
of Ottoman Prince Sabah al-Din, who in 1899 had put forth an idea
which would have turned the empire into a nationalist federation
31in which all the minorities would achieve additional rights.
According to Sureya Badr Kahn, a primary Kurdish nationalist in
1980: "at a congress in Paris in 1907 the Armenians , Kurds,
Greeks, and Macedonians agreed to make common cause with the
Young Turks to overthrow the Hamidian tyranny .. .the 1908 uprising
32
was a result of this pact."
As a result of the initial hurriet (freedom) of the Young
Turk regime in 1908, many of the minorities of the empire were
able to form and participate in new political organizations.
Among these for the Kurds were the Kurdi Taawin Jamiyyati
(Kurdish cooperation society) , and the student group Hewa (hope)
in Constantinople. These were the first Kurdish political clubs
and were founded by Amin Ali Badr Khan and General Sharif Pasha
of Suleimaniyah. 33 The role of both the officers and the students
were important in these clubs as they furnished the base of an
educated Kurdish elite for the Kurdish nationalist movement. Dur-
ing this constitutional period Kurdish representatives also gained
political experience in the Ottoman parliament which further
widened the base of the Kurdish nationalist elite.
Despite the existence of a cosmopolitan Kurdish elite, in
fact, probably the majority of Kurds did not support these
21

nationalist aspirations. Many Kurdish sheiks and tribal leaders
saw a threat to their own local authority by a rising nationalist
group and also viewed the Young Turks and their adherents as god-
34less and revolutionary. The Young Turks as well, once having
achieved power, were not eager to preside over the dissolution of
the Ottoman Empire. While their espoused policies of Pan-
Ottomanism, and later, Turkification , were to alienate minorities
in the future, they still maintained sufficient authority over
the Kurds to use them against the Persians in 1913, and to
fight the Christians in the Balkan Wars. Even during the Balkan
Wars, however, there was evidence of unrest among Kurdish units
due to lack of pay and also due to Young Turk mistreatment of
36
Kurdish leaders in 1909.
On the eve of World War I then, Kurdish nationalism was
nascent but the bulk of the Kurds still owed their primary
loyalty to the Sultan-Caliph of the Ottoman Empire. Despite pre-
vious Russian efforts to win Kurdish support, efforts which were
continued during the early stages of World War I, the fact that
Russia was a major Christian power, an enemy of the Sultan, and
a supporter of the Christian Assyrians and Armenians, meant
that the Kurds by and large remained loyal to the Sulton through-
out the war and answered the 1914 call to Jihad . The Kurds had
long been antagonistic to the Assyrians and Armenians and had been
used previously by the Ottomans to suppress those minorities.
In fact, from 1894-1896 Kurds had massacred between ten and
37
twenty-five percent of the Armenians of the Ottoman Empire.
The Armenians themselves were ready for revenge and between 1915
22

and 1918, with Russian support, killed approximately 600,000
Kurds in the Eastern Vilayets of Turkey.
The war itself, in addition to depopulating vast areas of
eastern Turkey, saw the use of 30 Kurdish irregular cavalry units
39
on the Turkish Eastern Front, and the beginning of a fierce
hatred of the Kurds for the Russians. Although Persia did not
declare war, Russians in north Persia supported Christian ele-
ments there as well and fostered a resultant cross-border coopera-
tion between Ottoman and Persian Kurds. One result of this co-
operation was the murder of Assyrian Patriarch Mar Shimun, the
leader of some 5000 Russian supported Assyrian riflemen, by the
40Persian Kurdish leader Ismail Agha (Simko) in late 1917.
Assyrian counter-actions, aimed at revenge for this action, were
defeated by the Kurds who were aided by the Turkish Army.
The outcome of World War I saw the Kurds well-armed (from
retreating Russian forces eager to join the revolution) , trained
militarily, and encouraged by United States' President Wilson's
point 12 of January 1918. This point stipulated that the non-
Turkish nationalities of the Ottoman Empire should be "assured
41
of an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development."
Also, in the last stages of the war, exiled Kurdish nationalist
leaders in Cairo, Beirut, and Paris were bargaining for Allied
support of their claims and founded the Kurdistan League for the
advancement of Kurdish independence. One of the League's
leaders, Sheikh Sharif Pasha obtained a hearing at the Paris Peace
42




Although much of Kurdish early history was dominated by
factional disputes, rivalry between empires, and much conflict,
the Kurds through 1918 survived as a distinct, although tribally
oriented people, with a common language, heritage, religion, and
territory. Although they were formally divided in 1639, several
instances of cross-border actions have been demonstrated which
indicate some sense of loyalty to the greater whole. With the
rise of nationalism in the latter half of the nineteenth century,
the Kurds were influenced by modern education and political aware-
ness as evidenced by their participation in the various political
clubs of the Young Turk period.
Although they remained loyal primarily to the Sultan-
Caliph during World War I, this loyalty can be viewed essentially
as of a religious, anti-Christian nature and not to the idea of
Pan-Ottomanism. The tradition of tribal independence from a far
removed central authority, and the existence of a vocal nationalist
elite at the end of World War I allowed the Kurdish nation, such
as it was, to have some impact on the peace process and to bargain
for promises of the autonomy which it had sought.
At this early stage several other patterns were established:
efforts at assimilation and control by the Ottoman and Persians,
cross-border united actions between Persian and Ottoman Kurds,
efforts by the regional powers (Persia and the Ottoman Empire) to
contain the Kurds, and the actions of at least one external actor,





Jere L. Bacharach, A Near East Studies Handbook (2nd ed.,
Seattle, Wash.: University of Washington Press, 1976), p. 136.
2 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive For Self-Determina-
tion," The Middle East Journal , 21 No. 3 (Spring, 1966), 280.
3Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran
,
(Pittsburgh, Pa.:
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), p. 66.
4Hassan Arfa, The Kurds
,
(New York: Oxford University Press,
1966)
, p. 3.
5 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determina-
tion," 280.
6Phillip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs , (10th ed., New
York: St. Martin's Press, 1970), p. 645.
7Sidney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History (3rd ed. New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), p. 126.
«
Q
Hassan Arfa, The Kurds
, p. 14.
9 ibid
. , p. 16
.
ibid.
William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1963), p. 4.
12
Andre Singer, "The Dervishes of Kurdistan," Asian Affairs ,
61 No. 2 (June, 1974), 179. This article covers in depth the
workings of the Qaderi order and its effect on village life in
Iran.
13 ibid. , 182.







. , p. 23.
17.. •
-,ibid .
18Robert F. Zeidner, "Kurdish Nationalism and the New Iraq
Government," Middle Eastern Affairs , x No. 1 (Jan., 19 59), 25.
19Hassan Arfa, The Kurds
, p. 24.
20Urban G. Whitaker, Jr., ed., Nationalism and International
Progress
,
(San Francisco, Co.: Chandler Publishing Co., 1960),
p. 5
.
21Richard W. Cottam, Nationalism in Iran
, p. 65.
22William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946
,
p. 6.
23Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt : 1961-1970, (Hamden,
Conn.: The Shoestring Press, Inc. , 1973)
, p. 16.
24William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946
, p. 7.
ibid .
26Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970
, p. 17.
27
C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," The Middle East Journal ,
II No. 1 (Winter, 1957), 55.
28Hugh Seton-Watson, Nationalism and Communism , (New York:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1964), p. 7.
29
C. J. Edmonds, The Kurds of Iraq," p. 56.
Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determina-
tion," 281.
31Sidney N. Fisher, The Middle East: A History , p. 344.
32 Israel T. Naamani, "The Kurdish Drive for Self-Determina-
tion," 282.
C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," 56.
26





In U.S. State Department dispatch 361 of December 11, 1912,
a report from Aleppo mentioned a threat to the city by 15,000
Kurdish cavalry who were intent on sacking the city as revenge
for the assasination of a Kurdish chief by the Committee for
Union and Progress in 1909. The American Embassy in Constantinople
reported by telegram of January 10, 1913 that 15,000 Kurds had
returned from the front and were threatening the government over
pay (they had received no booty). Lawrence Evans, United States




Johns Hopkins Press, 1965), p. 25.
37Guilford A. Dudley, A History of Eastern Civilizations
,
(New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1973), p. 419.
38Hassan Arfa, The Kurds
, p. 26.
39The Calvary divisions were organized from several tribes:
1st Division (Hinis) Zerikanli, Jeberanli, Zeriki, Hayranli,
Yusufyanli, Jemedanli, Kaskalli, Shadilli.; 2nd Division
(Eleskirt) Jemadanli, Zeylanli, Sepiki, Adamanli , Pashmanli,
Karapapakli, Sarachli, Jelali.; 3rd Division (Erchis) Hasananli,
Nisif, Haidaranlu, Marharanli, Kalkanli.; 4th Division (Viransehir)
Milli, Hizir, Deruki, Tai
•
, Kiki, Karakechi; Van Reserve Cavalry
Brigade (Van) Makuri, Takuri, Shefketi, Sherkan, Shemsheki,
Maylan, Shiyoli, Liyoli. Hasan Arfa, The Kurds , pps . 26-27.
40William Eagleton, Jr., The Kurdish Republic of 1946 , p. 10.
41
C. J. Edmonds, "The Kurds of Iraq," 56.





II. KURDISH REVOLTS: 1918-1944
Kurdistan from 1918 to the mid-1940 f s was racked by a series
of almost continuous revolts. The longest period of peace during
this span of about two decades was from 1937 to 1941. These re-
volts, however, were not all led by the same leader, nor did they
occur in the same provinces. Explanations advanced as to causa-
tion for the revolts ranged from purely tribal, through religio-
tribal, to nationalist. Robert F. Zeidner characterized the re-
volts of the era as the start of Kurdish nationalist aspirations.
Other analysts, such as Cottam, Wenner, and C. J. Edmonds have
characterized the revolts of 1919 and 1918-1922 as purely tribal
in character. Subsequent analyses of the revolts of 1925, 1930,
1937, 1941, and 1943 as well as intermittent flare ups , have also
been attributed to causes along the spectrum of tribal to
nationalist.
For purposes of analysis in this chapter, the following typo-
logy has been devised: tribal-feudal, religio-political , tribal
with nationalist overtones, and nationalist revolts. In regarding
nationalism versus tribalism, the definition formulted by Iliya
Harik was instructive as well:
Nationalist idealogy as we have witnessed it in the Middle
East, is in effect a rationalization of the primordial
sentiments of a people. The exaltation of the ethnic
principle by bequeathing on it the name of nationalism does
not blur that fact that it stems primarily from a pri-
mordialsentiment and that no nationalism in effect is any




Within this chapter the terms Iran and Persia are considered to
represent the same nation; Iran becoming the official name in
1935. Mesopotamia refers to the southern portion of modern Iraq
and Mosul refers to the northern provinces of Iraq.
A. TRIBAL-FEUDAL REVOLTS
Revolts within this category were considered to have had
as their primary causation the retention of tribal lands and the
maintenance of ascendancy of a particular tribe or leader.
Characteristic of these were that the leaders had been concerned
with consolidation of tribal lands or revenge. Revolts included
in this category were Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah f s revolt in 1919
in Iraq, the Dilo 1920 revolt in Iraq, the July 1925 revolt of
Seyyid Abdullah in Turkey, and the 1928 revolt of Sheikh Hadjo
in Turkey.
1. Sheikh Mahmud of Barzinjah
As early as May, 1918 the British, who had occupied the
liwas of Kirkuk and Suleimaniyah, had contacted Sheikh Mahmud
Barzinjah of the Baban confederation of tribes. Sheikh Mahmud was
descended from a family which had provided the leadership of the
Qaderi dervish community of Suleimaniyah. British aims were to
establish, under their close control, an autonomous Kurdish state
which would buffer both Mesopotamia and India from Turkey and the
Soviet Union. With this in mind, Major E. W. C. Noel was sent in
7to control the Sheikh or Hurkumdar . Sheikh Mahmud was advised
that "... any Kurdish groups or tribes in the three liwas of
Suleimani, Kirkuk and Arbil which might wish to accept his leader-
8
ship would be allowed to do so." The Ottoman reconquest of the
29

area put an end to this "kingdom" but the British reestablished
it after the hostilities were concluded under the Armistice
of Mudros on 30 October 1918.
Although the Sheikh initially cooperated with the British,
subsequent British actions (establishment of police posts) were
viewed by him as unwarranted interference in his tribal area.
Additionally, despite parliamentary assurances to the contrary,
he viewed British overtures to the Arabs as indications of future
interference in his area. Because of this, to reassert his
authority Sheikh Mahmud led a brief revolt in 1919 against the
British. This revolt failed due to preponderant British strength
and tribal frictions and the Sheikh was deposed and exiled to
India.
2. Dilo Kurds in Iraq - 1920
The revolt of the Dilo Kurds in Iraq in 19 20 also
deserves brief mention. It occurred during a general insurrection
against the British of both Arab and Kurd, Shiite and Sunni in
June - November 1920. The general rising has been characterized
by Amal Vinogradov as "... a primitive, but genuine, national
response to fundamental dislocation in the political and socio-
economic adaptation of the tribally organized rural Iraqis.
These dislocations were brought about through the direct and in-
12direct encroachment of the West." Within this general insurrec-
tion, the Dilo Kurds of Arbil in August, 1920 took advantage of
a weakened central authority to consolidate their mastery of, and
tribal independence in, the area. The British were successful
in quelling this brief revolt of the Dilo • s and were also able to
30

suppress the general rising. A key element in the success of the
British against the Kurds of Iraq was the action of the consul
at Kermanshah in Persia. He was able to induce (by payment)
,
Persian Kurdish Sinjabi tribes to cross the border and attack and
13weaken the Dilo Kurds. This also illustrated the rifts in an
overall Kurdish nationalism which had been claimed by Sharif Pasha
at Versailles.
3. Seyyid Abdullah, July 1925
The third tribal-feudal revolt of the period occurred in
July 1925 in Turkey and was primarily motivated by revenge for
Turkish actions during the earlier revolt of Sheikh Said, as well
as a desire to regain tribal lands. This revolt was led by
Seyyid Abdullah of the Turkish Qader tribes and lasted for approx-
imately one month before it was suppressed by elements of the
14Turkish Third Army. Seyyid Abdullah's father, Seyyid Abdul
Kader had been a Senator in the Ottoman government and was
implicated in Sheikh Said's revolt against the Kemalists. After
his capture in June 1925, he was hanged and the Turks attempted
to crush tribal authority in the eastern vilayets of Turkey. In
reaction to this, Seyyid Abdullah led a series of raids,
assisted by local clans, on government installations in the
Shamdinan region. The Turkish reaction was fairly swift and
Seyyid Abdullah was chased across the Turkish border to Iraq with
his followers on July 22, 1925.
4. Nisibin, Turkey - 1928
The brief revolt of December 1928 occurred in the vicin-
ity of Nisibin, Turkey (on the Turko-Syrian border) and was
31

probably led by Sheikh Hadjo (Hatcho) of the Badr Khan family. The
actual leader is unknown, but Hadjo was to also play a role in a
subsequent revolt in Turkey, again staged from Syria. 16 As
reported, the motivation of the "malcontent Kurds" in this revolt
were "... to maintain their primitive tribal life unimpaired by
Turkish modernism, but the incentive to smuggle and revenge them-
selves for the late war (1927) in which they were forced to
17
acknowledge Angora's authority has inevitably arisen." Thus
the motives for this revolt appeared to be feudal (retention of
lands vacated and of a way of life) and for revenge. Tribal
loyalties can be pointed to due to the support of local clans for
the raiders. Turkish suppression of this incident was also compli-
cated by the fact that:
The boundary in the neighborhood of Nisibin remains undefined
although both parties (Syria and Turkey) resorted to the
arbitration of a neutral, the Danish General Ernst. Turkey
has refused to accept the award, and this northeast sector of
Syria has become, in Turkish eyes, a source for smuggling and
brigandage. 18
Of the four revolts in this category, the revolt of Sheikh
Mahmud in 1919, and that of the Dilo Kurds of 1920, appeared to
be primarily motivated by tribal-feudal rationales. The revolts
of July 1925 and of 1928, while having tribal and revenge
rationales appeared to be offshoots or remnants of major Kurdish





Revolts in this category were characterized by religious
rationales: either the restoration of the Caliphate or major
support for a Kurdish leader on religious grounds. Coupled with
this rationale were some limited political motives such as
opposition to Arab nationalism, or the influence of Ottoman
nationalist forces. In the revolts to be discussed, claims for
an independent Kurdistan were put forth but were muted by the
religio-political inputs.
1. Sheikh Said of Palu (Genj )
Sheikh Said of Palu was the son of Sheikh Ali Effendi of
the Naqshbendi dervish order and consequently the leader of that
order in eastern Turkey. He was also related by marriage to
19
Sheikh Abdullah of Genj and Halid Bey of the Chiran Kurds. The
20
revolt which he led started on 13 February 1925 and lasted
21
until 28 April 1925. It was rather widespread in its impact
and before the Turkish army suppressed it, spread to the provinces
and towns of Arghana, Diarbekr, Mamuret-al-Aziz , Genj, Dersim,




The causes of the revolt were several, chief among them
being a strong opposition to the lay Republic and separation of
church and state which the Kemalist government was undertaking at
that time. 23 Another cause for Kurdish unrest in eastern Turkey
was the enactment of a law in 1924 which had prohibited the
teaching or use of the Kurdish language. Other political factors
33

of the revolt were related to a general dissatisfaction with cen-
25 2fitral government policies, poor economic conditions, and dis-
content of tribal leaders over central government expansion of
27
authority. At the outbreak of the revolt the Kurds issued pro-
paganda manifestos which argued for an independent Kurdistan in
which the Caliphate, under Prince Selim (Abdul Hamid II' s son),
28
would be reestablished.
Although the Turkish government initially tried to portray
29the revolt as a local one fomented by religious reactionaries,
they later reevaluated their position. On 4 March 1925, Fethi
Bey, the Turkish Prime Minister allowed that the only objective of
the revolt was "Kurdism". This was reinforced by the capture
on 10 March of manifestos and documents of the "Kurdish War
31Office." By 28 March, the Turkish government was admitting
that the revolt was much more widespread and with more general
32
objectives than was first thought. Further evidence in support
of this conclusion was that Sheikh Said's forces were estimated
33to number over 7000 rebels and it ultimately cost the Turkish
34 35government -6 2 million and 36,000 troops to contain and
quell the revolt.
The Turks at various other times blamed ex-Ottoman officers
and Nestorians, the British, and the Kurds in Syria for
instigating the revolt. There is some evidence to support the
first and second of these claims. The aim of the restoration
of the caliphate would have been sought by both the religious
Sheikh Said and ex-Ottoman officers. Sidney N. Fisher also
argues that since the revolt took place at the same time as the
34

League of Nations delegations visit to Mosul, the British would
have been heavily interested in stirring up Kurdish nationalism
against the Turks so as to gain the award of the vilayet to the
39British Mandate.
Other leaders who supported Sheikh Said were the Kurd
Mustapha Pasha, Sheikh Ali, Sheikh Ghaleb, Sheihk Hazem Ismail,
40
Rashid Bey Liganlu, and Rashid Agha of Kargabazar. These
leaders and Sheikh Abdullah of Genj were captured with Sheikh Said
in April 1925 after a major Turkish offensive and the revolt was
ended. Known tribes which joined the revolt were the Diarbekr
41 42 43tribes, the Guiran tribe, the Goyan, and the Midiat tribes.
Of these, the latter two escaped across the border, the Goyans to
44
Iraq and the Midiats to French Syria.
Other tactics which the Turks used to suppress the revolt
45
were the use of aircraft bombings, the establishment of martial
46law and "Tribunals of Independence", and cooperation with the
French in Syria to use the Baghdad Railway to transfer an esti-
mated 25,000 troops to the East. Post-revolt tactics included
the hanging of Sheikh Said and nine of his followers on 3 June
1925 and the deportation of many insurgents to Cilicia as well
48
as a general pillaging of the area. One offshoot of this
rebellion, the 1925 revolt of Seyyid Abdullah, has been discussed.
Although the Turks claimed that they controlled the area after
April 192 5, Abdul Rahman, Sheikh Said's brother, was not captured
49
until 17 January 1927 after sporadic raiding.
In retrospect, the initial causes of this revolt did appear
to be religio-political. In another sense, however, it can be
35

viewed as a revolt in transition. After this revolt religious
sentiments subsided in Turkey and Kurdish nationalism, fortified
by Turkish repression, began to be mobilized. According to
O'Ballance, 206 villages were destroyed, 8,758 houses were burnt,
and 15,200 people were killed during the course of the revolt
51
and during subsequent repressive actions.
2 . Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan
The other two religio-political revolts occurred in 1927
and 1932 in Northern Iraq and were led by Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan.
The Sheikhs of Barzan were leaders of the Naqshbendi dervish order
52in the Barzan district of northern Mesopotamia. Sheikh Ahmed
succeeded his brother as the leader of the order in 1914. In 1927
Sheikh Ahmed proclaimed himself as an incarnation of the deity
and began to impose his rule and doctrines over the villages in
the Shirwan district. This imposition was fought by several of the
other local tribes and finally was ended by British-officered
53
Iraqi levies (composed of Assyrians)
.
The next uprising in April-July 1932 of Sheikh Ahmed
covered the Iraqi districts of Shirwan, Barosh, and Mazuri Bala
and again had strong religious overtones. These were coupled
with political reasons. After Sheikh Mahmud's 1931 revolt (to
be discussed below) , the British and Iraqis attempted to establish
much more firm control over the northern provinces. Prior to
this, even after Sheikh Ahmed's previous actions, all that had
55
been established in the region were a few police posts. With
this encroachment on his territory by a central government which
was also of a different (Orthodox Sunni) religious sect, Sheikh
36

Ahmed revolted. British and Iraqi efforts at suppression included
mobile columns and airstrikes and were ultimately successful.
The Sheikh was at large, however, until 1933 when he surrendered
to the Turks. He was subsequently amnestied and placed in a form
of "exile" in Suleimaniyah where the Iraqi government could
56
observe him. Another interesting factor in this revolt was the
first appearance of Sheikh Ahmed's brother, Mullah Mustafa Barzani
57
as a very successful leader of men.
C. TRIBAL-NATIONALIST REVOLTS
Revolts of this type were characterized by claims of Kurdish
nationalism and proclamations of independence. The tribal ele-
ment still strongly persisted, as a growing Kurdish intelligentsia
had not yet joined with tribal leaders, and in some cases tribal
frictions during the revolts contributed to their failures. Re-
volts which will be considered under this category are the 1918-
1922 revolt of Agha Ismail (Simko) in Iran, the 1922-1924 and
1931 revolts of Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah in Iraq, the Jelali and
Haideranlu 1927 revolt in Turkey, and the 1935 revolt of Bazan of
Zibar in Iraq.
1. Simko in Persia
In Persia, after the Armistace of Mudros, the Kurdish
58
leader Simko of the Shakkak tribe was left with strong forces
59
which were virtually unopposed. Although Persian governors
tried to control his activities (including an assasination
attempt) , in the Summer of 1919 he proclaimed an open rebellion
in Urmiah and within a few days was in control of the Lakistan
37

60district. Shortly thereafter, he was attacked by elements of
the Russian officered Persian cossacks and negotiated a truce.
In 1920, probably influenced by the Treaty of Sevres provision on
6 lKurdish independence and his communications with Sharif Pasha,
Simko again rose and openly talked of independence. This time he
had the support also of the powerful Herki tribe and was further
reinforced in 1921 by the tribes of the Mahabad region (Mamash,
Mangur, Dehbokri, Piran, Zarza, Gowrik, Feyzollahbegi, Pishtdari,
62Baneh, and Qaderkhani)
. The rising lasted until 23 July 1922,
by which time Simko had rallied over 10,000 Kurds (including some
3000 Turkish Kurds) to his banner. They were finally defeated in
a major battle by the reconstituted Persian forces under General
6 "3
Reza Khan, and Simko fled to Turkey.
This revolt had the first post-war calls for Kurdish
independence but as has been argued, Simko would probably have
64been satisfied with a "national" state under his tribal authority.
Also of interest is that a grandson of the 19th century Sheikh
Ubeidullah assisted Simko in his campaigns. Essentially,
although Simko had heard of the Kurdish national idea, his
nationalism was strongly tinged by tribal motives and further took
advantage of the failing Qajar dynasty's lack of power in the
region.
2. Sheikh Mahmud Revisited
Although the British had exiled Sheikh Mahmud to India
after his failure to cooperate with them in 1919, events in Mosul
in the early 1920' s caused them to reconsider. The disposal of
the Mosul Vilayet was to be hotly contested by Arab, Turk, Kurd,
38

and Englishman and was not finally settled until the mid-1920* s.
In the meantime, however, the area was subjected to propaganda
from all sides and occassional armed forays from Turkey. After
one of these forays in 1922, the British reinstated Sheikh Mahmud
66
in Suleimaniya as King of Kurdistan. Their aim was to consoli-
date the Kurdish population in the area under him and oppose
Turkish influence. Unfortunately for the British, the Kurds had
stated in a plebiscite conducted in 1919 that they cared even
67less for the Arabs than the Turks. After Sheikh Mahmud was in
the area, he joined the anti-British forces and attempted a
separatist movement with the support of the Baban confederation
68
of tribes. This was a tribal revolt with strong nationalist
overtones and pitted Kurdish nationalist feelings against Arab
nationalism. The revolt was primarily against the control of the
69
British supported Arab overloads in the area. Tribal frictions
and British military strength led to the failure of the revolt and
in July 1924, Sheikh Mahmud and some of his followers fled to the
refuge of the Iranian Kurds of the Marivan district (led by
Mahmud Khan Kanisanani)
.
Sheikh Mahmud led sporadic raids back into Iraq (most
notably in 1927) after the 1924 revolt, but he was not again
successful in fomenting a general rising until 1931. The primary
causation of the 1931 revolt was the Iraqi/British effort to
consolidate control of the Mosul area and finalize the Iraqi-
71
Turkish frontier before the expiration of the Mandate in 1932.
This action again activated Kurdish fears of submergence in an
Arab sea and again the Baban confederation rose in support of
39

Sheikh Mahmud. Although the Kurds were able to hold out for
several months in their mountain strongholds, British aircraft
72
and a new system of loudspeaker propaganda helped to weaken
their resistance. Sheikh Mahmud was captured and exiled to
Suleimaniyah and then Nasiriyah where he died in 1956.
These latter revolts had nationalist motivations but were
also beset with tribal frictions and a new factor, the inability
to cooperate with a growing Kurdish urban nationalist intelli-
73
gentsia. Considering that Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan was also in
revolt at approximately the same time, it is interesting to note
that the two leaders did not join forces. This pointed further
to the continued division between tribes in the area as well as
probable lack of cooperation due to locational and sectarian
differences (Ahmed-Bar zan and Naqshbendi, Mahmud, Suleimaniyah and
Qaderi)
.
3. Jelali and Haideranlu in Turkey 1927
Sporadic Kurdish raids had occurred in Turkey during 1926
accompanied by deportations and repression by central government
forces. The first reported instance of trouble in 1927 occurred
in August when a Sheikh Pasho led a raid on Telit, Turkey from a
sanctuary in Persia. This raid was met by Turkish notes of pro-
test to the Persian government and claims in the Turkish newspaper
Jumhuriet that: "Our apprehensions that the hostile attitude of
Persia towards us is due to British influence (and) are thus
confirmed." While this raid was countered, trouble again broke
out in October 1927 by more raids into Turkey led by "Persian
Officers and brigands." 76 Tribes involved in these raids were the
40

Jelali and Haideranlu, and were supported by the Turkish Kurds
of the Kotch-Ushagh clan in Dersim and the Sassun and Bohtan
77tribes of Bitlis. Although the Turks tried to downplay these
raids as acts of brigands, they were later classed as a small
war led by "Monarchists" and "reactionary conspirators" and re-
78quired the use of some 4000 Turkish troops to suppress. The
Persian government, in response to Turkey's protests, claimed that
it was unable to control the tribes on the borders. Another possi-
ble motive for Persian interest in these incidents was a hope for
79
revision of the Turko-Persian frontier line of 1918.
While a tribal rationale was probably the foremost reason for
these raids, due to loss of land and Turkish repressive measures,
it was reported also that during this period, a group of Kurds
near Mt. Ararat had reformed the Khoybun (Kurdish Independent
Government) and had proclaimed independence. With this in mind,
81
the rebellion, which lasted to approximately 6 December 1927,
can be viewed as a prelude to the later 1930 revolt of Ishan Nuri.
4. Bazan of Zibar - 1935
The final revolt in this category occurred in Iraq from
82
August 1935 to March 1936 and was led by Khalil Khoshowi.
This revolt also had as its motive some overtones of Kurdish
nationalism but was primarily against central government control
8 3
over tribal areas. It is significant primarily in that Turkey
was now willing to cooperate with an independent Iraq in closing
84
its frontier and in suppression of the revolt. With this in
mind, this revolt was probably a final catalyst in convincing the
regional powers that interregional control of the Kurds was
41

necessary. Discussions between the powers later led to the sign-
ing of the Saadabad Pact in 1937.
D. NATIONALIST REVOLTS
Revolts classed in this category were considered to have had
as their primary aim the establishment of an independent Kurdish
area. They were also characterized by links with external Kurdish
nationalist organizations and intelligentsia and in almost all
cases received external support and were able to rally Kurds over
wide areas. The revolts which were grouped in this category were
Ishan Nuri's revolt in 1930 in Turkey, Sayyid Riza's 1937 Revolt,
revolts in Iraq from 1941-1943, and the revolt in Iran from 1941-42
1. Ishan Nuri in Turkey - 1930
This revolt, which actually started as raids of Haideranlu
85
and Jelali tribes into Turkey on 10 June 1930, escalated to wide-
spread actions. Although it was centered in the Mt. Ararat region,
it eventually included actions by Kurdish groups located in Turkey,
Persia, Syria, and Iraq and shewed the influence of both external
powers and Kurdish political groups. Primary causes of the revolt
g r
were continued dissatisfaction with Turkish repression, and the
arrest and trial of the 20 year old son of Sheikh Said of Palu,
87the Sheikh Selaheddine, on 23 May 1930. Other sources maintain
that it was a continuation of the Khoybun '
s
action which stemmed
88from the 1927 revolt in Turkey.
Tribes involved in the revolt included the Haideranlu,
89 9Jelali, Belikali, Moulari (Persian) , and the Herkis from
91
Iraq. During the revolt, the Kurds were able to muster 15,000-




of 60,000 regulars and reserves began in July and August 1930,
94 95Kurds from Iraq and Syria attacked across the border into
Turkey in an attempt to draw off Turkish troops.
Primary leaders initially were one Hussein Yusuf Aptal
of the Persian Jelalis, Sheikh Hadjo of Syria, and Ishan Nuri.
Ishan Nuri later emerged as the key leader. An ex-Ottoman
officer, he was able to provide military training to the Kurds
and links with other ex-Ottoman officers who served in the revolt.
By this time the Kurdish political groups had evolved under the
oversight of the Khoybun and at least two groups were active in the
revolt: a Pan-Iranian Kurdish Party which viewed Arabs and Turks
98
as aliens, and the Kurdish Union of Friends of Liberty, which
99had been led by Sheikh Selaheddine. Aims of the revolt were
various but were put forth in one declaration as the creation of a
Kurdish nationalist state in Bayezid, Van, and Mush provinces of
Turkey. 100
The coordinated attacks from Persia, Iraq and Syria
definitely pointed to an externally coordinated Kurdish group
which sent a manifesto to Kurds in all areas plus to the League of
Nations. The manifesto read, in part:
Brother Kurds, you must be worthy to become a great nation.
How can you allow the noble Kurdish nation to live as slaves
under the bondage of the Turks, while all other nations have
won their independence? A large free territory between Iran
and Iraq had been promised to us [by the Treaty of Sevres]
.
Unite in the struggles we have started to liberate our bro-
thers from the Turkish yoke, in order to liberate these lands
which have belonged to us for many centuries .101
There was also strong evidence of external support for the revolt
102
which was channeled via Soviet Armenia and possibly, Persia.
43

The Turks at various times blamed the British, the Persians, and
the Soviets for stirring up the revolt although definite proof of
who did what to whom was not available. The Kurds were well
armed during this revolt and were able to shoot down several
Turkish aircraft. The organized phase of the revolt ended
104
approximately 17 October 1930 after Turkey used "hot pursuit"
tactics into Persia and convinced the Persian government to
cooperate with them.
Final conclusions as to the motivation for the revolt,
combined opinions of it as a true "war of national liberation"
with probable Armenian (and possibly Soviet) support. Several
letters to the editor in the New York Times appeared in support
of Kurdish rights. Curiously, one of these letters was written by
106
an Armenian living in the U.S. Another letter written by the
Kurdish Khoybun "representative" in the United States, one N. M.
Bekir, claimed that the Kurds had seized the provinces of Bayazid,
Igdir, Sari-Kamish, Kahisman, Van, Mush, Bitlis, Hakkiari, and
Seghert. 107
While much information about this revolt was clouded by
propaganda and Turkish censorship, it is evident that a
coordinating Kurdish nationalist group existed, that some external
support was provided, that a large number of Kurds were mobilized
and that Persia and Turkey became aware of a need to "control"
the Kurds along their mutual border.
2. Sayyid Riza in Turkey, 19 3 7
The key thing about this revolt is that it largely broke
out and was repressed under very strict censorship of the Turkish
44

government. It started on about 17 March 1937 and no news
reports were made about it until 16 June 19 37 despite the fact
that some "30,000 Turkish troops and a fleet of airplanes were
109
required..." to suppress it. Tribes involved were the Kalan,
Abbasushagi, Haideranlu, Deman, and Lolanis with about 5000 total
insurgents. They were led by Sayyid Riza in the Dersim region
of Turkey and their professed aims were: "no garrisons be
built or administrative divisions created; that the tribesmen be
permitted to keep their arms; that they continue as before to pay
112
taxes by bargaining with tribal chiefs."
Although this revolt appeared to be more local initially than
the one of 1930, it continued through September 1937 when Sayyid
113
Riza was captured by the Turks and was joined in July by Kurds
114
of the Jezirah district in Syria. They, under the leadership
of the Badr Khan family in Cizre Syria, were in revolt in Syria for
115
autonomy from French and Arab rule. There was also evidence of
external support for the Syrian Kurds and possibly the Turkish
Kurds when weapons enroute to the insurgents were discovered in
116
Alleppo by French authorities. The French were able to control
117
and suppress the Syrian Kurds by mid-August and Sayyid Riza was
118hanged with his two sons in November 19 37 in Turkey.
3. Revolts in Iraq 1941-43
The revolts in Iraq during this period were primarily war
related due to an anti-British coup, Nazi propaganda, and war hard-
ships. In May 1941, Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah led a brief uprising
after the loss of central government control in the area following
the Rashid Ali coup against the British. His hopes apparently
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were that the British would be convinced of the unreliability of
119the Arabs and would reward him with his independent Kurdistan.
On the other side, possibly incited by the German agent Rudolf
120
Roser, Sheikh Mouhamed Zaidi rallied his tribe in Suleimaiyah
121in revolt against the British in September 1941. Again, here
the hope was for independence from a British dominated Iraqi-
Arab government.
The most serious nationalist revolt was led by Mullah
122Mustafa Barzani in 1943. Although this revolt was caused
initially by famine in the Barzan area, a rise in war prices and
123
small "exile allowances" for the Mullah, he was quickly joined
by the intellectuals of the Hewa (Hope) and Ruzkari Kurdish
124political groups which had nationalist sentiments. The British
employed the Iraqi Army against Barzani and paid some tribes to
fight against him. Although successful for a short time,
Barzani 's forces were eventually driven across the border to Iran
where they linked up with Kurdish nationalists in Mahabad in 1944.
4. Revolt in Iran 1941-1942
After the September 1941 occupation of Iran by British
and Russian forces, Kurdish hopes in that area grew and on
27 September 1941 Mehmet (Hama) Reshid of the Baneh tribe rose in
Kermanshah. This rising was accompanied by the declaration of a
125
"Free Kurdish State." The Teheran government responded by
moving troops and artillery toward the region and blamed the
126
trouble on "communist" or "Nazi" inspirations. They were un-
clear of the support for the revolt but were sure that "foreign
127
separatist propaganda" was to blame for it. The revolt
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eventually encompassed much of Iranian Kordestan and included the
Baneh, Khorkoreh, Yakilis, Ardalans, and Gowrik tribes. It was
not until May 1942 that Mehmet Rashid was defeated by the Iranian
128
army and he was later made a Governor of Baneh. This revolt,
indicative of Iranian Kurdish nationalism, plus the forthcoming
support of Mullah Mustafa Barzani, would serve to encourage other
Iranian Kurds in the establishment of the Mahabad Republic.
E. CONCLUSIONS
Dividing the revolts of the 1918-1944 period in a typology
obscures the chronological progression of revolts in the area. For
that reason, the following chronological list of Kurdish revolts
is provided:
1918-1922 Iran (Simko)
1919 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah)
1920 Iraq (Dilo Kurds)
1922-1924 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah)
1925 Turkey (Said and Sayyid Abdullah)
1927 Iraq (Ahmed Barzani)
1927 Turkey (Jelali and Haideranlu)
1928 Syria/Turkey (Hadjo)
1930 Turkey/Iraq/Syria/Persia (Ishan Nuri)
1931 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah)
1932 Iraq (Ahmed Barzani)
1935-1936 Iraq (Bazan of Zibar)
1937 Turkey/Syria (Sayyid Riza, Badr Kahn)
1941-1943 Iraq (Mahmud Barzinjah, Mouhamed Zaidi,
Mullah Mustafa Barzani)
1941-1943 Iran (Mehmet Rashid)
It appeared that the turbulence in the area created by terri-
torial uncertainties after World War I, and attempts by new nation-
states to consolidate their power, sparked a continuous series of
Kurdish revolts. These revolts had tribal, political, religious
and nationalist aspirations and were also affected by external
influences. The primary external influences were a growing group
47

of Kurdish intellectuals; Soviet, British, Armenian, Nazi and
possibly Persian instigations of revolts; and regional power
attempts at cooperation to suppress the Kurds. Both the Kurdish
national groups and nation-state control efforts grew and became
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III. POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS 1918-1944
Political developments in Kurdistan from 1918-1944 consisted
of the interactions between Great Powers, developing regional
actors, and Kurdish actions. The effect of Kurdish revolts has
already been discussed, but also during this period, Kurds became
more politically aware and developed their own political groups
and parties.
A. POLITICAL MANEUVERS PRECEDING THE TREATY OF SEVRES
Sharif Pasha's efforts at Paris in 1918 through 1920, to
obtain an independent Kurdistan, were enhanced by several factors:
British imperialist designs on portions of the Ottoman Empire
dating back to the Tripartite (Sykes-Picot) Agreement of October
1916; American and British public opinion which favored the
establishment of an independent Armenia to protect oppressed
Christian minorities; President Wilson's 12th point on non-Turkish
nationalities; overtures of the Soviet Union to the Muslims of the
East, and later, to Mustafa Kemal; and Sharif Pasha's ability to
negotiate with Armenian and Great Power representatives.
British interests in the area, particulary the objective of an
independent or autonomous Kurdistan, were driven by concern for
protection of India and its lifelines, the need to prevent French
influences in the area, and a concern for control over suspected
oil deposits in Mesopotamia and the vilayet of Mosul. A serious
threat to their interests in Asia was posed by the new Soviet
57

government of Russia, or the Russian Soviet Federation of Socialist
Republics (RFSFR)
.
As early as 1917, the Soviet government had issued an appeal
to Muslim workers in the East to rise against their colonial
masters
:
Even far-off India, that land which has been oppressed by
the European "torchbearers of civilization" for so many
centuries, has raised the standard of revolt, organizing
its councils of deputies, throwing the hated yoke of
slavery from its shoulders, and summoning the people of
the East to the struggle for freedom.
*
Stalin, in May 1918, spoke to a strong Soviet interest in
"liberating" the Muslims of the East from colonial oppression:
Allow me to state in the name of the Central Soviet
government that the Council of Peoples' Commissars has
always believed and still believes that it is its sacred
duty to meet halfway the movement of liberation of the
oppressed and exploited masses of the East, and first of
all, of the most wronged of the Muslims East. The entire
character of our revolution, the very nature of the Soviet
government, the general international situation, and
finally even the geographical position of Russia, situated
between imperialist Europe and oppressed Asia - all these
necessarily prompt the Soviet government to pursue the
policy of fraternal support of oppressed people of the East
in their struggle for their own liberation.
3
The British could not ignore these threats to their imperial
interests and in May 1919, endeavored to establish around Mosul
a fringe of "autonomous Kurdish states with Kurdish chiefs who
4
will be advised by British Political Officers." After their
reoccupation of Mesopotamia in late 1918, and subsequent problems
with the "King of Kurdistan," Sheikh Mahmud, in 1919, the British




At the same time, Sharif Pasha of the Khoybun (Kurdish
Independence League) , was in Paris. His negotiations were with
British and other Great Powers and with the Armenian representa-
tive, Boghas Nubar Pasha. Sharif Pasha's communications with
Boghos Nubar Pasha were of crucial importance to a settlement
which would be favorable to the Kurds. The Christian Great Powers
were very concerned with the protection of the Christian Armenians
of the Ottoman empire who had suffered so many deprivations dur-
ing the war. President Wilson, in August 1919, sent a direct
communication to the Ottoman Grand Vizier warning that:
... if immediate measures are not taken to prohibit all
violences or massacres on the part of the Turks, Kurds, or
other Musselmans [sic] against the Armenians in the Caucasus
or elsewhere, the President will withdraw Article 12 from
the Peace Conditions. This action would result in the
complete dissolution of the Ottoman Empire.
5
Earlier in 1919, the King-Crane commission's report had also
been received by the President. In it the formation of an
Armenian state "...provided with a definite territory... which
takes into account their losses by the massacres of 1884-96, and
1915-16" was recommended. This humanitarian interest in the
Armenians gave Boghos Nubar Pasha an inordinate amount of
influence at the Peace Conference and also made it essential for
Sharif Pasha to come to an agreement with him if a Kurdistan
were to be carved from the Ottoman Empire. Sharif Pasha was
successful in his efforts with Boghos Nubar Pasha, and by
December 1919, Kurdish and Armenian territorial claims had been
resolved and an agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was con-
cluded between the two representatives . Other King-Crane
commission recommendations, which met with British needs and
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inclinations also may have been considered during peace negotia-
tions. First, with regard to Mesopotamia, its unity was to be
preserved and was to include "...at least the Vilayets of Basra,
Bagdad, and Mosul. And the Southern Kurds and Assyrians might
g
well be linked up with Mesopotamia." Secondly, in Anatolia, a
Kurdish state was proposed.
between the proposed Armenia on the north and Mesopotamia
on the south, with the divide between the Euphrates and the
Tigris as the western boundary, and the Persian frontier as
the eastern boundary. A measure of autonomy can be allowed
them under close mandatory rule, with the object of prepar-
ing them for ultimate independence or for federation with
neighboring areas in a larger self-governing union.
9
These recommendations and the agreement between Kurd and
Armenian fitted the objectives of both the U.S. and Great Britain,
The Armenians would be protected, the two groups would work
together, Mesopotamia would be held together (with Mosul) , and an
autonomous Kurdish state would be interposed between the lifeline
to India and the RSFSR. The way was cleared for a Kurdish
national state to be included in the Peace Treaty of Sevres.
B. THE TREATY OF SEVRES TO THE TREATY OF LAUSANNE
With the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920,
Kurdish nationalist aspirations seemed assured. At the least,
Article 62 guaranteed "... a scheme of local autonomy for the
predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of the Euphrates, south
of the southern boundary of Armenia as it may be hereafter
determined, and north of the frontier of Turkey with Syria and
Mesopotamia ..." Further provision was made in Article 64 for
independence of Kurdistan within one year of enactment of the
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treaty provisions, as well as the adherence of Kurdish inhabi-
tants of Mosul vilayet to the independent state.
The treaty, however, was never enacted. Factors which contri-
buted to its demise were: the rise of a Turkish nationalist
regime intent on maintenance of Anatolian territorial integrity;
Soviet links to the Turkish nationalists; American disinterest
in the continued question of Anatolia; British, French, and
Turkish claims to the province of Mosul and its oil resources,
and the lack of a consistant Kurdish nationalist program, as well as
the absence of a recognized Kurdish nationalist leader.
The Turkish nationalists, led by General Mustafa Kemal
Ataturk, had by mid-1919 banded together to oppose the dissection
of Turkish Anatolia. In January 1920, (some eight months prior
to Sevres) they issued their own statement on Turkish sovereignty,
the Turkish National Pact. Article 5 of the Pact pledged to
defend the rights of minorities in Turkey and Article 2 referred
to the Kurdish Sanjak3 which had "... united themselves by a
12general vote to the mother country." In short, the Allies were
placed on notice that in the event of a treaty with the Ottoman
Government of Constantinople which divided the Turkish territor-
ies, a fight would ensue. Further Turkish nationalist attitudes
toward the question of the Kurdish minorities, in particular,
were revealed in the writings of Ziya Gokalp. He insisted among
other things, that the Kurdish language of Diarbekr was the
13
"Kurdish of the Turks" and that all the people of Turkey's




so far remained Turkish." To Gokalp, the only reason that
Turkoman tribes had become Kurdicized was to survive in early
15
times, but that they were still nationally Turks. These writings
were later to form an ideological basis for the Turkish national-
ists 1 claim that there were no Kurds in Turkey; just "mountain
Turks.
"
Turkish nationalist links to the Soviets also date from the
period of 1919-1920. These links were to enable the Turks to con-
centrate their forces against the French and Greeks in Anatolia and
to ultimately defeat them in 1920 and 1922 respectively. There is
some evidence to suggest that as early as May 1919, while Ataturk
was serving as Inspector-General, that he met with a Soviet Army
officer, Colonel Semen M. Budenny, himself of Kurdish extraction,
16
in Havza. The Soviets were willing to offer money, weapons, and
direct military support in return for a sovietized Turkey. While
Ataturk would not promise a sovietized Turkey, he did make use of
what aid he could receive. The Turks took advantage of the signing
of the Treaty of Moscow, in 1921, to crush the Armenian and other
17(Kurdish) resistors to Turkish national authority. With Turkish
nationalist military and diplomatic successes in Anatolia, the
Treaty of Sevres was, in effect, overturned.
Soviet motives in extending this aid and support to Turkey
were both economic and political. Economically, the Soviets hoped
to gain Turkish support for Soviet presence in the Caucasus so as
18to be able to trade with the outside world. Politically, a
friendly Turkey and Persia, as well as Soviet control of the




the drive to undermine British interests in the Near East."
There were also strong hopes of furthering the "revolution" in
Turkey and Persia. To this end, a Soviet Central Asian Bureau
under the Department of International Propaganda was estab-
lished in 1919 and was entrusted to the Turkish revolutionary
Mustafa Suphi. The Bureau soon had twelve sections: Arab,
Persian, Turkish, Azerbaijani, Burkharan, Kurghiz [Caucasus]
20Mountaineers, Kalmak, Chinese, Korean, Japanese, and India.
21Activities in Persia and Turkey were centered in Baku and were
assisted in 1921 by the establishment of universities to train
Asians in Communist ideology, infiltration, and propaganda
22techniques. The Soviet government took this action upon them-
selves partially because as early as July 1920, they realized
that the Turkish revolution was primarily anti-European and not
23
oriented toward the masses.
Additionally, the Soviets saw the establishment of the
Soviet Republic of Azerbaijan in April 1920 as beneficial to
their goal of sovietization of the East:
Red Turkestan has played the role of a revolutionary bea-
con for Chinese Turkestan, Tibet, Afghanistan, India,
Bukhara, and Khiva. Now Soviet Azerbaijan with its old and
experienced revolutionary proletariat and its sufficiently
consolidated Communist Party (Gummet) will become revolu-
tionary beacons for Persia, Arabia, and Turkey. It will
bear a direct influence on the Transcaspian regions via
Krasnovodsk. The fact that the Azerbaijani language can be
understood by the Istanbul Turks and the Tabriz Persians
and the Kurds, as well as by the Turkic tribes of the
Transcaspian region and the Armenians and Georgians, will
only increase the political significance of Soviet
Azerbaijan for the East. From there it will be possible to
disturb the British in Persia, to stretch a friendly hand
to Arabia, to lead the revolutionary movement in Turkey un-
til it takes the form of a class revolution.
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The implications for Turkey and Persia were to either work
with the Soviet government, or be subjected to Communist infiltra-
tion through discontented tribes and other groups.
The British in Mesopotamia and Mosul also faced difficulties
with regard to controlling the Kurdish tribes and populace there.
The Turks, still heavily interested in the Mosul vilayet propagan-
dized the Kurds who were as previously discussed, not overly
25
enthusiastic about possible Arab control of the area. The Turks
were still interested in Mosul for reasons of oil, past history
of possession, and the fear that a Kurdish autonomous province
in the area would threaten their own control over the Kurds in
26
Turkey. In addition to Mahmud ' s revolts and intrasigence in
Mosul, after the British-French settlement over Syria and Faisal's
installation in Mesopotamia as Emir, the British were faced with
further Kurdish intransigence when the Kurds of Suleimaniyah,
Arbil, and Kirkuk refused to participate in the referendum of
27July 1921 which was to legitimize Faisal's rule.
s
By mid-1922, regardless of the provisions of Sevres, the Kurds
had been defeated militarily by the Turks, Persians, and British.
All their leaders had either been discredited or, as in the case
of Sharif Pasha, were not in a position to take any action.
Additionally, the British found themselves in a situation where
they had to counter what was perceived as Soviet influence in
Turkey and Persia, as well as among the tribes, and were in a
position where the ownership of Mosul and its oil was still dis-
puted. Another factor for the loss of Great Power support for
the Kurds which should be considered is that they, unlike the
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Arabs, had not been allied to the British during the war and had
in fact, fought them and the Russians. With the loss of Armenia
to Turkey, and subsequently Armenian support; after Sevres the
Kurds had no real ability to influence Great Britain in their
favor except in the Mosul area.
The first Lausanne conference convened on 20 November, 1922
and the final acts were signed on 24 July 1923. Several provisions
of Sevres had been altered in the negotiations and all references
to an "independent Kurdistan" were deleted. The United States,
which had previously championed the rights of minorities, was, at
Lausanne, a non-voter. The U.S. position, however, was stated in
a memorandum from Allen Dulles to the Secretary of State. U.S.
interests fell under several categories: capitulations, commerce,
education and missionary activity, claims, the Straits, minorities,
2 8
and international financial control of Turkey. The strength of
the Kemalist government in Anatolia made several of these objec-
tives unobtainable, and the U.S., with regard to minorities, was
29
concerned only with the Christian ones remaining in Turkey.
Trade and freedom of the Seas interests dominated other U.S.
efforts and as long as the "Open Door" could be maintained and the
Dardenelles kept open, U.S, isolationist tendencies did not per-
mit further efforts at arbitration.
The British raised the minorities question at Lausanne, with
a view toward control of Mosul, but were countered by the Turkish
negotiator, Ismet Inonu who claimed that "...if minorities were
to be heard, those of Ireland, India and Egypt should appear also."
He additionally maintained with regard to the Kurds that "... there
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were no Moslem minorities in Turkey, for no distinction was made
either in theory or in practice between the various elements of
31
the Moslem population." Ismet Inonu also saw it as his duty to
press for as much of the vilayet of Mosul as he could. The
British disputed Turkish claims to this province and put forth an
Iraqi census of 1920 which showed 494,007 Kurds; 166,941 Arabs;
38,652 Turks; 61,336 Christians; 11,897 Jews; and 26,275 Yazidis
32(total 799,090) residing in the vilayet . While Ismet made the
same claims as to there being no such thing as a Kurd, the British
persisted and Lausanne was signed with the Mosul question un-
resolved. This, as has been shown, led to further British-Arab-
Turko-Kurdish frictions.
It appeared, that in all, other interests of the Great Powers,
33
who really "...made no pretense of interest in the Kurds,"
coupled with Turkish control of Anatolia, British desires not to
yield on Mosul, and a U.S. desire not to get heavily involved,
caused the Kurdistan which was created at Sevres to be deleted
from the Treaty of Lausanne. Because of the new boundaries, the
Kurds were divided as follows: Southwestern Turkey 2,000,000;
northwestern Persia 750,000; northern Iraq 700,000; northeastern
34Syria 250,000; and the USSR up to 100,000.
C. POST-LAUSANNE EUROPEAN ACTIONS TO 1944
European actors were involved in at least three major issues
which affected the Kurds during this period. They were the Mosul
Question, the Tripartite treaty of 1926, and World War II efforts.
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1. The Mosul Question
The Mosul question, unresolved at Lausanne, was referred to
the League of Nations for determination. On 28 January 1925 a
three-man delegation led by M. af Wirsen, who was assisted by
Count Teleki and Colonel Paulus, arrived at Mosul and commenced
interviews and surveys to determine the nature and desires of the
35population. They found a variegated group, some of whom were
strongly pro-Arab and some of whom were pro-Turk. Feelings had
been polarized due to the propaganda and other efforts of the
British and the Turks since about 1920. Additionally, the
commission was hampered in its work by lack of knowledge of local
3 6
customs and an insufficient command of 'the language in the area.
One comment made at the time described their difficulties: "So
various are the communities that exist here and so confusing are
the local politics that it defies the genius of any sincere




Besides having to deal with a Turkish delegation led by
3 8Jevad Pasha, and the British High Commissioner Sir Henry Dobbs,
who on 7 February was "... convinced that the commission now
39
realized that Mosul belonged to Iraq and was an Arab town,"
the commission also had to visit with local delegations of
Assyrians, Chaldeans, Shebaks, Turkomans, Kurds, village Arabs
40
and Bedouin Shammar. To say the least, they were confronted
with a confusing situation. By 25 February, Turkish irregular
military encroachments were reported to have ceased but copies
of a pamphlet by one Hashim Nahid which urged Kurds to declare
67

41for Turkey, were being distributed throughout the area. It was
probable that the need for Turkish troops to combat Sheikh Said's
revolt was a primary causative factor in the troop withdrawal by
Turkey during this period. Reasons for Turkey's concern over
Mosul have already been described but Arnold Toynbee, while at
Angora in 1924 found that economic and strategic reasons were not
primary to the Turks. After he had discussions with then Prime
Minister, Ra'uf Bey, Toynbee came away with the clear impression
42that Turks were concerned over Mosul due to the Kurdish question.
Their aims were to gain suzerainty over their "brothers" to the
south as well as to prevent an autonomous Mosul from influencing
the Kurds in Anatolia.
43The commission concluded its work by 23 March 1925 and
found that the Kurds of the area dreaded Arab rule more than they
did Turkish administration but, rather than either of these alter-
44
natives, they preferred the British mandate government. The
League Commission also did not accept the Turks' definition of the
Kurds as brothers and found that the vilayet only had a 3 percent
45Turkish population. It appeared then that strong representations
to the commission which were anti-Turk, coupled with the Sheikh
Said revolt which "... had destroyed the fiction of Turco-Kurdish
46friendship and solidarity," and a willingness on the part of the
Kurdish majority to accept a British mandate influenced the final
decision. By December 1925 the League had decided to award the
47
Mosul Vilayet to Iraq under a British Mandate.
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2. The Tripartite Treaty; Iraq, Turkey , and United Kingdom-
5 June 1926
Despite the League award, the Turks and Iraqis (British)
were still at odds over the Mosul issue, and in particular over
the frontier line to be drawn. All three powers had by this time
had to quell Kurdish revolts in their territory and were motivated
to settle the issue so that they could concentrate their efforts
on consolidating their holdings. As late as March 1926 the Turks
were resorting to the tactic of insisting that since they were
not a member of the League of Nations, its Council decisions were
48
not binding. Even after the treaty was signed, there was some
deliberation in the Turkish heirarchy as to whether to go to war
49
rather than to ratify the treaty. The decision was made, however,
due to lack of resources and the need to consolidate territorial
holdings, to ratify the treaty. This decision was made only after
50
5 hours of heated debate on 9 June 1926 as opposed to a one hour
debate and unanimous decision in Iraq on 14 June 1925. The
treaty itself, as signed by Sir Ronald Lindsay and Tewfik Rushdi
Bey contained the following main provisions: 1) The Brussels
line was to be accepted as the frontier (Turkey would receive a
small slice of northern Mosul) , 2) the frontier was to be
inviolable, 3) a final frontier was to established by joint
commission in three months, 4) a general amnesty would be effected
in Iraq, 5) people in Mosul would be allowed to choose Turkish
nationality, 6) Turkey was to receive 10 percent of oil revenues
for 25 years, and 7) a neutral zone, in which no insurgent bands
could be formed, would be established on both sides of the
69

52frontier. Other lessons learned during the Mosul question,
which directly applied to and resulted from problems with the
Kurds were incorporated in the treaty. Articles 6, 7 , and 8 ex-
pressly provided for the opposition of "... any preparations made
by one or more armed individuals with the object of commiting acts
53
of pillage or brigandage in the neighboring frontier zone.../"
and that reciprocal information exchange regarding such bands
54
would be undertaken. Additionally, article 12 was a mutual
guarantee to refrain from
. . . all correspondence of an official or political nature
with the chiefs, sheikhs, or other members of tribes which
are nationals of the other State and which are actually in
the territory of that State . . . They shall not permit in
the frontier zone any organization for propaganda or meeting
directed against either State. "55
3. World War II Efforts
The advent of World War II drew still another European
actor, Nazi Germany, into the Kurdish arena. In Secret Protocal
number 1 of the Russo-German negotiations on spheres of influence
in the Near and Middle East of November 1940, it was agreed that
the Soviet Union had unopposed territorial ambitions "...south of
the national territory of the Soviet Union in the direction of the
56
Indian Ocean." Additionally, in Secret Protocal number 2,
Germany, Italy, and the USSR agreed to try to "...detach Turkey
from her existing international committments..." and to deal with
57
Turkey over the extent of her possessions. These agreements
set the stage particularly after the Nazi invasion of the USSR,
in which a Soviet-Nazi propaganda battle was to take place in both
Turkey and Persia. One of the focal points in this battle was
7Q

to be eastern Turkey and western Persia, as well as in Northern
Iraq.
As reported in the Times of London , however, German efforts
in Iraq were not all that successful and despite the efforts of a
Herr Grobba, as of 23 May 1941 there was "... no evidence that the
Kurds of northern Iraq have adhered to the rebel (Rashid Ali)
58government." As has been previously discussed, there were
small Kurdish revolts in Iraq in the wake of the Rashid Ali coup
and possibly one, Shaikh Mahmud ' s , may have been influenced by Herr
Grobba' s propaganda.
German actions in Turkey and in Iran took a two-edged
effort.
On the one hand their agents .have been most active in stirring
up trouble among the Kurdish tribes; on the other their pro-
pagandists in Turkey have been spreading rumors to the effect
that the Russians, to be seconded when the time is ripe, by
the British, are giving encouragement to an independent
Kurdistan, which would encroach on the eastern provinces of
Turkey. "59
As has been shown, both the Nazis and the Soviets were active in
Iran among the Kurds in the early 1940* s. The Soviets especially,
as early as 1942, had established. links with several Kurdish aghas
6in Iran subsequent to the partition of that country. In any
event, actions, or rumors of them, of instigation of the Kurdish
tribes were sufficient to warrant at least one visit to the east by
Turkish Premier Shukru Sarucoglu in August 1942.
Despite the actions of German agents, British and Soyiet
control of the area was strong enough that by 1944 there was no
real threat of Nazi-Kurdish cooperation in the area. The Soviets,
however, were taking their "sphere of interest" aspirations
71

seriously and weEe attempting to consolidate their interests in
Iran and in other areas of the Middle East. On 30 October 194 3,
it was reported that the Vice-Commissar for Foreign Relations
Ivan M. Maidky was visiting the entire area with a view to extend-
ing relations between what had been the traditional links with
6 2
Iran and Turkey. Some of these efforts were successful, as on
1 January 1944, the Soviets and Iraqis agreed to establish diplo-
63
matic relations. The largest Soviet effort, however, was to
occur in Iran. Soviet motives were to gain access to oil con-
cessions and to "fraternally assist" the Iranian Tudeh (masses)
Party in its efforts to revolutionize the country. The situation
in Kurdistan also by 1944 appeared attractive to the Soviets.
The year 1944 saw Azerbaijan and Kurdistan filled with
Soviet political officers and other agents, mostly Moslems
from Soviet Azerbaijan. The work in Kurdistan centered
around the Soviet consulate at Rezaieh, attached to which
was at least one of the Soviet Union's 100,000 Kurds, known
as 'Captain Jafarov, ' who wandered freely among the tribes-
men and villagers in Kurdish dress. 64
After 1944, through overt support and propaganda efforts, the
Soviets were able to infiltrate the Iranian Kurdish nationalist
society, the Komala in Mahabad. These links, as will be dis-
cussed below, were to prove crucial to the formation of the
Mahabad Republic in 1945.
It was interesting to note that prior to this Soviet
activity in Iranian Kurdistan, they had endorsed the Teheran
Tripartite Statement of 1 December 1943. This read in part: "The
Governments of the United States of America, the USSR, and the
United Kingdom are at one with the Government of Iran in their
desire for the maintenance of the independence, sovereignty, and
ft ft
territorial integrity of Iran." At least as early as 1940,
72

Soviet efforts to consolidate to consolidate their position, one
factor of which, was to he support for Kurdish nationalists, were
in place. Further evidence of post-war troubles were disputes
with Mohammed Said's Iranian government over oil concessions in
fi 7
October-November 1944 as well as the veiled threat in Tass of
25 December 1944 that "A movement is continuing among 'broad masses'
ft Q
in Northern Iran for the creation of a 'democratic government'."
D. REGIONAL ACTORS: EFFORTS AT CONTROL
Although the settlement of the Mosul question and the
Tripartite treaty appeared to be a solution at least to Kurdish-
Turkish-Iraqi problems, there were also earlier treaties enacted
between the regional actors which had implications for control of
Kurdish cross-border support. Article V of the Russo-Persian
Treaty of Friendship of 1921 prohibited "...the formation or pre-
sence within their respective territories of any organizations or
groups of persons, irrespective of the name by which they are
known, whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against
69Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia." Similarly,
Article VIII of the Russo-Turkish Treaty of Friendship of 16 March
1921 prohibited organizations which would wage warfare against
each other or claiming to be the Government of the other country.
The Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality between Persia and the
USSR of 1 October 1927, possibly after consideration of the
Kurdish revolts up to that time, repeated the prohibition of sub-
versive organizations and even went so far in Article 4 to
"
—
prohibit military enrollment and the introduction into their
73

territory of armed forces, arms, ammunition, and all other war
material intended ... for those organization." While these
treaty provisions were a start toward regional control of subver-
sive groups, including the Kurds, there were no agreements binding
between Turkey and Persia, or Persia and Iraq. After the 1930 re-
volt of Ishan Nuri, however, which was supported from Syria,
Persia, Iraq, and probably Soviet Armenia, the countries moved
gradually toward a regional non-aggression agreement.
Turkish politicians had been extremely agitated by the lack
of Persian action to control the Kurds in 1930. As stated by the
Turkish periodical Akcham during the revolt, the Turkish people
72
"...view with alarm the stupid attitude of our neighbor."
Additionally Djumhuriet mentioned that "Meanwhile the attitude of
the Persian Government has caused a regrettable impression on
73Turkish public opinion." In addition to hot pursuit methods of
containing the Kurds, the Turks pressed in July 1930 for Persia to
79
cede Mount Ararat to Turkey. Negotiations over this issue con-
tinued for about two years until 30 May 1932 when Persia ceded
Little Ararat to Turkey in return for some territory on the
75
southern border.
Renewed revolts of Sheikhs Mahmud and Ahmed in the early
1930 's continued to cause Turko-Iraqi and Persian frictions and
with Iraq's pending independence, Feisal visited Turkey in July
761931 in what can be viewed as a prelude to the Saadabad Pact.
Iraqi -Turk negotiations were followed up by Turko-Persian negoti-
77
ations in December 1931. By 9 January 1932, Turkey and Iraq




could be useful against Kurdish cross-border support. This
treaty was followed by a similar treaty in November 1932 between
79Turkey and Persia. Again extradition provisions were included.
By April 1934, there were rumors connected with the Shah's expected
visit to Turkey that the formation of a Near-Eastern Bloc was
80
likely. There was even some speculation that the Soviets were
interested in joining this bloc. It was reported in March 1935
that Soviet Ambassador L. M. Karakhan, Turkey's Rassif Bey, and
Persia's M. Sayed had been conferring in Moscow over frontier
81issues. Apparently, however, Soviet overtures were rejected and
a Pact of Non-aggression between Turkey, Persia, Iraq, and
82Afghanistan was announced on 13 January 1936. The pact was
8 3
signed by the powers in July 1937, following Sayyid Riza's re-
volt, and it was no surprise that Turkey had been a prime mover in
getting this Saadabad Pact enacted.
While the Pact dealt with several issues, including the right
to self-defense and promises of non-aggression, Article 7 appeared
to be aimed directly at the Kurdish nationalists and tribes which
had troubled three of the four signatories since the end of World
War I. It read:
Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to prevent,
within his respective frontiers, the formation or activities
of armed bands, associations or organizations to subvert the
established institutions, or disturb the order or security
of any part, whether situated on the frontier or elsewhere,
of the territory of another Party, or to change the constitu-
tional system of such other party. 84
Although French Syria was not a signatory to the Pact, there was
also evidence of Franco-Iraqi cooperation against the Kurds. In
the 1937 Jezirah revolts when arms destined for Kurdish insurgents
75

were captured in Syria, the Iraqis were apparently concerned
enough to send General Eussein Fawzi Cwho had been on maneuvers
8 5
with the Turkish Army) to inspect the arms.
Methods inside each regional country varied to some extent for
control over their Kurdish populations. Turkish deportations and
Independence Tribunals, as well as failure to even acknowledge
the existance of Kurds have already been discussed. The policy
was essentially, in light of persistent revolts, one of repression
and detribalization attempts following each revolt. Persian
and French policy was to try to attract the Kurds to a superior
8 6
culture coupled with attempts to disarm and detribalize all
87tribes. An assessment of Persian policy was provided in December
1933: "The tribes are said to be peaceful, subdued, and disarmed.
The first is at the moment true, the second is doubtful, and the
88third untrue." This same report blamed much of the failure of
Persia's Kurdish and tribal policy to too much centralization of
authority under Reza Shah, coupled with an incompetent and
irresponsible bureaucracy. In Iraq, a policy of repression and
exile of Kurdish insurgents was combined with the policy of allow-
ing those Kurds who would cooperate, to participate in government.
It has also been argued that Faisal I did not want to eliminate the
Sheiks (Arab or Kurd) after 1932 and independence because he






E. KURDISH POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
In addition to tribally led revolts from 1918-1944, Kurdish
intellectuals both, on international and regional levels began to
organize themselves in various political groups. These groups
were the Khoybun , the Hewa Party, the Pan-Iranian League, the
Komala, and the Shursh group. Links were forged between these
groups and with other groups such as the Armenian Socialist
Revolutionary Federation (Dashnakzutium ) and the Iraqi Communist
Party.
1. The Khoybun
The Khoybun (Kurdish League for Independence) was first
formed at the end of World War I in Paris by Sharif Pasha with,
as previously discussed, the aim of negotiating with the Great
Powers for an independent Kurdistan. The name was also used to
denote the name of the ill-fated Kurdish state which was pro-
claimed in Turkey during the 1927 revolt. As Arfa describes the
organization, its aims were "...the ultimate independence of the
Kurdish nation, theoretically within the regions where the Kurds
90
were in the majority." Its leaders were primarily liberal
91intellectuals interested in a westernized form of democracy and
although it maintained links with local Kurdish groups, the
organization maintained itself as an international body outside
of Kurdistan. By 1942, it had headquarters in Beirut and large
branches in Damascus and Paris and was led by Kamuran of the
92Syrian Badr Khan family. For this reason, Eagleton described
it as "...a small group of exiles" who represented almost no one
actually in Kurdistan." 93
77

The group was important however, not only for its inter-
national links, But also for its ability as an outside group, to
coordinate the efforts of other Kurdish groups. At least one
of the external links was to the Armenian Socialist Revolution
Federation, led by a M. Varandian in Geneva. In November 19 25,
this group came out against Turkish repression and for Kurdish
emancipation. In a speech to the meeting of the Executive
Committee of the Socialist and Labor International in London,
Varandian stated:
After exterminating the Armenian peoples and expelling
the Greeks from Asia Minor, the Nationalist Turkish Govern-
ment has now set about annihalating the Kurds so as to
transform Asia Minor into an all-Turkish territory and to
secure the triumph of the Pan-Turkish idea. In order to
defend their very existence against this ruthless policy,
the Kurds some months ago [Sheikh Said] rose in rebellion.
The Turkish government answered with blood and iron applied
to the whole Kurdish population. Now the first phase of
the struggle is settled. Turkish troops are occupying
Kurdish territory and the courts-martial are at work.
Already more than 200 leaders of the movement have been
hanged and several thousands of innocent men and women
have been massacred and their homes given over to pillage.
But this does not mean that the Kurdish revolutionaries
have given up the cause of liberation of their people.
^
4
After the 1927 revolt and during the 1930 revolt the
presence of the Khoybun and its role of coordination was alluded
to. In 1928 one report stated that "There is outside Turkey
a Kurdish national movement, with groups of young adherents
who sometimes bear very distinguished names. It has head-
95
quarters in Paris and at least one other in the Soviet Union.' "
Another report during the 1930 revolt asserted that a large




the Ararat revolt— " At least two known splinters, of the
Khoybun were known to exist. One was the Kurdish. Union of the
Friends of Liberty Calso known as the Association of the Friends
of the Kurds) led by Sheikh Selaheddine which has already been
discussed. Another, also in Turkey, and also led by Sheikh
97Selaheddine was the Association of Northern Kurdistan. The
Khoybun was also later, in the 1930' s and 1940' s, to provide
98
moral support to the Hewa Party and the Komala and in August
1944, provided the map of "Greater Kurdistan" which was agreed
99




This group, led by Ishan Nuri of the 193 revolt, de-
serves some mention in that it may have been linked to the
Khoybun and during the 1930' s carried out Pan-Iranian agitations
in Turkey. Its basic platform was not for Kurdish nationalism
but rather for a community of Iran and Kurdistan against
"alien" Turks, Arabs and Semitic influences.
3. The Hewa Party
The Hewa (hope) party derived its name from a youth
organization in Constantinople in 1908 but was formed in Iraq
as a Kurdish nationalist political group during the Mandate
period, and may have grown from the Kurdish National Defense
*
102Organization formed in Mosul during 1925. It was dominated
by educated, urban, purely Kurdish nationalist elements and
had a major advantage over the Khoybun in that it was actually
located in Kurdish territory. The party was first located in
79

Kirkuk and rapidly grew with branches in Baghdad, Suleimaniyah,
104
and Mosul. Some indications of its early actions, before
it joined with tribal forces, occurred in 1930 over the pro-
posed Anglo-Iraqi treaty. Riots were reported in several Kurdish
cities and also protests were sent to the League of Nations
105demanding guarantees of Kurdish rights. These rights were
further delineated in 194 3 by ex-Captain Izzet Abd-el-Aziz in
negotiations with the Nuri Sa ' id government. The Hewa, by this
10 6
time led by Mulla Mustafa Barzani, demanded a Kurdish
autonomous province to include Kirkuk, Suleimaniyah, Arbil,
Dehok, and Khanaquin; a Special Minister for Kurdish Affairs in
the Iraqi cabinet, an assistant Kurdish Minister in each




A major impact provided by this party was its links in
1942 to the Komala in Iran, and the advice on organization
108
which it was to provide. There was also evidence that mem-
bers of this party had established ties with the Iraqi
Communist Party (ICP) . In 1935, the ICP issued a manifesto in
which "...complete independence to the Kurds and of their
109
cultural rights was proposed." Tribal and intellectual
frictions surfaced within the Hewa in the later 1940' s and
ultimately resulted in its split.
4. The Shursh Group
During 1943, another group of Iraqi Kurds formed them-
selves into the Shursh (Revolution) group. These Kurds were
80

urban intelligentsia but were Marxist-Leninist in philosophy and
acted as the organ of the Iraqi Communist Party in Kurdistan.
While they were only a splinter organization, they were to pro-
vide a leftist input to later Kurdish nationalist actions as
well as a strong Kurdish input in the late 1940' s and early
1950 's, into the Iraqi Communist Party.
5. The Komala
The Komala-i-Zhian-i Kurdistan (Committee for the regen-
eration/resurrection/life of Kurdistan) was formed on 16
September 1942 in Iran by a group of middle class Mahabadi
112
Kurds. Members joining it were subjected to secrecy and had
to take an oath not to betray the Kurdish nation, to work for
self-government, not to disclose secrets, to remain a member
113for life, and not to join other parties. By April of 1943
114
a Central Committee was elected, chaired by Rahman Zabihi
and by the end of 1944 it had spread through all of Northern
Kurdistan. Although this was initially an Iranian Kurdish or-
ganization, the early members looked to the Hewa party of Iraq,
represented by Mir Haj at the founding, for advice and as the
"senior" Kurdish political party. Additionally, visits
were exchanged between the two parties for advice and mutual
116
support through the summer of 1944. Although the party was
initially middle class, it established tribal links also with
117
the Herkis, Shakkaks , and other local tribes. Tribal leaders
joined primarily to avoid "missing" the political bandwagon, and
118




Although there were Soviet efforts, as discussed, to
infiltrate this group, they did not really come to fruition
until later in 1945. Through 1944, the party was primarily
Kurdish nationalist and was, with the Hewa party, a major mover
in the August 1944 signing between Turkish, Iraqi, and Iranian
Kurds, of the Peman i Se Senar (Three borders pact) at Mount
119Dalanpur in furtherance of the goal of "Greater Kurdistan."
By October, 1944, partially to further appeal to the Kurdish
chiefs, the "reactionary" Qazi Mohammed, future president of
120the Mahabad Republic, joined the party.
F. CONCLUSIONS
External political influences played a large part from
1918-1944 both in the creation of the stillborne Kurdish state,
and later in its division and repression. As has been shown,
the fate of the Kurdish state rested on the moves and counter-
moves between Great Britain, Turkey, Iraq, Persia, and the
Soviet Union. With the loss of the Sevres provisions and the
rise of new nation-states with nationalist ideologies of their
own, the Kurds took to revolt and also began to form political
organizations. The problems which they caused were met in
some instances with outright military repression and in other
instances, with efforts at conciliation. The turbulence in
the area culminated in the signing of the Saadabad Pact as a
regional control instrument. The rise of regional Kurdish
political groups was not really a major factor until the late
82

1930* s and early 194Q's when these small groups of intellectuals
realized the need to join with tribal leaders so as to obtain
forces in the field.
The presence of large groups of dissident Kurds in the area
provided numerous levers which could be pulled by various exter-
nal powers in their conflicts and disputes. With the advent of
World War II, Soviet interests in the area, first shown in 1918,
became much greater. These Soviet interests were to be coupled
with support for the union between Kurdish tribes and political
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IV. THE KURDS FROM 19"45-19:58
At the close of World War II, the Kurds once again had an
opportunity for an independent Kurdish state. The Mahabad
Republic, unlike the one which was to have been created at the
end of World War I, was not the creation of the Great Powers.
Rather, it came into existence through the coincidence of at
least three factors: the Soviet-British occupation of Iran
and subsequent loss of Iranian central government control in
northern Iran, Soviet designs to communize northern Iran, and
the presence of organized Kurdish nationalists in a "shadow
zone". The fall of this state was attributable directly to the
withdrawal of Soviet support, dissension within Kurdish ranks,
and the military preponderance of Iranian forces following the
Soviet withdrawal.
Other developments during this period of time which di-
rectly affected the Kurds were the influence of the Cold War
and propaganda, continued Kurdish political development, and a
regional pact which was backed by a superpower, the Baghdad Pact
A. THE MAHABAD REPUBLIC
1. Political Prelude
After the formation of the Komala, the Kurdish national-
ists in Mahabad, West Azerbaijan province, had a vehicle for
Kurdish independence, or at least, autonomy. As this region was
under Soviet control, the Soviets had, as discussed, maintained
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links with, various Kurdish leaders. Throughout the war they
maintained continuous contact with tribal leaders of the Jelali,
Shakkak, and Herki tribes, but by late 1944 it had been decided
to deal with and infiltrate the Komala rather than work through
tribal leaders. This initial contact was accomplished via two
2Soviet resident agents Abdullahov and Hajiov. Additionally, in
early 1945, VOKS the Soviet State Propaganda ministry, approved
the establishment in Mahabad of a Kurdish - Soviet cultural
organization, the Anjoman-i-Farhangi-i-Kurdistan-u-Shurawi
3(Kurdistan-Soviet Cultural Relations Society)
.
Soviet motives in support of the Kurds were as follows.
On the one hand, a "democratic" Kurdish Republic under Soviet
tutelage could, in conjunction with an independent Azerbaijan,
form a buffer between the West and part of the USSR's southern
flank similar to the buffer which was to be created in Eastern
Europe. On the other hand, such a state would also provide the
Soviets with a location to weaken Turkey and Iraq and might
serve as a wedge in further infiltration in the Middle East as
4
well as a way to break the ring of capitalist encirclement.
The Soviets were faced with problems, however, in that the
Komala was too loosely organized and too undisciplined for
5
efficient action. It was also dominated in their eyes by large
landowners, feudal chiefs; and religious leaders. Another
problem which the Soviets faced in dealing with the Komala , which
was to persist even after the Democratic Party of Kurdistan
(DPK) was formed, was the unwillingness of the Kurds to fully
93

cooperate with the Democratic Party of Azerbaijan and the
Communist Tudeh Party. To begin with, there was a latent
7hostility between the Kurds and the Azeris along ethnic lines.
There was also a wide gulf in class structure between the DPK
and the Tudeh . "The gulf between the Tudeh Party and the Demo-
cratic Party of Kurdistan was even wider, for the latter, led
by local landlords, tribal chiefs, and religious leaders had no
o
pretense of carrying out a program of moderate reform" The
primary reasons for Kurdish cooperation with the Soviets were
not ideological, but rather, pragmatic. The Soviets were in
physical control of the area, had espoused some sympathy for
the Kurds, and the Kurds had hopes of a favorable post-war
9
settlement.
In any event, Soviet moves toward support for the Kurds
in Iran continued, and on September 12, 1945, Soviet Captain
Namazaliev arranged a second visit of the prominent Kurdish
chiefs, Qazi Mohammed, and Seif Qazi, to Baku. During this
visit, after haggling between Qazi Mohammed and the Soviet
Azerbaijani Baghirov over the nature of Kurdish independence,
the Kurds were promised tanks, cannon, machine guns, and rifles
as well as training and financial support. It was also during
this visit that Baghirov insisted on the formation of the DPK
12
out of the Komala . Shortly after their return, Qazi Mohammed
met with other Mahabadi Kurdish notables and announced the
formation of the DPK in late September, 1945. The manifesto
issued by Qazi Mohammed stated that the Kurdish people wished
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"to take advantage of the liberation of the world from fascism
13
and to share in the promises- of the Atlantic Charter."
Specifically, aims of the Kurds were listed as:
1) The Kurdish people in Iran should have freedom and self-
government in the administration of their local affairs,
and obtain autonomy within the limits of the Iranian
state.
2) The Kurdish language should be used in education and be
the official language in administrative affairs.
3) The provicial council of Kurdistan should be immediately
elected according to constitutional law and should super-
vise and inspect all state and social matters.
4) All state officials must be of local origin.
5) A single law for both peasants and notables should be
adopted and the future of both secured.
6) The Kurdish Democrat Party will make a special effort
to establish unity and complete fraternity with the
Azerbaijani people and the other peoples that live in
Azerbaijan (Assyrians, Armenians, etc.) in their struggle.
7) The Kurdish Democrat Party will strive for the improve-
ment of the moral and economic state of the Kurdish people
through the exploration of Kurdistan's many natural
resources, the progress of agriculture and commerce, and
the development of hygiene and education.
8) We desire that the peoples living in Iran be able to
strive freely for the happiness and progress of their
country. 14
This proclamation, which also dissolved the Komala , led
to some opposition of the tribal chiefs in the area, who despite
some cooperation with the Soviets, were still distrustful of
ultimate Soviet aims. Tribal dislike for the Soviets stemmed
from historic, social, religious and economic reasons. " Further
complications were caused for Qazi Mohammed in that he could
not rely on the support of Kurdish tribes in Kordestan. That
area of Iran had been occupied by the British, and Iranian cen-
Ifi
tral government control over the tribes had been maintained.
This tenuous tribal support might have made the position of the
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DPK in its later formation of the Mahahad Republic untenable
but for the arrival of another actor, Mullah Mustafa Barzani of
Iraq.
2. Mullah Mustafa's 1945 Revolt
Mullah Mustafa realized that the intelligentsia of the
Hewa party were not prepared to accept the realities of armed
struggle, but he needed their support for logistics purposes.
Additionally, he was not completely in agreement with all of
their ideology and consequently on 12 February 1945 he formed,
with Izzet Abd-el-Aziz, Mostafa Khoshnao, Abd-el Hamid Bager,
Mohammed Mahmud, Ahmad Isma'il, Showkat Na'man, and Hefzollah
17
Isma'il, the "Freedom Group." The aims of this group were put
forth as to foster cooperation between all Kurdish tribes in
Iraq, to accomplish the salvation of Iraqi Kurdistan, to estab-
lish contact with other liberal Kurdish parties, to send
petitions to members of the foreign powers and publish propagan-
da, to struggle against the exploitation of the Iraqi govern-
18
ment, and to prepare armed forces.
The Mullah was at first prepared to cooperate with the
government of Nuri Sa'id, which had been somewhat conciliatory.
With that government's fall in late 1944, the Iraqi government
19began more repressive measures in Kurdistan. This, in turn,
fueled Kurdish discontent and was a primary factor in the forma-
tion of the Freedom Group. Mullah Mustafa's group and the Hewa
sent protests about suspected Iraqi actions to the British and
2Q
U.S. Ambassadors through August 1945 but the Iraqi army moved
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to control the Kurds. On 1Q August 1945, the Barzanis, assisted
21
by the Shivran and Milli Kurds, rose in revolt against the
approaching Iraqi forces. The Iraqis were able to eventually
22
envelop the Kurdish forces by 25 September 1945. With his
escape route to Turkey blocked by the Turkish army, and the un-
tenable situation in Iraq, Mullah Mustafa, his brother Ahmed and
some 10,000 followers, of which 1000 were insurgents, fled into
23Iran on 30 September. By the end of October the Mullah's army
had grown to 3000 armed men with British rifles, machine guns
24
and at least one field piece. Mullah Mustafa, his brother,
and thirty three followers were later in December 1945 condemned
25
to death in absentia by the Iraqi government.
Also of interest in Iraq during this period was the con-
tinued growth of the Communist Kurdish elements. The Ruzkari
Kurd (Party of Kurdish Liberation) was formed in 194 5 from an
auxiliary of the earlier Shursh group. It was later, in 1946 in
Iraq, to join with the Hewa and other nationalists to form the
2 £>
Kurdish Democratic Party - Iraq (KDPI) . The name Ruzkari
was also to be applied to the overall Kurdish nationalist front
of the DPK, KDPI, Khoybun and other groups which joined in
support of the Mahabad Republic. In this sense it denoted a
united nationalist front organization.
3. Formation of the Republic
With the arrival of Barzani ' s troops, formation of a
political leadership, and Soviet support, the way was clear for
the formation of the Mahabad Republic. Soviet support continued
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in two ways. Tanks, planes, and artillery pieces were never
to be given to the DPK but they did receive Soviet uniforms
,
training, and in December 1245, 12(30 rifles which the Soviets
27had confiscated from the Iranian Gendarmerie. The Soviets
also cooperated by keeping the Iranian central government
forces out of the area. In October 1945, the Iranians attempted
to enter the Mahabad region to quell an "...independence move-
ment among shepherds and peasants," and were repelled by Soviet
armed forces
.
There was also evidnece that Qazi Mohammed was attempt-
ing to dilute Soviet influence when in December 1945 he
29
approached the British for support, which was denied. The
British were very concerned over any possible Kurdish autonomy
in the area. Not only were they opposed to Soviet plans, but
they were also concerned lest any Iranian - Iraqi Kurdish co-
operation should threaten the oil-fields in the Mosul-Kirkuk
area which were the main source of petroleum for the British
Fleet. The Iraqis were very concerned about the collaboration
of the Barzanis and the DPK, and Turkey also was watching the
situation in Iran closely. The Turks, with their own sizeable
Kurdish minority, and faced with claims by the USSR on Kars and
Ardahan provinces, were wary of a possible Soviet-dominated
Kurdistan in Iran. This was compounded by reports on 27 December
1945 that a new nationalist Kurdish organization had been formed
31by the Soviets in eastern Turkey. As the Turks had commented
previously in November regarding events in Iran, "This is not
32




Qazi Mohammad felt sure enough, of support that following
the Azerbaijani declaration of the establishment of their
33
"revolutionary government" on 16 December 1945, lie went ahead
with plans for the Kurdish proclamation. In December 194 5 at
Mahabad, accompanied by Soviet officers, Qazi Mohammed inaugu-
34
rated the Kurdish People's Government. This was followed by
the formation of a 13 member parliament and the proclamation of
35
an autonomous Kurdish Republic on 22 January 1946.
4 . Demise of the Mahabad Republic
The new government started off auspiciously. It sent
observers to the Azerbaijan National Assembly and dispatched
"General" Mullah Mustafa Barzani to fight the Iranian garrisons
in Saqqiz, Baneh, and Sardasht with a view toward winning
Kordestan for the Kurdish Republic. Unfortunately for Qazi
Mohammed and the Kurds, events were already moving which would
doom the existence of their Republic. Relations between the
Soviets and Iran, and the Soviets and the U.S. would force a
withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area. Additionally, there
were cracks in the front between tribal leaders and the DPK that
would widen.
Soviet negotiations for oil concessions with the Iranians
37
were continuing and to these were added Soviet demands for
guarantees of autonomy for the Azerbaijan Republic. These
negotiations were subject to pressure by the Soviets who ignored
the deadline for withdrawal of their troops on 2 March 194 6 and
who on 4 March started reinforcement of their forces. This was
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to culminate in 15 brigades arriving in Azerbaijan by the end
38
of March.. To this U.S. President Rarry Truman, reacted by
communicating to Stalin on 21 March that unless Soviet forces
withdrew in six weeks, U.S. armed forces would be utilized in
39
Iran. The Soviets withdrew their forces on 9 May 1946 after
U.S. pressure and after they had obtained the oil and Azerbaijan
40
concessions which they sought. The Soviets had not reckoned
however, on the wilyness of the Iranian Premier Qavam or on the
Shah. An inkling of Qavam 's attitude was revealed to the
Azerbaijanis during their negotiations with the Iranian govern-
ment following the Soviet withdrawal. He stated that the
"...Iranian cabinet had decided to permit the Azerbaijanis to
have their ideal relized as far as the Constitution and laws of
41the country would permit." The Shah's attitude toward re-
covery of the Kurdish and Azerbaijani Republics was even more
adamant. After the Soviet withdrawal he ordered new elections
throughout the country. As he stated:
When I ordered new elections throughout the country, that
was exactly what I meant - and the country plainly included
the province of Azerbaijan. The "autonomous" Azerbaijan
regime naturally took a dim view of our holding elections
in "their" province. The Russians found themselves in an
awkward position; they wanted to support their puppet
state [s], but at the same time they wanted to keep on good
terms with Teheran in hopes of getting oil. At this junc-
ture I followed my conscience. I ordered my troops to
Azerbaijan to put down the rebellion once and for all and
at the same time I personally flew over the rebel positions
to ascertain their strength. The Russians now completely de-
serted their puppets, and the rebel government collapsed..." 42
While the Iranians were negotiating with the Soviets,




cooperation with. the. Azerbai3ani government. Despite terms of
cooperation in this- treaty, the subsequent negotiations between
the Azerbaijanis and the Iranians, which appeared before
Iranian military actions to legitimize the Azeri regime, had not
been favorable to the Kurds. In their eyes, through cooperation
with the Azeris they had progressed from the condition of a
minority in the Iranian state to a minority in the Azerbaijani
44Turkish state.
There were also rifts apparent within the Kurdish
Republic. The tribal chiefs initially backed the government
which they saw as dominated by leftist middle-class groups so
as to allow no drastic reforms which could injure their interests.
They were also displeased with the cooperation between the
Azeris and the DKP . As was reported, many Kurds who wanted in-
dependence, felt that Qazi Mohammed had replaced one master, the
45
Iranians, with another, the Russians and Azeris. On the other
hand the intelligentsia were trying to reduce the influence of
46
the chiefs. Initially, the Barzani tribes worked with the
Herkis, Shakkaks , Milan, Jelalis, Haideranlu, Kuresuni, Gowrik,
and Dehbokri tribes whose numbers totaled about 20,0 00
47insurgents. The Mamash and Mangur tribes resisted Qazi
Mohammed's forces and had to be attacked by the Barzanis in the
48
summer of 1946. The main problem for the Kurdish tribes was
the isolation of the Kurdish Republic from Iran which had been
49their chief market and source of food. By the fall of 1946,
without Soviet support and instigation of the Dehbokri and
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Shakkak tribes., as well as frictions between the Barzanis and
other Iranian tribes-, all Qazi Mohammed could count on was the
support of the Gowrik and Zerza tribes with a little over
5Q100Q men. There was also some indication that the Barzanis,
who were dissatisfied with Qazi's leadership, were lessening
their support.
Overtures to the Kurds of Kordestan also appeared to
be unsuccessful as the governor of the province, as late as
April 1946 claimed that the province was quiet and that "...the
52
Kurds are docile and patriotic."
With the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and frictions
within their own movement, the Mahabad Republic's DPK was un-
able to hold out against the Iranian pressure. The Iranians
were even helped in their move into the area by the Telekalis
tribe, -and with the commencement of the advance of General
Homayuni * s Iranian armies in November 1946, several of the
chiefs opted for the Iranian government. By this time only the
Barzanis, who felt they had no other place to go, were ready
53to fight. Iranian forces were successful in their advance,
and after the fall of the Azerbaijani Republic, Qazi Mohammed
realized that he had no hope and surrendered on 15 December
541946 after heavy fighting. The Barzanis however, fought on
for their own survival until they requested on 24 December 1946
55
to surrender to General Homayuni ' s armies
.
This marked the end of the Kurdish state although it
was not the end of Kurdish nationalist sentiments. Followers
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of the republic were tried and on 6 February 19.47 11 men were
hanged. This was followed on 31 March 19147 By the hanging
of Qazi Mohammed , his brother Sadr Qazi, and his cousin Seif
57Qazi. Mullah Mustafa and his followers requested to return
to Iraq but were rejected by the Iraqis. The counter-offer
of the Iranians was to remain in Iran but be disarmed. This
alternative was not accepted by the Barzanis and led to heavy
58fighting in Ushnuigeh on 22 February 1947. This was
followed by a campaign of repeated heavy fighting in which the
Barzanis were gradually driven out of Iran and into Iraq by
59April 1947. The Iraqi's were quick to react and in May
attacked the Barzanis and drove Mullah Mustafa and 1000 followers
into Turkey. From there, the Barzani group fled back into
6 2
the Soviet Union where they were granted refuge.
5 . Assessment and Regional Shocks
Although the Mahabad Republic of 19 46 was formed with
the heavy support of the Soviet Union, it was by no means a
communist government. Tribal and landowner interests pre-
viously discussed prevented any such occurrence. Additionally,
there was no communist mass party in West Azerbaijan. Although
the Tudeh had supported the DPK, as Vahan states: "At the time
of the Kurdish revolt in 1945, the Tudeh Party had no branches
in the region, and only one person in the whole population of
63
Mahabad was familiar with Marxism." This interpretation was
further borne out by Eagleton's findings that: "In Mahabad,
however, there was no social revolution, no serious move
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towards land distribution, no Marxist indoctrination, no secret
64police, and no Russian-trained 'cadres'." Therefore, the
Mahabad Republic was the manifestation of a Kurdish national
front between tribal and intellectual lines, with previous cross-
border Kurdish nationalist support. If Mullah Mustafa's re-
volts in Iraq were the first real instances of tribal and
intelligentsia cooperation in a revolt, the Mahabad Republic was
the first Kurdish revolt in which large scale overt assistance
had been received from an outside power. It was probably only
of secondary importance to the Soviets in comparison with
Azerbaijan. In any event, the loss of Soviet military support
led to its rapid demise and pointed to continued frictions be-
tween tribes and the intelligentsia.
The Republic and the Kurdish revolts did cause several
regional shocks. The Iraqis and Turks were, as previously
mentioned, concerned earlier with the threat to their own
integrity. This concern was shown further during the existence
of the Republic. As early as 1 March 1946 a Turkey-Iraq
Conference on solidifying relations was opened at Ankara and
one of the key objects of the conference was mutual support
against the Soviets as well as "mutual protection against
dangerous individuals" which were interpreted as the Kurdish
tribes. Additionally on 20 March 1946 the Turkish newspaper
ULUS , voicing government commentary, called upon Iraq and
Syria to help forestall an "autonomous" uprising of the Kurds
on the frontier. This was followed on 3CL March 194 6 by the
1Q4

signing of a Pact between Turkey and Iraq; which- would provide
67for "mutual assistance on the question of public order."
Clearly, the establishment of the Mahabad Republic had alarmed
the other regional powers.
B. COLD WAR PROPAGANDA EFFORTS
With the defeat of Soviet aims in Iran, they continued
attempts to weaken the influence of the West in the "Northern
Tier" and to weaken the pro-Western governments which existed
there. One of the instruments used by the Soviets was inten-
sive propaganda and the Kurds were a primary target. Soviet
ideologues felt that the October Revolution of 1917 had affected
the rise of a Kurdish Nationalist movement and aimed their
efforts at what was perceived as a growing Kurdish proletariat
69led by "progressives". As argued by Geoffery Wheeler:
Soviet post-war propaganda started with several advan-
tages: during and since the war many Middle Eastern,
South, and Southeastern Asian countries experienced
Western military occupation and armed intervention, but
none except Iran, has ever seen Soviet ground troops...
Always of a high order, Russian oriented studies con-
ducted in Soviet universities and academies of science
have since the early days of the regime, been firmly
geared to Soviet Asian policies. "70
To these advantages were added a Soviet interest in local
cultures and widespread knowledge of foreign languages . In
the case of the Kurds, past Soviet support was also to provide
some receptivity to their message.
The opening salvo of this propaganda effort was fired on
29 November 1947, less than one year after the collapse of
1Q5

the Mahabad Republic. A secret radio which, called itself the
"democratic party's- radio station" Began Broadcasts from
Russian AzerBaijan asserting that it sought to defend the
Azeris and Kurds against the "persecution of the central
71(Iranian) government." This campaign continued and asserted
that the U.S. was assisting Iranian forces in suppression in
72
Iran, and blamed the U.S. for paying for the assasination
73
of Kurdish leaders with cigarettes . The motive was to re-
duce U.S. influence in Iran and was coupled with offers to
74
Kurds and others to visit Soviet Uzbekistan. These last
allegations were disputed by George V. Allen was was a former
Ambassador to Iran. He categorized Soviet efforts as:
This is a prize example of Soviet propaganda at its worst.
The use of the terms assassination and gunmen is typical.
The allegations are false from beginning to end. During
my stay in Iran I was on the friendliest terms with the
Kurdish leaders, notably Amir Khan Shakkak, one of their
most notable chieftans.'^
By June 19 49, the U.S. had become so concerned over
potential disruptive influences of Soviet propaganda among the
Kurds, that it was decided to establish a Kurdish broadcast
from the U.S. Middle East Information Bureau. It was felt
that it would be "worthwhile" to inform the Kurds that there
were other forces at work than the Soviet Union and other ways
76
of life. The propaganda "war" continued with the establish-
ment of another Soviet station in Erivan, Armenia SSR and by
January 1950, the U.S. was coordinating its efforts with the
77
Iranian government to offset Soviet propaganda . Soviet
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efforts in 12.50. culminated with, an offer broadcast in September
to support Kurdish minorities in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey who
were ready to "rise and fight for freedom, peace, and indepen-
78dence." By 1253, this propaganda had intensified and was
including the Albanians and Kurds in attempts to bypass a
Western defense arrangement. Additionally, Soviet agitators
were infiltrated into the Kurdish regions and it was rumored
that Mullah Mustafa Barzani was considering reentering
79Kurdistan with Soviet support.
C. KURDISH POST-MAHABAD POLITICAL DEVELOPMENTS
1. Formation of the UDPK
In Iraq, the role of the Kurds in the Iraqi Communist
Party, (ICP) , was also growing. Although, as Batatu argued,
Kurds were still more interested in nationalism than Marxist
ideology. "The relatively high proportion of the Kurds in the
Party was to a considerable degree connected with the sense of
80frustrated national rights under which they labored." None-
theless, Iraqi Kurds had entered the Party in the 1240' s and
part of the ICP ' s resurgence in Iraqi politics in 1251 was due
to a Kurdish leader Din Nuri (a relative of Sheikh Mahmud) who
8
1
was a devout communist. This marked a period of ascendency
in the ICP for the Kurds until 12 5 5 when the party was crushed.
During this period the Kurds provided all of the General
82
Secretaries and 31 percent of all the Central Committee.
In 1253 73 Kurdish communists had split from the party as
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"right deviationists" and formed the Banner of the Workers fac-
83
tion. It was this- faction in 1254 which, helped to create the
United Democratic Party of Kurdistan CUDPKI from what was left
of the Hewa and KDPI in Iraq. The UDPK had as its Secretary
Ibrahim Ahmed, a communist lawyer, and nominated Mullah Mustafa
Barzani as its chairman in absentia . Another up and coming mem-
ber of this party was Jalal Talabani who was on the five-man
84Politburo. This Party which was Kurdish nationalist with
Marxist leanings, was able to remain allied with the ICP through
1959.
2. Iranian and Turkish Kurds
Both of these groups were under tight control by the
central governments throughout this period and any political
groups which existed such as the DPK were underground. There
was some response in Iran, however, to Soviet incitements to
revolt. On September 3, 19 50, the Javarundi tribe, along the
Iraqi - Iranian border in Iran rose against the Iranian policy
of disarming the tribes and had been influenced by Soviet
8 5
"secessionist" urgings. Their strength was estimated as
800-2000 men and no real support, either external or cross-
border, was forthcoming. The Iranians were able to crush the
8 6
revolt by September 6 . There was also evidence of continued
Kurdish international groupings, however. Sharif Pasha, of
Versailles fame, had continued as a representative of Kurdish
87
aspirations to the U.N. in early 1950 but was largely ignored.
After the Javarundi revolt, a group of Kurdish non-communist
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leaders in Paris, led By Emir Dr. Kamuran Ali Badr Khan pro-
tested to the. U.S. again after the Iranian attacks. Badr Khan
was the leader of a group which had evolved from the Khoybun
and was called the Center for Kurdish Studies. These latest
representations also seemed to appeal to some Western Middle
East experts who were recommending that the Soviets ' propaganda
efforts could be deflated if the Kurds were given protection
8 8by the U.N. as non-autonomous peoples. The U.N. again re-
jected the Kurdish appeal and Soviet propaganda continued.
By 1954, it was reported that most Kurds, now being led by
89leftists, looked to the Soviets for any sort of independence
and again in February 1956, the Javarundi tribe revolted in
90
Iran for twenty-one days before the Iranians defeated them.
This period then, for the Kurds was marked by continued
political development of at least one regional party and a
sophistication which allowed for united action with other,
non-Kurdish parties. There continued to exist a group of non-
communist internationalists. However, these political groups
were ineffectual in achieving Kurdish autonomy. The regional
parties still could not gain the support of the tribes. The
internationalists were still largely cut-off from regional
developments as well as being ideologically at odds with the
only apparent patron of the Kurds, the Soviet Union, and the
growing leftist Kurdish political leaders.
3. Regional Power Actions
Regional power actions after Mahabad were concerned with
controlling and assimilating their tribesmen where possible,
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and resisting Soviet influences. These two threats would cul-
minate in the signing of another regional cooperation Pact in
1955.
Following their experiences of 1246, the Iranians had
by 1949 opted to rearm the elected tribes and incorporate them
into the army due to frictions which had risen over disarming
91the tribes. Additionally, in June 1949, Iran signed with
Iraq, a Mutual Aid pact which was designed for the "maintenance
92
of peace in this part of the world" and which could be useful
in controlling the tribes along their borders. By December,
1956 Iranian efforts at control and also development resulted
93in the country being reported as "subversion free". In 1958,
Iranian officials were openly voicing faith in the loyalty of
94
their Kurds despite Soviet intrigues and in July 19 58, in
an effort to forestall further Soviet moves, Iran offered to
unite the Kurdish minorities of Iraq and Syria with their
"motherland". 95
Turkey was also very concerned, particularly in the
early 1950 's, but maintained its army in place and in strength,
96
coupled with a slow modernization program Iraq, on the other
hand, opted for a policy of inclusion in the government of
some Kurdish notables and a gradual improvement of conditions
97in the Kurdish areas.
All three of these powers recognized what they saw as
a Soviet threat and also kept their common Kurdish problem in
mind. They were supported in this at first by Great Britain
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and later, by the United States which, was interested in main-
taining stability in the area and preventing Soviet influences
in the "Northern Tier" and the iMiddle East. To this end, the
U.S. heavily supported Iraq and Turkey with aid. Iraq and
Turkey signed the Baghdad Pact on 24 February 1955. While this
pact was primarily oriented against the Soviets , the Soviets
had also been propagandizing the Kurds in their countries. In
the Pact, article 3 pledged non-interference in internal
affairs and Article 1 pledged mutual support for security and
9 8defense. Iran later joined the Pact, over Soviet protests of
99imperialism and aggression, in October 1955.
The Kurdish areas remained relatively quiet, with the
exception of the 19 56 Iranian revolt, after the signing of
the Pact. It appeared, at least for a time, that the Kurdish
problem was under control and was gradually being settled by
the local powers. The July 14, 195 8 coup d'etat in Iraq, how-
ever, would change the situation and lead to one of the longest
running revolts in Kurdish history.
D. CONCLUSIONS
There were several trends which developed from 1944-1958.
Firstly, a Kurdish state was established, with a union of
tribal and intellectual leaders and with both cross-border
Kurdish support and overt external power support provided by
the U.S.S.R. As events showed, however, this state, while
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nationalist in character, was: not strong enough, to withstand
the loss of external support nor its own internal frictions.
There was also, in news coverage, much more attention paid
to Kurdish nationalist aspirations. In the 1920*3 and 1930 's
they had largely been referred to as "brigands" or "bandits"
but during this period their desire for their own state was
more openly legitimized. This coverage was to change with the
advent of cold war in the early 1950' s and some Kurds,
especially Mullah Mustafa Barzani, were to be branded as
Communists
.
The period, however, after Mahabad was fairly quiet for the
Kurds. Again, nationalist leaders had been defeated and dis-
persed and regional actors regained control in their areas.
The competition between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. marked a decline
in British and French colonial interests which were also being
pushed aside by the aspirations of regional powers. No longer
would the Kurds look to the British for support.
With only sporadic U.S. attention to their problems and in
light of continued Soviet propaganda and other efforts, the
Kurds would turn their eyes more and more to the Soviet Union.
This was to be facilitated, in turn, by the rise of a leftist-
dominated Kurdish political party in Iraq.
In short, after Mahabad, the Kurds were forced to sit and
wait for a time in which local conditions of instability or
super-power interest would favor their cause. They could then
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V. THE KURDS IN IRAQ 1353-19.80
"The Kurdish nation is indivisible and the frontiers separa-
ting it are artificial . "*
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, 1959
"Government Forces took only seven days to end the mutiny




Premier Abdel Karim Kassim,
April 1962
"The fighting is over ... We are alone with no friends. The
Americans have not provided any help or protection. I think
dark times are coming. "3
Mullah Mustafa Barzani, March 197 5
The above quotes represent attitudes present during the key
domestic crisis which existed in Iraq from 1959 through 1975.
The Kurds continued to seek autonomy and were not defeated
until 1975. At the same time, Iraqi governments continually
resisted many of the various demands which the Kurds put forth.
The expectations of Kassim 1 s "imperialists" were to prove more
accurate than either his or subsequent Iraqi leaders' estimates
of the longevity of the Kurdish Question. During this period,
while the Kurds and Iraqis were at the center of the crisis,
several other influences impacted and prevented a settlement
of the problem. These influences were: political maneuvers
within the Iraqi political structure; political maneuvers
with the Kurdish political structure; Kurdish attempts to
internationalize the dispute; and the actions of the USSR, the
U.S., Israel, Iran, Egypt, and Syria. From 1975 to 1980, events
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in Iraqi Kurdistan centered primarily around the Ba'th Party's
efforts to spread and consolidate its control in the face of
sporadic Kurdish resistance.
A. THE GATHERING STORM: 14 July 1958 - September 1961
1. Initial Cooperation
The 14 July 19 58 revolution, which deposed and killed
King Feisal II and Nuri Said, was followed by an initial period
of cooperation between Kassim and the UDPK led by Ibrahim
Ahmed. Kassim needed support from as many segments of the
population as he could attract, and the UDPK as well as its ICP
links provided one leg of that support. Shortly after the
revolution, Ibrahim Ahmed led a delegation to press for Kurdish
rights and autonomy. This delegation was met by Michael Aflaq,
Secretary General of the Ba'th party, and the Kurds were
assured of their rights under the new regime:
Brethren, take it from me as a clear and pure word... we
are anxious for liberty for all mankind. We are prepared
to make sacrifices in the defense of freedom in the world.
...How can we then not defend the freedom of those who
have been living with us for hundreds of years, with nothing
and nobody being able to divide us. Numerous links have
bound us. We bear for you feelings of love and fraternity
and this is not only because we care for you and your inter-
ests but also because we care for our country, and its
safety and because we are anxious that stability, security,
and cooperation should reign among all of us.
While this statement guaranteed their "rights", it was, in
effect, a denial of autonomy due to the "numerous links" which
had bound Kurds and Arabs. Ahmed, however, was encouraged by
the terms of the new provisional constitution. Articles 2 and
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3 stated that Arabs and Kurds were "considered as partners in
the [Arab] fatherland, and their national rights- within the
unity of Iraq are acknowledged by this constitution." Addi-
tionally, several of the members of the Revolutionary Command
Council had, or were reputed to be of Kurdish stock, including
Kassim.
It was also probable that Ahmed, who was a communist,
and who had strong ties with the ICP, may have been encouraged
to work within a government structure with the aim of
communizing it from within. This concept fitted well with the
Soviet tactic of a Modified National Front explained by Lenczowski
in which the "progressive" forces could work with other forces
7
to attain revolutionary objectives. Shortly after the coup,
a national cabinet was formed with representatives of the
Ba'th Party, the National Democratic Party, the Independence
o
Party and the UDPK. The cooperation of the Kurds also extended
to the tribal areas in the north. On 26 July, Brigadier-
General al-Tabakchali, in command in the north stated: "... the
northern part of Iraq is wholly loyal to the new Government.
9
The army and population greeted the revolution with Doy." A
Kurdish tribal leader was also reputed to have stated that the
Kurds of the mountains were all behind the revolution.
In a further attempt to gain Kurdish support, Kassim
offered amnesty to Mullah Mustafa Barzani, who had been in the
Soviet Union since the collapse of the Mahabad Republic. The
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Mullah/ after some negotiations with, regard to his followers,
and who was still the chairman of the UDPK, returned to Baghdad
on 7 October 1958. This return was accompanied by both Soviet
and Egyptian propaganda in favor of Kurdish independence.
Later, in February 1959, the Mullah issued a call for a Kurdish
National Congress which was supported by Iraq and an Iraqi
minister, Ibrahim Kubba, further encouraged Kurdish hopes of
autonomy by announcing the "abandonment" of assimilation
tactics.
Kassim during this period was engaging in verbal combat
with President Nasser of Egypt over leadership of Arab national-
ism. In January 1959 he stated that: "The free democratic
Iraqi republic will work to build up true scientific nationalism
and not the false nationalism that wished to rule the Arab
people through a reactionary dictatorship regime carrying the
13banner of total Arab Union." " The Ba'th-Nasser conflict also
existed inside Iraq and in March 1959 the Pan-Arab (Nasserist)
14Shammar Tribe and Nasserists in the military revolted in Mosul.
This revolt was crushed by Kurds in the area, who were called
out by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, as well as by ICP members, who
were predominantly Kurds. The Mosul revolt was significant
in that Barzani was still showing loyalty to Kassim, the Kurds
and Iraqi communists were still working together and the Kurds
were able to defeat a traditional enemy, the Arab Shammar tribe.




Kurdish, education, ajid economic development. Of more signifi-
cance, however, was the demonstration to Kassim of the amount
of unity that existed in Kurdish, forces.
2. The Barzanis Return to the North
After Barzani's demonstrated support, Kassim allowed
his followers to return to Iraq from the USSR. On 7 April 1959
it was reported that 855 armed Kurds were enroute to Basra
17from Odessa aboard the Soviet ship Gruzia. They were followed
by another ship, the Argun later in April and 2 other ships
18
reported to be loaded with military equipment. Nasser viewed
these Kurds as a "foreign legion" who's objective was to bol-
19
ster the Kassim regime against his internal enemies. The
West, after Iraq's withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact on 4 April
1959, was also concerned about the movement of the tribesmen.
CIA Director Allen Dulles gave an assessment that: "The Soviet
Union seems to be planning to use Kurdish refugee tribesmen,
recently returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union to stir up
trouble in northern Iraq and establish a bridgehead for the
,.20Soviet Union.
There was some indication that, regardless of Soviet
aims, Kassim hoped to "use" the Barzanis to weaken the more
feudal tribal Kurdish leaders in the area, who by this time,
were coming out in opposition to the government. At least one
leader, Sheikh Rashid of the Birost tribe was disillusioned by
the "leftist" leanings of Kassim, and persecution of religious
21leaders. To this was added the natural inclination of the
Barzanis to reclaim their lands in the north. Their move back
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into the area caused fighting and tribal frictions to break
out with the Biradosts, Lolanis, Pishtdaris, Zibaris, and
22Rikanis, many of whom fled into Turkey and Iran. By allow-
ing and supporting Barzani in this move, Kassim was able to
accomplish several things. He could suppress mounting opposi-
tion among some Kurdish tribes, cause numerous tribal frictions
which might break up any united Kurdish threat from the north,
separate the Mullah from the other, leftist and detribalized
UDPK leadership, maintain Barzani ' s support, and cooperate
with the Soviets. This last factor was important.
The Soviets had supported Barzani, and as mentioned,
had engaged in extensive propaganda in support of the Kurds.
To this was also added the strong concern of the Soviet Union
for the role that the ICP was to play in governing Iraq.
Kassim on the other hand, with opposition from Nasser, and his
break with the West, needed arms. Kassim could not yield to
all the demands of the ICP for representation or he would lose
23
control of the revolution. The Kurdish card, however,
allowed him to show support for at least one perceived Soviet
faction. Kassim 1 s overtures were successful and on 26 June
1959, Iraq signed a $100 million arms contract with the
24Soviets. This was followed rapidly by the formation of the
United National Front between the ICP, National Democratic
25
Party and the UDPK to govern the country.
126

3 . Road to Revolt
Despite Kassim's maneuvers, there were indications in
July 1959, that a monster had been created. There were large
scale disturbances in Kirkuk on 14-16 July against Turcomans
and Arabs by the Kurds and the ICP and, significantly, the
2 6
mostly Kurdish 2nd Division was not used to quell the revolt.
The revolt was only put down on 17 July when an armored column
from Baghdad, under the command of Col. Abd al 'Rahman Arif,
entered the city. One of the results of this rioting was
Kassim's break with the Communists in late July, followed by a
UDPK suspension of members who had cooperated in the past with
27
the ICP. Following this period, Barzani continued to
cooperate with Kassim and to consolidate his control in
Kurdistan. Kassim was trying again to formulate a new coalition
of support between the various groups and on 6 January 1960
the Law of Association was promulgated to legalize selected
parties. One result of this law was the change of the UDPK
2 8into the Kurdistani Democratic Party (KDP) . This name
change was a compromise between Kassim and Barzani. Kassim was
not happy with the regional implications of "United" nor was
he happy with the secessionist implications of "Kurdistan" and
proposed, through Brigadier General Yahya, the name Kurdish
Democratic Party. The Mullah was not ready to drop "Kurdistan"
29but did eventually accept "Kurdistani". There were other
elements in the negotiations to legalize the party which
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resulted in references to the "Kurdish People" and "fighting
for self-determination" being eliminated. Although this
allowed the Kurds continued participation as a party in the
government, the wrangling, according to Ahmed "finally con-
vinced the party that Kassim wished to convert it into a cul-
tural society devoted to his own support."
To this was added, while the Fifth congress of the KDP
was sitting in May 1960, Kassim' s publicized overtures to the
32
Surchi and Herki Kurds . These tribes had been traditional
enemies of the Barzanis and the overtures were further evidence
of Kassim 1 s desire to play off one group against another.
That the Kurds were becoming more dissatisfied with
Kassim was also shown during the 2nd anniversary parade of the
33Revolution in which no Kurds took part. On 6 November 1961
with no reforms in progress for Kurdish autonomy and no economic
development, the Mullah sought Soviet support and journeyed
34
to the USSR. Ibrahim Ahmed was also outspoken in his
criticism of the government and was arrested for a short period
35
as a warning. Barzani returned from the USSR in January
1961 with no Soviet support and convinced that the Kurds would
3 6
have to take matters into their own hands. This was
followed by the closing down by Kassim of the Kurdish news-
37
paper Khabat in March 1961 and rising Arab-Kurd tensions in
Baghdad. Also during March, Barzani returned to his tribal
area where he quickly took charge. He was still the chairman
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of the KDP, but moat control of the Party was held by Ahmed.
According to O'Ballance, the Mullah with, this development had
it both ways ; he could retain a strong stake in tribal matters
and had a prestige position in the KDP. The KDP, as before,
38had little tribal support and needed the Mullah's links.
After the KDP and the Mullah presented a petition for Kurdish
39
rights in June 1961 and its rejection by the RCC, positions
hardened on both sides which would lead to the outbreak of the
revolt.
B. THE KURDISH REVOLT September 1961 - April 1975
The revolt can be broken into essentially three phases:
September 1961 - 29 June, 1966; March 1969 - March 1974 and
March 1974 - April 1975. Prior to September 1961, the Mullah
continued his pressure on the opposing tribes, and after per-
suading most of the tribes to support him he was ready to raise
the standard of revolt.
1. The First Phase - September 1961-29 June 1966
The revolt broke out on 16 September 1961 initially
against Mullah Mustafa's advice. He had wanted more time to
prepare but younger party members, among them Jalal Talabani,
41
and the Derbendi Khans went into revolt anyway. The Mullah
joined with his own forces after the Iraqi government followed
42
a policy of indiscriminate bombing and attacked his own area.
Initially the Kurds had approximately 8QQQ followers but by
April 1962, the Pesh Merga ("those who face death") forces had
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grown to 15-20,000 and consisted of the Ako, Pishtdaris, Balak,
43
and Zibari tribes. Other: support also came from Abbas
Mamandour Agha as well as a spectrum of other Kurdish national-
44
ists, communists, army deserters, and the KDP.
The initial government attitude was that the revolt had
been crushed by the end of September 1961 and Baghdad reported
not only that it was crushed but that the "British Stooge"
45Barzani was under arrest in Iran. These reports were untrue
and were more reflective of a disguise for poor Iraqi army
performance as well as a reason to break off the campaign with
the advent of winter. The Kurds, this time armed with captured
and brought-over bazookas and mortars, attacked again in
46January 1962 in an attempt to expand their holdings. Despite
repeated claims of "glorious victories" by the Iraqis, by
23 April 1962 the fighting was recognized as a widespread re-
volt and the Kurds had gained control in the north from Mosul
47
to the Turko-Iranian border and in the south to Suleimaniyah.
Kassim outlawed the KDP in September shortly after the
48
revolt and blamed the insurgency on the British, the U.S.
49
and CENTO Powers. Kurdish demands were put forth and were
to remain much the same throughout the next several years.
They were announced in April 1962 as "an autonomous Kurdistan
within the Iraqi Republic and withdrawal of the Iraqi army from
50the north" To these were added in late May 1962 guarantees
of political, economic, social and cultural rights and a cessa-
51tion of exploitation of tribal rivalries.
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52Despite the "Red Mullah. 1 s" initial successes, the
Iraqis, who committed 26 battalions of troops and police against
them, were hurting the Pesh Merga and particularly Kurdish
civilians. Particularly irksome to the Kurds was the
strafing arid bombing of villages which the Iraqis pursued.
This tactic was used for two primary reasons. First, it was
only in the flat areas where the towns were where the Iraqi
forces could be effective, and secondly, it was hoped that by
damaging houses and injuring civilians left behind, that the
Pesh Merga in the mountains would be weakened in their resolve.
Because of these casualties, the Kurdish Bureau in Lausanne
issued a protest in June 1962 to the U.N. This "Statement
from the Kurdish Bureau" attested that "Entire towns and
villages have been wiped out in aerial bombardments and some
54innocent men, women and children have been slain." The
"Kurdish nation" then appealed to the UN to investigate crimes
of genocide in the Kurdish area. Another effect of the bombings
was to drive numerous other Kurds, particularly in the de-
tribalized intelligentsia, up into the mountains to join Pesh
Merga units.
Although the West had asserted in the past that the
Mullah was being used in a nefarious plot by the Soviets, and
the Iraqis insisted that he was being used by the West, the
Mullah maintained that he was receiving no support from any




to make Iraq into a "Western Stronghold. " As. he stated in
September 19.62 though:
If the Americans go on thinking only of the interests of
Turkey and Iran, who do not want us to get help, if the
Americans never ask after our interests, there is a danger.
The danger is that we will be obliged by necessity to
accept aid from the communists. Then it will not be our
fault. 56
Essentially, he was ready to work with the U.S., especially
after the Soviets had supplied weapons to Iraq, but would take
aid from whoever or wherever necessary to sustain the fight.
The U.S., at this early stage, however, was not willing to
trust the Mullah. Not only did the U.S. feel that such aid
would be meddling in the internal affairs of Iraq, but a strong
Kurdish movement would threaten CENTO allies Iran and Turkey
with their own large Kurdish minority groups. At the same
time, an "independent" Kurdistan was not considered viable
57
and would therefore be "prey" for the Soviet Union. In the
face of the U.S.'s refusal to supply Barzani, the Soviets
stepped up their propaganda support but apparently provided
little else. In September 1962 an article appeared in the CPSU
publication Problems of Peace and Socialism in which the KDP
was characterized as an "anti-imperialist" party and in which
5 8
a national front between the KDP and ICP was urged. Addi-
tionally, in September, the Tudeh party of Iran and the ICP
urged Barzani to extend his efforts into Iran in return for
59Soviet aid. Barzani did not respond to these offers as he was
still awaiting U.S. or other Western support. In any event,
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it did not appear that any aid in weapons, other than that
provided by the DKP "CSyria)' , DKP Clranl , and the Kurdish-
bureau was received. At this time, one witness described the
Kurdish arsenal as consisting primarily of some machine guns,
light mortars, Czech Brno rifles (captured from Iraqi troops)
and some British and Russian rifles.
The initial period saw several trends established:
repeated Kurdish calls for aid, Iraqi control of towns, Kurdish
control of mountainous areas, campaigns governed by winter
considerations, some internationalization of the conflict, and
U.S. - USSR maneuvering with regard to the Kurds and Iraq.
The revolt still continued in force as the Iraqis
could not successfully enter the mountain strongholds of
Barzani's Pesh Merga . At the same time they were also having
severe difficulties in attacking the southern region which was
controlled by a KDP faction led by Jalal Talabani; despite the
use of the Jash , or anti-Barzani Kurds, who were serving as
Iraqi auxiliaries. By January 1963 Kassim was in severe
straits and offered an "amnesty or destruction" proposal on 14
6 2
January to all the Pesh Merga . Despite use of over one
third of the Iraqi army and border controls imposed by Iran,
Syria, and Turkey the revolt had not been crushed. The Kurds
refused the amnesty as Kassim refused any conditions. On
8 February 1963, Kassim was removed as an actor by a coup d'etat,





64The new government, led by General 'Abd al-Salam *Arif
,
was eager to end the Kurdish question and reunite Iraq. It
was thought that with Kassim out of the way this might be
accomplished, and a cease-fire was offered which Mullah Mustafa
Barzani agreed to on 16 February. The chief negotiator for
the Kurds was Jalal Talabani although Barzani ensured that he
6 fi
was represented in talks by his associate Omar Mustafa. The
Kurds presented three demands: autonomy in an Iraqi Republic,
a fair division of state revenues (primarily from oil in the
Kurdish region) , and withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kurdish
67
areas. *Arif was in a precarious position. His government
was under pressure from the ICP and there was a strong likeli-
hood that if too many concessions were given to the Kurds, ex-
treme Arab Nationalists in the Ba ' th party as well as dis-
gruntled military officers might attempt to overthrow him. At
the same time, however, Iraq was negotiating with Syria and
6 8
Egypt to form the tripartite UAR. This also posed problems
for 'Arif. If Iraq appeared disunited, the other two countries
might not be willing to join. On the other hand, a strong
united Iraq might be able to negotiate for a strong position
within the UAR. There was also the danger that by granting
Kurdish autonomy, 'Arif might be perceived by the Syrians and
Nasser as a traitor to Arab Nationalism. The course he chose
69
was to release many Kurdish political prisoners and an agree-
ment to "a decentralized government" for the Kurds. Because
134

of the equivocation, by 28 February Barzani threatened to
resume the war if no autonomy was granted and even threatened
71
to declare independence from Iraq. At the same time, Talabani
was in Cairo talking with Nasser in an attempt to gain Arab
72
support for the Kurdish cause.
The negotiations, however, dragged on and despite
Talabani ' s efforts and a two week stay in Baghdad by Barzani
73in April, the issue of autonomy remained a sticking point.
By early June there were reports that the negotiations had
failed and, with the coming of spring, that both sides were pre-
paring to fight. By 10 June another Iraqi offensive was under-
way against the Kurds and the RCC proclaimed: "We are purging
the northern area of the remnants of Barzani 's gang and the
74
northern area is reported operational." Again a bombing
offensive against villages was initiated and some 60,000
75Iraqis were estimated to be fighting up to 30,000 Pesh Merga .
The Kurds again followed their pattern of withdrawing from the
lowlands but this time added a new tactic: threats against
76the oil pipelines. Other new factors were the gathering of
elements of almost all (except the Herkis) tribes to Barzani,
use of Talabani as a Kurdish representative in Europe, and the
77
support for the Kurds by Arab newspapers. Another new ele-
ment was added in June 1963, when in an anti-Nasser move, Syria




During the negotiations, the Soviets had claimed that
'Arif was prevaricating and continually came out in support of
the Kurds. To this was added in July 1963, the recall of
Soviet technicians from Iraq and a Mongolian initiative at
79the U.N. which accused Iraq of extermination tactics. The
fighting continued very heavily through 18 August 1963 with
neither side really able to win. On the 18th the Kurdish
representative Abbas Mamand Agha met with Ma j . General Saleh
Mahdi Anashi at Raniah, and conditions were exchanged. The
Iraqis were willing, in return for Mullah Mustafa's departure
from Iraq and a cessation of fighting, to offer to grant some
Kurdish demands for self-rule (i.e. cultural and education
demands), $56 million dollars annually from state revenues,
and $14 million in indemnities to the tribes. Autonomy issues
would be discussed later. The Kurds countered with a demand
for release of political prisoners and stated that Mullah
Mustafa would only leave Iraq if those responsible for the war
8
of extermination were ousted also. Needless to say, neither
side would accept those terms and the war continued. Iraq,
however, was running out of parts for their aircraft and tanks,
as well as ammunition. Egypt and -the USSR refused to supply the
81
parts and Syria had very few to give.
In November, however, a mini-coup was held in which
the Ba'th leaders were removed and which 'Arif and the military
remained solely in power. On 23 November 'Arif, freed of his
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Ba'thish constraints, reinitiated moves toward the UAR and pro-
8 3posed new promises to the Kurds to end the fighting. The
Kurds held out for terms but were also beginning to suffer
from an economic blockade and heavy civilian casualties. Also
in January 1964, Nasser had talked with 'Arif at the Arab
Leader's Conference about the Kurds and had sent a representa-
tive to Barzani. Nasser, at this time, was still concerned
with his prestige, but was also becoming more concerned with
uniting Arab armies against Israel.
On 10 February 1964, 'Arif and Barzani announced a
truce and a resumption of negotiations. The Government posi-
tion was once again stated but without promising autonomy:
"the Iraqi government endorses the national rights of the Kurds
85
within one Iraqi national entity." This was coupled with
promises to release prisoners and to reconstruct the north.
8 6Additionally, Mullah Mustafa was free to remain in Iraq.
The Mullah, by now rather wary of Iraqi promises, stated his
position clearly on 29 February:
We're going to give the government a chance to show what
it is willing to do for the Kurds by way of granting their
national rights. If they don't live up to their promises,
we will be forced to fight again. 87
During the cease-fire period, the Iraqis delayed in
implementing promises granted. Of more importance was the out-
break of fighting within the Kurdish movement due to the long-
suppressed differences between Barzani and the Politburo of
137

the KDP . Essentially these differences were due to on the one
hand, Mullah Mustafa's desire to negotiate with the Iraqis and
on the other hand the KDP politburo's desire to press mili-
tarily what they saw as a weakened, unsteady Iraqi government.
Additionally, there were ideological splits as the Mullah was
still very tribally oriented in his outlook while the KDP
Politburo was concentrating on building a political infrastruc-
ture and implementing "agrarian reform measures" in their
88
area. After much maneuvering, in which the Mullah gained
the support of the Herkis, in July 1964 some 2000 Barzani Pesh
Merga advanced southward into the KDP sector and drove
Talabani's forces into Iran where they gained some new re-
90
cruits and it is thought, some support from the Shah. At
this stage, the Shah was interested in seeing a disunited Iraq
persist and also, by playing off the KDP Politburo against
Barzani, could prevent a united Kurdish movement from attrac-
90ting too many Iranian Kurds. The absence of the KDP
hierarachy allowed Barzani to strengthen his own grassroots
support and at two Kurdish congresses held in July and
91September he first expelled the Politburo from the KDP, and
then, after mediation, reaccepted all members of the KDP under
his sole authority.
The Iraqis continued to delay implementation of
Kurdish reforms, perhaps encouraged by the internecine fight-
ing between the Kurds. As a result, after talks in August,
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the Mullah began reforming his troops and on 12 November 1964,
93proclaimed a defacto autonomy in Kurdistan and formed a cabinet.
Because of winter conditions/ no real outbreaks of fighting
ensued and 'Arif continued to express his willingness to con-
94 ^
sider the "realities of the Kurdish problem." At the same
time, Mullah Mustafa again appealed to the West and to U.N.
Secretary-General U. Thant for guarantees of Kurdish autonomy.
The uneasy truce persisted through March 19 65 when reports of
up to 65,000 Iraqi troops massing near Kurdistan were
96
received. By 23 April 1965 the Iraqis had started another
97heavy offensive against the Kurds. This offensive was similar
to earlier ones and had essentially the same result: stalemate.
In November, 1965 Abdulla Rahman al-Bazzaz, a civilian,
gained the Premiership in Iraq and a new chance for peace
seemed possible. On 9 November 1965, the Bazzaz government
issued a new appeal to the Kurds which stated that Kurdish
autonomy would be recognized within a unified Iraq, and in which
Kurdish demands for cultural, economic, and social rights
9 8
would be recognized. The Kurds, now very wary of Iraqi
overtures, continued fighting with some success through
December and the Iraqis on 7 December began receiving help
99from Egyptian troops. Nasser, who had seen the Kurdish pro-
blem severly hamper his efforts for a UAR and for Arab unity
against Israel, by now had made up his mind to help his Arab
brothers once and for all against the Kurds. During this
139

winter fighting, itself a new development in the revolt,
the Kurds were much better armed, with heavier equipment
then before and inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi forces.
There was, in addition to evidence that Iran was providing
covert support to the Kurds, a first mention that Israel was
also providing support. Israel's motives would have been
rather obvious. By supporting Barzani they could accomplish
several objectives: a key Arab state would remain divided and
unable to confront them, sizeable amounts of Arab troops and
other resources would be tied up against the Kurds, and the
civil war might continue to delay other efforts at Pan-Arab
unity. There were further reports in late December that the
Iranian border was open and that Kurds were crossing it at
will enroute to Europe and other areas, and that a new KDP
102
office for international support was being opened in Brussels.
The fighting persisted but in February 1966 Talabani,
in a new move for power, attempted to overthrow Barzani and
started undercover dealings for peace with the Iraqi govern-
ment. The Mullah found out about this and attempted to arrest
Talabani who was able to escape into Iran from where he made
103direct contact with Premier Bazzaz. It was probable that
the Iraqis knew that they would continue to have difficulties
in negotiating with the unassailable Barzani and Talabani '
s
move gave them a chance at the least, to actively work to
split the Kurdish movement, and at best, to achieve peace on
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Iraqi terms. This was not to occur, as the Mullah retained his
position and fighting continued through April 1966. On 13
April, President 'Arif was killed in a helicopter crash, and
his brother Abdul Rahman 'Arif became the new President. This
factor opened a new opportunity. Mullah Mustafa now had a
new actor to deal with to replace the other 'Arif whom he had
come, quite naturally, to distrust. The new President, on
10419 April, made a statement which talked to autonomy and the
Mullah responded on 20 April with a ceasefire. The Kurdish
demands presented were essentially the same as before with
one new one, a requirement for a neutral Arab country to act
105
as a guarantor for any agreement reached. After some
10 6
negotiations, the Iraqis, fortified by offers of Soviet aid,
again were unable to swallow autonomy for the Kurds. After
a statement on 2 8 April in which 'Arif stated that the Kurds
107
would be forgiven if they repented, and with the arrival of
good weather, the Iraqis launched another offensive with
108
30,000 men on 2 May 1966.
Barzani had consolidated his strength during the cease-
fire but still was at odds with Talabani. Nonetheless, the
109Kurds were able to inflict defeats on the Iraqis by late May.
The Iraqis were following a new policy of relocating Kurds
from oil-areas by this time and were also continuing to negoti-
ate with Talabani. The failure of this Iraqi offensive
strengthened Bazzaz's hand and Barzani, probably concerned over
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Talabani's actions, as well as operating from a position of
strength, offered new demands to Iraq in late June. Demands
for a Kurdish military force and oil revenues were dropped
from this list and Bazzaz broadcast a twelve point program
for peace in which, among other things, Kurdish government
rights would be established, the Kurdish language would be
112
used, and money for reconstruction would be made available.
Barzani accepted the proposal and a new cease-fire went into
113
effect which was to last until 1 March 1969.
2. The Ceasefire
There were indications, however, that the ceasefire
was not popular among all segments of the Iraqis. In July
1966 a Colonel Razzak led an abortive coup attempt in which
the professed goals were to forceably solve the Kurdish pro-
114blem, redeem the army, and preserve the Arab unity. Army
influence was also sufficient to force the resignation of
Bazzaz in August 1966. The Kurds, as well, were not
completely satisfied with the results of the ceasefire.
Barzani retained his forces intact through the period and made
repeated charges that the government was reneging on its pro-
116
mises. By March 1968, both sides were dissatisfied with
the situation but neither was willing to fight again. The
Mullah was still trying to obtain political goals and to prevent
further destruction in Kurdish areas. The Iraqis also had
117large forces in Jordan facing the Israelis. The situation
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remained in a stalement through 17 July 19 68 when another coup
in Iraq brought the Ba ' th party back to power under President
Ahmed Hassan al-Bakr.
The new regime, however, continued to maintain the
ceasefire with the Kurds. On 21 July 1968 in a gesture of
reassurance, then Premier Razek al-Nayef, met with Barzani to
continue discussions on Kurdish rights and in August 1968 the
government issued a pledge of adherence to the promise of
118Kurdish local government. The Kurdish reception to these
overtures was cool but the attitude was one of "wait-and-see"
with regard to the new regime's actions. Later in August
there was new friction between Barzani and the Ba'thists. The
Kurds had been promised four cabinet ministerial positions in
the new government but were only allowed to appoint two. One
minister from the Talabani faction of the KDP, Tahar Mohieddon,
i • , o 119was also appointed.
Perhaps these differences might have been worked out,
but later in December, there were evidences of outside powers
approaching Barzani with offers of support. On 14 December
1968, the Iraqis reported that they had broken up an Israeli spy
ring which had been active in Kurdish areas . According to
Iraqi sources the purposes of this ring were to "... stir up
120trouble with dissident Kurdish tribesmen in the north."
Additionally, after the ceasefire ended and fighting resumed, it




and anti-air warfare weapons. Finally, an Iraqi Brigadier-
General Madhat al-Haj Sirri, on trial for espionage in June
1969, admitted that he had been working for the CIA for 9 years
and had coordinated Israeli and Iranian overtures to the
122
Kurds. While these reports were initially dismissed in the
West as propaganda, the new weapons systems plus Iran's
123
abrogation of the Shatt-al-Arab agreement on 18 April 1969
pointed to continued Iranian and Israeli attempts to foment
disunity within Iraq. The ceasefire finally broke down on
1 March 19 69 when -the Pesh Merga attacked oil facilities at
Kirkuk and caused a disruption of 70 percent of Iraq's oil re-
124fining capacity and $2 million dollars in damage.
3. The Second Phase March 1969-March 1974
This phase consisted of active Kurdish insurgency from
March 1969-March 1970, and a ceasefire from March 1970-March
1974. During this phase Iranian and Israeli influences on the
Kurds continued but were joined by U.S. support. Iraq's Ba ' th
leaders moved closer to the Soviets.
The new Kurdish offensive in March 1969 achieved several
gains and the Mullah regained control of much of Kurdistan.
The Iraqi's were largely unsuccessful in containing the situa-
tion and in May 196 9 made new peace initiatives to the Mullah.
These initiatives included a renewed proposal for a law on
autonomy which would achieve a "peaceful and just solution" to
125the Kurdish question. In this regard, it appeared that
Hassan al-Bakr was trying to avoid the mistakes of past
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governments in being drawn into a no-win war situation and then
overthrown. Additional considerations which motivated the
Iraqis were that they still had 12,000 troops in Jordan and
6000 in Syria, faced possible internal difficulties from
'Arif-ists still at large, and needed to conserve their strength
12 6in the dispute with Iran. One of the most crucial reasons
for attempting to settle with the Kurds, however, was the
threat to oil resources. At that time, even considering low
price levels, Iraqi oil accounted for some 65 percent of state
127
revenues or a little over $400 million dollars annually.
These revenues were also badly needed to continue paying for
Soviet weapons. The Soviets also in August 1969 moved closer
to Iraq by signing an agreement for access to Iraqi oil and
128the development of the North Rumeila oil fields.
Barzani, with continued support from Iran, was not
satisfied with the Iraqi government offer. Again the problem
was over the definition autonomy. In October, Iraq launched
another offensive in the Kurdistan area in an attempt to cut
129
off the Iranian border from the Kurds. This offensive was
also unsuccessful but both sides were suffering, from
casualties and damage and the Mullah, still maintaining de
facto autonomy in Kurdistan, responded to an Iraqi peace over-
ture in December 1969. During the peace talks in Baghdad,
Barzani continued to insist on maintaining a Kurdish militia
and autonomy. Discussions were successful and on 11 March
145

1970 a new manifesto was issued by Hassan al-Bakr. This mani-
festo proclaimed a decentralized government for the Kurdish
region, economic reconstruction, amnesty, and other cultural
guarantees, and provided for autonomy for the Kurds by
13111 March 1974. There were, however, disagreements between
Barzani and al-Bakr over the Kirkuk area which the Kurds
claimed and which, because of its oil facilities, the Iraqis
132
could not afford to give away. The Kurds agreed to work
within this framework but also maintained 10,000 Pesh Merga
133intact. By 30 March 1970, in partial implementation of the
agreement, five Kurds were appointed to the cabinet which also
134held ICP and Ba'th party members.
As before, however, Barzani remained dissatisfied over
Iraqi slowness in implementing this agreement and in delayed
economic reconstruction. On 11 August 1970 he threatened to
withdraw the five cabinet ministers and refused to appoint
135the Kurdish Vice-President until more progress was achieved.
Peace continued, though, but Kurdish reconstruction continued
slowly and in January 1971 Emir Kamuran Badr Khan formed a
Kurdish American Relief society for reconstruction aid in the
United States with Justice William O. Douglas as its honorary
13 6
President. There were also indications of strife between
rival Kurdish factions during the peace. In early December
137
1970 an assasination attempt was made on Barzani' s son Idris




life. There were also indications that the Iraqis were
still trying to split the movement by dealing with the KDP fac-
139tion led by Jalal Talabani and Ibrahim Ahmed. Barzani was
very disturbed over this and also continued to be dissatisfied
with Iraqi progress in implementing the March 11th manifesto.
In late October 1971 he sent letters to Al-Bakr demanding that
shortfalls in autonomy, the Kirkuk problem, conduct of a
140
census, and appointment of legislators be rectified.
In 1972, the two super powers became directly involved
in the situation, as well. The U.S. through Iran which was
dealing with a more and more receptive Barzani, and the
Soviets became involved more closely than ever before with
Iraq. On 6 April 1972 Premier Alexei Kosygin visited Iraq
and negotiated agreements on the use of the port of Umm Qasr,
141
oil, and military support. Iraq, which had been urging war
on Israel and which was still embroiled in the dispute with
Iran, was receptive to these overtures and on 9 April 1972
signed a 15 year Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the
Soviets.
The U.S. also was receptive to overtures of the Shah
and was able to provide indirect support for Israel. The story
of U.S. involvement with the Kurds did not "break" until late
1975 when the Pike Commission was investigating CIA activi-
ties. However, it was determined that in May 1972, during
President Nixon's visit to the Shah, that it was agreed to
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support the Kurds against an anti-Israeli and pro-Soviet Iraq.
As Henry Kissinger stated: "Whatever the failings of the
Shah, wrestling perhaps with forces beyond any man's control,
he was for us that rarest of leaders, an unconditional ally, and
one whose understanding of the world situation enhanced our
..143
own. It was fe i t that there was a danger of Soviet-
radical encirclement of the "moderate" regimes of Saudi Arabia,
Jordan and the United Arab Emirates and U.S. support for the
Shah could bolster Iran and maintain the Kissingerian idea of
144
a regional balance of power. Another key factor in obtain-
ing U.S. support was that the U.S., still suffering from
Vietnam, would not have to commit any troops in the endeavor
145
and that it could be handled through covert means . Yet
another benefit to be derived from supporting the Kurds was the
occupation of Iraqi troops. Although Kissinger still has not
revealed the complete story of U.S. involvement, as he stated:
"The benefit of Nixon's Kurdish decision was apparent in just
over a year: only one Iraqi division was available to partici-
pate in the October 1973 Middle East War." 6
With this new source of support, and with what he per-
ceived as continued Iraqi intransigence, the Mullah by June
1973 began to rebuild his forces. His attitude on the Iraqis
was that only through force could he attain Kurdish aims:
"These Arabs seem to favor a no war - no peace policy every-




cover of a peace agreement." Also his rebuilding was
coupled with renewed calls for outside aid and promises to
148
the West of control of oil areas. With the autonomy deadline
drawing near, it was reported the Kurds still had some 20,000
men under arms and that Barzani could muster up to 100,000
149Pesh Merga . Barzani was also openly admitting the receipt
of aid from Iran but said that it was only 10 percent of what
150it should be. With regard to financial help and other
assistance from Israel, Barzani was evasive and when pressed,
only stated that "There are things that may be true that are
151better not spoken about."
In October 1973, the Kurds and Arabs were still at
odds over the issue of autonomy. As Saddam Hussein stated:
"You are aware that members of the KDP had submitted a pro-
posal but we see it is far removed from the concept of auto-
152
nomy." All historical arguments were rejected with regard
to Kurdish demands and negotiations continued for a time but
were broken off in early March 1974. Finally the Ba'th party,
being rapidly reinforced by sophisticated Soviet weapons and
advisors, felt strong enough to issue an ultimatum to the
Kurds. The Iraqi position was also aided by the presence of
the ICP with its own Kurdish representatives in the National
Front. The ultimatum issued to Idris Barzani was that dis-
cussions could continue from the 9th to the 11th of March 1974.
After that, the Law of Autonomy would be promulgated and a
149

15 day period of acceptance for the KDP would be allowed. If
the KDP had not joined the National Front by that time, they
153
would be considered as enemies. The discussions were fruit-
less and Iraq proclaimed on 11 March 1974 the Law of Autonomy for
154Kurdistan Region.
By 14 March there were indications that this was un-
acceptable to Barzani's followers. Some fighting was breaking
out between the Pesh Merga and the 45,000 Iraqi troops who were
. . . 155taking positions in the area. Additionally the Voice of
156Kurdistan (clandestine) , began to call out the tribesmen.
Talks still continued, but on 21 March 1974 the Kurds, with
approximately 20,000 men, declared a "defensive alert" in their
area and with the deadline approaching on 27 March, Mullah
157
Mustafa threatened all out war again. By 29 March 1974
war was in the air and the Mullah continued to seek additional
aid. When asked about his sources he stated: "A drowning
man stretches his hand for everything, whether a stone, a
158piece of food, or a piece of grass." A senior KDP official
also admitted that aid was being received from Israel, Iran,
and Syrian, and Turkish Kurds and that numerous doctors,
engineers, students, professors, religious leaders, army
159deserters, and policemen were flocking to Barzani.
4. The Third Phase March 1974-April 1975
Preparations escalated on both sides and fighting
broke out in April 1974 as the Kurds successfully cut off Iraqi
150

bases in the area in retaliation to a renewed Iraqi economic
blockade. By late April, the fighting was in earnest and
despite initial Kurdish successes, the Iraqis were able to
inflict massive damage in the area. Evidence of the severity
of Iraqi actions was provided when a new letter to U.N.
Secretary-General Waldheim was sent protesting mass genocide
and the use of napalm. For the first time in the revolt,
161large numbers of Kurdish refugees began fleeing into Iran.
The force of the Iraqi offensive was such that by September
1974, the Iraqis had captured virtually every village and
162the Mullah, for the first time, began to talk about defeat.
The government was also pressing hard into the mountain areas
with approximately 80,000 men committed and utilizing combined
163
arms attacks with Soviet advisors.
There was also evidence that the Sunni regime of Hassan
al-Bakr was using this conflict for internal political purposes.
Large scale conscriptions of the Shiites in the south were con-
164ducted and many casualties were sustained within their ranks.
Iran continued its support by providing direct intervention of
mobile artillery and by shooting down Iraqi Migs with Hawk
missiles in December 1974. Once again, winter snows
slowed the Iraqi drive and gave the Kuds a breather. During
this period Iraq continued attempts to mobilize Arab support
for its drive against the Kurds and Iran. These negotiations
proved successful and on 8 March 1975 at a meeting in Algiers
151

among OPEC nations, Iran and Iraq agreed to settle the Shatt-al
166Arab dispute and to end Iranian support for the Kurds. This
agreement on Iran's part was due to a perceived need to strength-
en OPEC unity. Also, clashes between Iraqi and Iranian forces
alerted the Shah to the fact that this conflict could rapidly
widen. This would have also been against U.S. interests for
regional stability in the area. Kissinger admitted that the
settlement of the dispute was also made possible by a U.S.
agreement with Iran's assessment of the Kurds' situation:
The Shah's decision in 1975 to settle the Kurdish problem
with Iraq was based on the judgment, almost certainly
correct, that the Kurds were about to be overwhelmed; they
could not have been saved without the intervention of two
Iranian divisions and $300 million in assistance from us.
The Shah was not willing to commit the former; this was
his sovereign decision to make. To imagine that Congress
would have appropriated the latter seen in the month that
Vietnam was collapsing would be fatuaous. If we had
sought this escalation of our covert intelligence opera-
tions, many of those later mourning the Kurds' tragic fate
would have probably led the charge against it. 167
With this final withdrawal of support, the Iraqis were
able to concentrate their full force on the Kurds and a massive
offensive was mounted on 11 March 1975 which pushed the Kurds
out of the mountains. This was followed by the Iranians closing
16 8
their border on 12 March to all but refugees. Finally on 13
March 197 5, the Kurds, outmanned and outgunned, agreed to a two
week ceasefire which had been proposed by the Shah. Iraq's leaders
promised at the end of this ceasefire to "resume their march to
169liquidate the pocket of lackeys for good" if they had not
yet surrendered, and on 19 March rejected Barzani ' s last offer
152

to negotiate. The only option was an amnesty offer which
would expire on 1 April. The Mullah, realizing that his
support was gone and with over 150,000 refugees in Iran,
announced the end of his resistance on 22 March 1975 saying:
"Instead of getting our rights and seeing a good end, we see
a bad end. There is a sort of cooperation between different
171
countries at our expense." Kurdish forces continued to
withdraw out of Iraq to Turkey and Iran and on 31 March Iraqi
forces advanced into what was left of the Kurdish areas and
172
were reported to be in complete control by 2 April 1975.
Mullah Mustafa Barzani wisely took refuge in Tehran and stated
173that further rebellion was futile and would never be resumed.
C. DEVELOPMENTS FROM APRIL 197 5-1980
1. Kurdish Political Developments
With his defeat and his associations with Iran and
the U.S., Mullah Mustafa Barzani was effectively discredited
as a leader of the Kurdish nationalist struggle. This led to
political groups which had been overshadowed by him to strive
for more influences and dominance within the Kurdish movement.
With Barzani ' s break with the government in March 1974,
two groups of KDP broke from his leadership and, professing
socialist ideals, worked with the Ba'th party. The first of
these was the branch led by Aziz Akrawi and Hashim Hassan.
Another member of this group was one of Mullah Mustafa's sons,
174Ubaidalla. This group became the KDP - Government Branch
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and closely cooperated with the Ba'th government and joined
175the National Peoples Pregressive Front. Hashim Hassan
became the Chief of the Executive Council of the Kurdish
176Province.
The second of these parties was the Kurdistani
Revolutionary Party led by 'Abd al-Sattar Tahir which had pre-
177
viously claimed itself as the left wing of the KDP . It too
cooperated with the Ba'th government and entered the National
Front. Another small group which broke off was led by a
moderate Kurdish nationalist Abd-Allah Ismail. This faction
has remained very small and while working with the Ba'th,
Ismail has not been able to form a party as such.
The biggest splits came after Barzani's defeat, how-
ever. The Kurdistan Democratic Party - Provisional Leader-
ship, was formed in December 1975 and remained closer to
Barzani's original philosophy. Although there were no dis-
tinct leaders, Massoud and Idris Barzani were known to be mem-
bers of this party. It has also maintained external links
179
with Kurdish groups in Europe, Iran and Turkey.
Another group was the KDP-Preparatory Committee, formed
in December 1976 by a onetime follower of Barzani, Mahmoud
Osman. Osman has been critical of Barzani's methods and
intended to struggle for overall leadership of the movement for
the KDP and to reconstitute it along "new progressive and
180democratic bases." Talabani also made a not unexpected
154

break in June 1975 when he formed the Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan (PUK) . He has been highly critical of Barzani's
"tribal" methods and described as the PUK's main objectives,
the overthrow of the Baghdad regime and the destruction of all
181
elements of the KDP. This group was based in Damacus and
with Iraq's perceived "turn to the west" after 1978 some evi-
18 2dence of Soviet support for their faction has been seen.
Aligned with the PUK were the Kurdistan Socialist Movement
183
which was founded in late 197 6 by Ali Askari, and the
Marxist-Leninist League (Maoist) which officially came into
U • 10-7C 184being in 1976.
The defeat of the Kurds caused a large-scale splinter-
ing of the movement and the emergence of the more leftist-
oriented groups vying for positions and clashes were reported
between the KDP-Provisional Leadership and other groups in
18 5 18 6
July 1976 and again in July 1978. A dominant party has
not emerged and strife between the groups could prevent a
unified Kurdish national movement from rising again in Iraq.
The KRP, however, has closely worked with the Ba'thists and on
15 August 1979 praised the Ba * th party for scoring "huge
187development and nationalist gains." There were further
evidences of factional fighting in Iran between the PUK and
18 8
the KDP-Provisional Leadership in August 1979 which indicated
that both of those groups were trying to obtain Iranian
Kurdish support for their objectives.
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Mullah Mustafa Barzani ' s death on 1 March 1979 in
189Washington, D.C. also removed the one Kurdish leader who
had had some success against the Iraqis. This could lead to
support for Talabani who has remained anti-Ba'th and was one
of the last surviving names of the Kurdish Revolt. On the other
hand, there have been signs that tie Kurds in Iraq have for-
given Barzani for his indiscretions and as stated in his
obituary, that he "will go down in history with the greatest
190
of all the Kurds - Saladin the Great." A mellowing of
attitudes toward Barzani, coupled with Ba'thist repression,
could serve to work to the advantage of his sons Idris, now
37, and Massoud now 34.
2. Iraqi Ba'th Policies
After taking control of the area, Iraq continued to
mend its fences with Iran and to fully impose the March 1974
declaration in Kurdistan. Its cooperation with the KRP and
other Kurdish elements, plus large oil revenues after 197 3,
has allowed the regime some success. This was coupled with
strong military control of the area and deportations of Kurds
191
away to southern Iraq. Additionally, in late 1977, the
Ba'th went on a campaign to eliminate Kurdish contacts abroad.
On 9 December an amnesty was announced which would last for
192
two months for the return of all Iraqi Kurds.
By December 1978 it appeared to Lord Kilbracken that
there was peace throughout most of Kurdistan, and Iraq was
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sure enough of its control to allow neutral observers into the
193
area for the first time. It was also reported in August
1978 that much redevelopment had occurred and one witness
observed new schools, housing and factories under construc-
194
tion. In early 1980, further evidence of the Ba'th's
benevolence, now directed by Saddem Hussein, was provided by a
member of the ruling council of Kurdistan, Abdel-Gafar al
Seyegh. He stated that he was an Iraqi first and that most
195
educated Kurds now considered themselves as Ba'thist Iraqis.
He also stated that: "We speak our own language, have our own
press, and schools, and Kurds are represented at all levels
196
of government." Additionally a budget allocation of some
$3,125 million has been announced for rebuilding in the region
197for 1980. The Iraqi Ba ' th position toward Kurdistan was
stated by Hassan al-Bakr in 1976:
In the present circumstances of prevalent stability in the
northern part of the homeland and of the growing national
unity, it behooves us to double and redouble our efforts
for implementing the revolution's programmes as regards
automony rule, the fulfillment of the ambitions of our
Kurdish people, and promotion of all-embracing develop-
ment in that dear part of the homeland. 198
Conditions as late as April 1980 were vividly
described by an Iraqi Kurd of the Pishtdari tribe who revisited
the area after living in the United States. To him there was
much evidence of money being spent in the area as previously
mentioned, and this in turn has kept Kurdish youth in the
199 •
area. However, the regime has removed the instruction in
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language from the schools and it is now only voluntary.
Additionally, only one Kurdish newspaper Khabat
, in Kurdicized
Arabic, is authorized for publication and it is "full of
Ba'thist, Pan-Arab, and Iraqi naticnalist propaganda." A key
change which he noted was the pervasive influence of the Iraqi
army. Where before the Kurds had been left alone in their
mountain fastnesses, now"there is not a hill in Kurdistan
201
which does not have an Iraqi army or police post on it.
"
Despite Ba'thist inspired improvements there are three issues
which may lead to unrest in Iraqi Kurdistan according to him.
The first is that Kurds cannot enter the Ba'th party proper
and therefore have no real hope of attaining power in Iraq.
Secondly they are very upset about the removal of language
instruction in the schools. Lastly, the Kurds are becoming
more and more resentful (as a "simmering volcano") of Arab
202
settlement and inroads in Kurdistan.
The recent, ongoing Iraqi-Iranian war could lead to
further unrest among Iraqi Kurds. Despite Ayatollah Khomeini's
203
castigation of the Iranian Kurds as infidels, with the
latest outbreak of war Tehran radio has urged the Kurds of
204Iraq to revolt against the Baghdad regime. This appeared
to be a replay of the Shah's tactics except without the
military support. There were 20,000 Iranian troops "poised"
205in Kordestan but as of 14 October 1980, their presence
appeared to be aimed more at control of Iranian Kurds who
might take advantage of war disruption than for use against
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Iraq or in support of Iraqi Kurds . Any support which
Khomeini might hope of receiving from Iraqi Kurds could also
be more than offset by damage and casualties which Iranian
aircraft have caused in Kirkuk, Mosul, Arbil, Kut, and
20 6Nasiriyah, all of which are in Kurdish territory.
D. CONCLUSIONS
From the foregoing, several conclusions are readily
apparent. The first one is that throughout the period of
revolt, and continuing to today, a strong fabric of Kurdish
nationalism and a demand for their rights has existed.
This nationalism, however, was caught in the web of local,
regional, pan-Arab and anti-Israel politics. Mullah Mustafa,
in his search for allies and support became embroiled in
negotiations with various parties, any and all of whom,
would change sides away from the Kurdish cause in search of a
greater goal. This happened both during the search for the UAR
and also during the pressure on Iran for greater OPEC unity.
The second conclusion is that while there was a fabric
of Kurdish nationalism in Iraq, it continued to be subject
to both tribal and ideological rifts. The intelligentsia in
the KDP politburo during the revolt really only worked with
Barzani because he held control over the majority of Kurdish
military forces. There was also evidence that not even all
the tribes rallied to the Kurdish banner and that some even
fought for the Iraqis against Barzani. Once the
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intelligentsia, particulary Talabani, had created their own
military capabilities in the mid-1960' s, there was a renewed
ideological struggle for control of the movement. This
struggle in turn made both Kurdish sides susceptible to
Iraqi bargaining. Talabani was susceptible in the hope of
recognition as the true progressive leader of the Kurds and
the Mullah was susceptible in that he had to negotiate after
1965 to preempt government overtures to Talabani. As has
been shown, these ideological rifts are still existant and
may even be a dominant factor in preventing further Kurdish
action in Iraq. The proliferation of groups and parties after
the Mullah's defeat pointed both to the success of Ba'thist
overtures to Kurdish elements, as well as the wide diffusion
of Kurds who would like to be leaders for all the Kurds.
External influences were existant through all phases
of the revolt. It was Soviet support which caused the return
of Mullah Mustafa in the first place. There was also a con-
straint on U.S. action initially for fear of disturbing
either Iran or Turkey. Arab nationalist and Israeli actors
came into play either to use the Kurds to weaken Iraq or to
support Iraq against the Kurds, depending on what the Iraqi
internal political status was. Iraqi politics also became
heavily involved starting with Kassim who hoped to divide the
Kurdish movement using Barzani. The Iranian factor, which
came into play after 1966 in response to Soviet arming of
160

Iraq and in 1969 with the Shatt-al-Arab dispute, became
increasingly important; enough so that the United States
would enter the picture in direct support of Iran and in
indirect support of Israel in 1972.
Initially, although Barzani repeatedly requested it,
the Kurds of Iraq were able to hold out against unstable
governments and an inefficient military without much aid.
Up to 1966 it appeared that all they received was what they
could steal or capture or what was provided to them by
Kurdish groups abroad. With heavier Soviet interests in
Iraq, and particularly after the 1972 Treaty of Friendship
and Cooperation, the Kurds were no longer facing just the
Iraqis but the military sophistication of the Soviets. For
Mullah Mustafa's forces to survive in that environment,
massive external weapons support and aid was required. The
loss of this aid in 1975 in the face of a strong regime with
modern weapons led, just as it did in Mahabad in 1946, to
the crushing of the Kurdish movement for autonomy and the
reimposition of central government control.
The role of oil has only been briefly touched on, but
it became more important as well after the 1973 price rises
and Iraqi nationalization efforts. Not only were the Iraqis
more than ever determined to defend and retain the oil-
bearing areas of Kurdistan after this, but the oil was a key
factor in attracting Soviet support and paying for Soviet
weapons and advisors. Finally only through the availability
161

of these oil revenues have the Iraqis been able to devote re-
sources to the redevelopment of Kurdistan which has been an
important factor in maintaining the peace and stability
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VI. CONCLUSION AND PROGNOSIS
A. CONCLUSIONS
1. Kurdish Nationalism
At the start of this study a definition of nationalism
was proposed which had as its elements unity of territory,
unity of culture, common history, pride and sorrow in the
nation's achievement, disregard of other groups, esteem for
nationals of the same group, devotion to the national entity,
common dominant socio-economic institutions, common government,
or a desire for one, and the hope for a great and glorious
future. The definition was further modified to reflect Middle
Eastern conditions in that nationalism could be considered to
be a rationalization of primordial sentiments of a people and
the exaltation of an ethnic principle.
As has been shown, the Kurds, throughout much of their
history, and particularly since 1880, have fit all or most of
the requirements of the proposed definition. They have re-
sided in and claimed ownership of the same unit of territory
and have had a belief in a common history. The history has
been embelished over time by numerous instances in which the
Kurds could both take pride and have sorrow for. Principal
items in which they have been able to take pride in have been
the exploits of Saladin Ayyubi, Mullah Mustafa Barzani, Sheikh
Said of Palu, and their general capability as warriors to hold
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out against seemingly greater odds. On the other hand, a
common sorrow can be expressed in the continued inability to
achieve a united independent Kurdish state and in the hard-
ships such as deportation, repression, and mass destruction,
which have accompanied each attempt to establish one. There
has also existed a strong disregard for other groups, such as
Turks, Assyrians, Armenians, and Arabs who live in or near
Kurdish areas. This disregard has been reinforced by the
efforts of Arabs, Iranians, and Turks to divide, repress, and
control the Kurds.
One weakness in the definition has been the requirement
for esteem for other nationals. Revolts up through 1975
depended heavily on the support of tribal levies to form large
groups of insurgents, or Pesh Merga which indicated some sense
of loyalty to the greater whole. However, inter-tribal fric-
tions, which weakened Sheikh Ubeidullah's rebellion, which
contributed to the end of the 19 2 Dilo Kurd Revolt, the end
of the Mahabad Republic, and which also worked against Mullah
Mustafa Barzani's revolt in Iraq, have also persisted through-
out the Kurdish struggle. As was shown, the lack of unity
between Sheikh Ahmed of Barzan and Sheikh Mahmud Barzinjah in
the 1930' s also pointed to an inability to cooperate toward the
greater whole.
This weakness also combined with two other areas of
weakness: the common devotion to a national entity and common
socio-economic links. Although the revolts of 1930 and 1937
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in Turkey, the Mahabad Republic of 1946 and Mullah Mustafa's
revolt of 1961-1975 showed evidences of cross-border loyalties
and external coordinating international Kurdish groups, they
also displayed rifts in different conceptions of the national
entity. The tribal leaders or "feudalists" possessed a con-
ception which was largely at odds with the perception possessed,
particularly after the 193 's, by a growing group of modernized
Kurdish intellectual political actors. This in turn led to a
split in ideas as to what the common socio-economic institution
for Kurds should be. The pattern which developed was one of
each group using each other for its own advantage. The tribal
leaders used the intellectuals as links to the prevailing cen-
tral government and the outside world and for logistic support.
Intellectuals on the other hand, such as the Kurds in the
Komala , or the ICP or Ibrahim Ahmed, or Jalal Talabani used the
tribal leaders to provide armed support with the hope of
achieving a break-away from a hostile regime and the subse-
quent hope of creating a new order in Kurdistan. With the
growth of power of national regimes in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey,
the devotion to an independent national entity for Kurds was
also tempered by reality. This was indicated by Mullah
Mustafa's shift to demands for autonomy as well as the several
groups of Iraqi Kurds who elected to work with the Ba'thist
government after 1974. The Iranian Kurds, who have been
opposing the Khomeini regime since March 1979, have also
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insisted not on independence, but on demands for autonomy
within a federal Islamic republic.
Primordial sentiments, however, have remained strong
for the majority of Kurds and a tribal structure, which is
being slowly eroded, still exists. As Hudson found:
The social structure in Kurdistan remains patriarchal and
tribal with local leadership over a village or locale in
the hands of an agha or local clan leader, linked to a
larger tribal community. The tribal organization helps
keep order among groups of adjacent and economically
independent villages, and it also functions to mobilize
warriors in the event of external threats, which, as
Kurdish history indicates, are chronic.
2
There have been developments throughout Kurdistan which point
to continued sociological rifts, however. In Turkey, develop-
ment in the east has been slower than in other areas, but it
has expanded greatly since the 1930' s, particularly in the
towns. The areas unaffected have been largely the remoter
3
areas in which tribal aghas still have much influence. Iraq's
massive attempts to redevelop and modernize the Kurdish pro-
vince have also led to new jobs and schooling. One danger of
the modernization efforts for national regimes has been the
historic growth of a middle class in those areas and the
4
creation of "... the breeding ground of modern nationalism."
As in Iraq, Turkish educated youth have rejected tribal-feudal
values and have joined socialist-oriented groups such as the
Dev-Genc , the Turkish Workers Party and the Eastern Revolutionary
5Hearths (DDO) . This development promised to widen the
ideological split between traditional Kurds and modernized Kurds
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as well as posing a potential danger to established regimes.
There has been a similar development in the Iranian Kurdish
situation between landlords and tribal leaders, or feudalists,
and the poltical leaders of the KDPI, the Marxist Komala and
associated groups. These developments pointed to another
assessment of Hudson that in the Middle-East, socio-political
cleavages have been becoming more important than primordial
7parochial cleavages.
However, the modernization and politization process has
proven to be a slow and agonizing one and in all likelihood,
primordial sentiments and ethnic particularism seem likely to
persist. This in turn, poses continued problems for local
governments attempting to assimilate the Kurds: "Since it is
clear that no amount of modernization is likely to eliminate
(through total assimilation) minority solidarity groups, the
possibility for ethnosectarian conflict remains a constant
gdanger should the conflict precipitating circumstances arise."
Studies in political culture and political socializa-
tion also have pointed to the importance of primary socialization
in the home in a child's early years as being crucial in deter-
9
mining his self-perception and attitude toward a government.
Continued Kurdish emphasis on folk-tales and the glory of the
Kurdish people can only partially be offset by later attempts
at schooling to instill loyalty to a greater Arab, Turkish or
Iranian entity. The conflict of loyalties has in the past caused
a phenomenon of cognitive dissonance as a result of discontinuous
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socialization in which, the individual has become hostile toward
either the regime or to his earlier ties . In the Kurdish
case, particularly in Turkey, it has been found that after
years of insistance the Kurds were really Turks, most Kurds had
insufficient Turkish to follow a Turkish newspaper or radio
newscast and that they were very receptive to broadcasts in
Kurdish from other neighborning countries, which in turn
reinforced their ethnic particularism.
In short, Kurdish nationalism in the Middle East
exists, although it has evolved from a largely tribal, ethnic
phenomenon to one which is now tempered by the physical
realities of the Kurds' situation as well as the impacts of
modernization and new ideologies. A strong tribal, traditional
element still forms the core of this nationalism but it has been
progressively split by the growth of a new class of intellec-
tuals who are striving for leadership of the Kurdish movement.
2. The Impact of External Influences
External influences on Kurdish nationalism have
impacted in a number of ways. Lack of government control of the
area, government efforts to impose authority or to repress the
Kurds, regional actor use of the Kurds against other actors,
regional cooperation against the Kurds, and extra-regional
actors' use of the Kurds for various reasons, have all
occurred in the past. The interaction of these factors has
led to a confused situation of countries working with the Kurds,
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then against the Kurds , and with and against each other de-
pending on the political vagaries of the Middle East political
sub-system. It has also led to the Kurds developing a sense
of political importance as a regional actor as well as the
knowledge that a successful move for Kurdish autonomy can only
12be independently sustained in the short-run. Long-run efforts
at autonomy or independence for the Kurds have required some
support from an external actor and when this support has been
removed, the revolt or republic, has failed.
Lack of central government control of the Kurdish
areas as a factor was demonstrated in several instances. It
had been a factor in pre-modern times and allowed the Kurdish
aghas and derebeys to maintain a semi-independence in their
feudal domains. Ismail Simko's revolt in Persia after World
War I was successful for as long as it was, in large part due
to the Qajar dynasty's weaknesses and inability to project
effective power into the regions. The Dilo Kurd revolt of 1920
occurred in a period when a new Arab government was establish-
ing itself and had not, even with British support, gained full
control of Iraq. Soviet actions in the West Azerbaijan region
during World War II prevented the central Iranian government
from imposing control over the Kurdish nationalists there. In
Iraq from 1961-1975, government forces, weakened by internal
Iraqi political differences, were also unable to effectively
enter and control the region. During the last two of these
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examples, regional and extraregional actors also interacted to
provide support to the Kurds against the central governments.
Central government attempts at control caused at least
two reactions among the Kurds: fear of submergence in an Arab,
13Turkish or secular culture and violent reactions to measures
of repression such as deportation and criminal punishments. As
early as Sultan Mahmud ' s time, his reform measures and attempts
at imposing control in Kurdish areas alienated the derebeys
.
Sheik Said's revolt in 1925 and the revolt of Sheikh Abdullah
which followed it, were reactions to Turkish secularism, the
attempted imposition of central government and Turkish nationalist
control in the region, and the Turkish Independence Tribunals
and deportations. The 1927 revolt of the Haideranlu and Jelali
tribes also had as a motivation anger against continued Turkish
repressive policies as did Sayyid Riza's 1937 revolt. The
1930 's revolts in Iraq also reflected a fear of submergence,
particularly after settlement of the Mosul question, and a
reaction to Britain's (then acting as a regional actor) and
Iraq's attempts to consolidate holdings prior to expiration of
the mandate.
Regional actor use of the Kurds has existed since
ancient times in the alliances between Kurds, Mongols, Turks,
Arabs and Persians. It was followed by Ottoman and Safavid
use of Kurdish tribes against each other to obtain or control
border territories. It was also a factor in Sheikh Ubeidullah's
revolt in 1880 when he received Ottoman support in an attempt

to gain Persian territory. In the mid-19 th century, Russia,
as a regional actor, appealed to and used Kurds against both
the Ottomans and Persians. After World War I, there was
evidence of Persian, British, and Ottoman restorationist
support for revolts in Turkey against the Kemalist regime.
More recently, the Iranians and Israelis supported the Kurds
against Iraq to weaken and divide the country so as to provide
for greater security for both Israel and Iran, and to assist
in territorial aggrandizement for the Shah.
Iraq's leaders, notably Kassim and later, the 'Arifs
and al-Bakr played on ideological and tribal rifts within the
Kurdish movement to internally divide it and weaken the Kurds.
Nasser and the rulers of Syria, while never providing tangi-
ble support for the Kurds, did, as the situation warranted,
attempt to use them as a lever against recalcitrant or hostile
Iraqi regimes. Finally, various regional parties such as the
Tudeh , the ICP, the Ba'th; and ethnic groups, such as the
14Armenians and the Palestinians have aligned with Kurdish
factions in attempts to further their own aspirations; whether
security for an autonomous Azerbaijan or weakening a Western-
leaning Iraqi regime. The pattern of involvement with the
Kurds appeared to be one in which the stronger regional power
attempted to use the Kurds against the weaker.
Another side of regional actors ' relations with
Kurdish nationalism has been shown by efforts at regional
cooperation-in-control. This usually became manifest after
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a period of Kurdish revolts in which the regional nation-
states (or empires) decided that they were losing more than
they were gaining by supporting the Kurds against one another.
Perhaps the first instance of this cooperation was the Treaty
of Erzerum in 1639. More recent examples were provided by
the Turko-Soviet cooperation in 1921 which made the Sevres
provisions unworkable. Other evidences of this were the
bilateral treaties in the 1920' s and 1930 's between Iraq, Iran,
Turkey, and the Soviet Union, which culminated in the signing
of the Saadabad Pact in 1937. The regional powers have also
cooperated with each other by closing their borders to Kurdish
movements. This was shown during Sheikh Said's revolt in 1925
when additional Turko-Syrian (French) cooperation occurred in
the transit of Turkish troops along the Baghdad Railway. In
1935 Turkey and Iraq cooperated against the Zibaris and in
1937 the French and Turks cooperated against the Kurds at
Jezirah. During Mullah Mustafa's flight after the end of the
Mahabad Republic, Iran, Iraq, and Turkey all cooperated with
each other to prevent his movements and further insurgency.
Provisions in the Baghdad Pact of 19 55 were aimed against the
Kurds, and later, at least Turkey cooperated with Iraq in
attempting to prevent Kurdish cross-border support to the Pesh
Merga. Even the Shah, after the 1975 accord with Iraq, re-
joined the cooperative effort against Kurdish nationalism.
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Extraregional support for the Kurds was largely a
post-World War I phenonmenon which was initiated by Sharif
Pasha's efforts to gain Great Power recognition of and
guarantees for a Kurdish state. The British, this time acting
as an extra-regional power, attempted to establish Sheikh Mahmud
Barzinjah in 1918 and later an autonomous Kurdish state which
would act as a buffer against Soviet threats to India and
other colonial interests. As has been noted, British actions
also took a regional character when they attempted to influence
the Kurds against the Turks during the Mosul controversy.
The Soviets also, after the 1917 revolution, have acted
for ideological reasons to use the Kurds in an effort to commu-
nize the area. The overtures of the Nazis and the Soviets
toward the Kurds during World War II were also an effort by
extra-regional actors against regional actors as well as
against the other extraregional powers, notably Great Britain.
The Soviet effort at Mahabad could be viewed from two per-
spectives: one as an attempt to expand Soviet influences for
ideological purposes and secondly as an attempt against other
extraregional powers to both establish a buffer or to break
out of the "ring of capitalist encirclement." With the advent
of the cold-war, the Soviet Union and the U.S. became involved
in propagandizing the Kurds. The former became involved with
the objective of weakening the pro-Western regimes of what was




Repeated appeals of the Kurds to the League of Nations,
the United Nations and to the U.S., Great Britain, and the
Soviet Union, were further evidence of their recognition that
external power support was needed to achieve Kurdish aspira-
tions. This was especially true during Mullah Mustafa Barzani's
1961-1975 revolt. His willingness to accept aid from any side
also demonstrated his unwillingness to be classed as anything
other than a Kurdish nationalist. The U.S., which was fore-
stalled by its concerns for Turkey and Iran during the 1950*3
and 1960 's, also came to the conclusion in 1972, that to
achieve its regional and global aims for stability, aid to
the Kurds could be useful. Another "external actor" which
heavily affected the Kurds' chances in 1975, was the entity of
OPEC. While furtherance of OPEC unity was not the dominant
reason for the Shah's withdrawal of support in 1975, it was a
factor in that withdrawal.
A major conclusion drawn from the above not lost on
today's Kurds, has been that extraregional or regional actors
supporting the Kurds have rarely wanted them to be fully success-
ful in their aspirations. They have been employed for the
most part in pursuit of the goals of the other actors, who
payed lip-service to Kurdish nationalist goals, but who really
had other objectives in mind. This has become more apparent
to the Kurds, particularly since 1975. While they still have
maintained fairly widespread external links, both for
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coordination of efforts, and for links to external powers,
there is also evidence of a realization of the need for self-
reliance. As stated by Iran's KDP leader Abdul Rahman
Qassemlu:
Defeat piled upon defeat have given rise to the legend
which says that the Kurds have no friends. The truth is
that the Kurds have many friends but to find them they
must seek them out, especially in the country they live
in.!6
This sentiment could also be interpreted to mean that the Kurds
in the future may be susceptible to external influences, but
they are also very likely to be more exacting or demanding in
the alliances made. At least two developments have pointed to
this. The ascendancy of the Kurdish intelligentsia to posi-
tions of power could lead to more sophisticated negotiations
for support and pay-back. Secondly, the apparent abandonment,
at least for the present, of the goal of independence, and the
acceptance of a goal for local autonomy, could make the Kurds
less desperate for and therefore less susceptible to extra-
regional overtures.
3. The Hypothesis
The hypothesis posed for examination was that the
importance of Kurdish nationalism and its vitality are dependent
upon the greater conflict of which it is a part; to wit: the
status of governments in, and disputes between the regional
actors as well as the power roles of external actors in the
Northern Tier and Persian Gulf region. The foregoing evidence
supports this hypothesis. External influences on the movement
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have been an important factor in causation and suppression of
revolts and other Kurdish actions and much of the visible
vitality of Kurdish nationalism has been due to the effects
of those influences. As was vividly demonstrated in Iran in
1946 and in Iraq after 1958, the withdrawal of external
support /caused the collapse of large-scale Kurdish efforts.
The search Jbr support of Iraq's post-revolt Kurds, either
from the Ba'th or Syria or even the West, points to the con-
tinual recognition that while Kurdish nationalism is strong
enough to attract large numbers of followers, outside support
is essential to achieve any success.
B. PROGNOSIS
Various estimates place total Kurdish population figures
17between 6,990,000 and 16,470,000. Those figures in and of
themselves point to continued difficulties within the region.
As the current de facto Kurdish autonomy in Iran indicates,
the Kurds are still very capable of mustering support along
ethnic lines. The Kurdish success there, while no extra-
18
regional support has yet been proven, seems to be largely
a factor of lack of central government control. The Kurds
there have established links with both Talabani ' s PUK and the
Barzanis 1 KDP-Provisional Leadership. They have also, how-
ever, established additional ties with other parties, such as
19the Tudeh , the Fedayi and the Mujahidin . While these groups
are primarily leftist in orientation, they appear to be working
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with the Kurds through a revitalized marxist Komala and the
20KDPI of Qassemlu. Additionally, anti-Sh'ism is a factor
and many of the Sunni Kurds are united in their support of
21the other main Kurdish leader Sheikh Ezzeddin Husseini. At
least two other Kurdish radical groups are known to exist and
are centered in the Marivan region: The Revolutionary Kurdish
Worker's Movement and the Movement for the Defense of Liberty
22
and Revolution in Kurdistan. Qassemlou and Hosseini have
repeatedly stated that they wished to work with the Khomeini
regime in order to carry out the revolution and achieve auto-
23
nomy for Iranian Kurdistan.
It would appear for the present that the Kurds will
remain in control of their area until a stronger central
government is able to reimpose its control. Whether or not the
U.S. or U.S.S.R. will be approached, given their past records,
or if approached, will give aid is unclear. With regard to
the U.S., current policy appears to place more emphasis on
actual U.S. military involvement to protect the West's inter-
est in the region which might, in turn, rule out covert
24
support for the Kurds or other groups. While Kurdish auto-
nomy in Iran and links to leftist groups is seen to offer
25
opportunities to the Soviets, it has been argued that
current Soviet policy is:
"... to support the Iranian Left so long as there are no
open clashes with Khomeini. There are no indications
that the Soviet Union will try to use leftist groups,
the Kurds, or other minority groups in Iran, to destabil-
ize the country. °
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The Soviets may very well be forestalled from acting in support
of the Kurds by the suspicion that further destabilization in
the region could only draw the U.S. in deeper. Recent rela-
tions during the 1980 Iran-Iraq war have shown that the Soviets
and the U.S. were immobilized with regard to action in the
region for fear of causing a larger reaction by the other power,
There have been indications that the Israelis recently
have attempted to work with Iranian Kurds. On 28 August 1979
it was reported that four Israeli spies were arrested in
Kordestan in fighting between the "defunct Democratic Party of
27Kordestan" and Islamic Republic forces. Israeli motives
could be to support the KDPI against the Khomeini regime, which
2 8has shown sympathy for the PLO or possibly to strengthen
Kurdish segments who may be opposed to Talabani ' s PUK which
29
also has PLO ties. More recent reports have claimed that
over 200 Kurds from both Iraq and Iran are being trained in
Israeli camps with a view toward weakening the regime of Saddam
30Hussein in Iraq.
In Turkey, prior to the military coup, it was evident
that Kurds were also dissatisfied with their situation and were
causing unrest. Several groups were known to be active. The
Apocular is one of the major ones and is described as a left-
wing group which espouses an independent, socialist Kurdish
31
state. Leftist groups were reported to be active in the




of Iran in the Fall of 1979. Other known organizations in
Turkey are the Anti-Colonialist Democratic Culture organiza-
tion (ASDK-DER) , the Peoples Revolutionary Culture Associ-
ation (DDKD) , and the Kurdish Proletarian Party. These are all
leftist in orientation and the last two argue for the Kurdish
33
state as part of a greater proletarian revolution. " The re-
maining groups are underground: the Liberation of the Kurdish
Nation (KUK) , the KDP , and the Kawa (a legendary Kurdish hero)
34
and are known collectively as the Rizkari (Liberation) group.
These last groups may also have ties with the Armenian Secret
Army (ASA) which is also leftist and has engaged in post-coup
35terrorist activities. The overall size of these groups is
uncertain, but it was reported in August 1979 that over 30,000
people in east Turkey had signed a petition to participate in
3 fi
a Kurdish political struggle in the area. When this figure
37is combined with estimates of 7000-50,000 Pesh Merga in
Iran, and when one considers the reputed numbers of Mullah
Mustafa's past followers, a potential force of over 100,000
Pesh Merga could be mobilized. This appears unlikely however,
in that there are numerous groups and leaders all vying for
control who are unlikely to cooperate with each other.
Additionally, the regional powers at present are cooperating
38
with each other in controlling the Kurds and it does not




What does appear certain is that the question of
Kurdish discontent with their situation is likely to persist.
The political movement appears divided along ideological and
personal lines and is therefore susceptible to external efforts
to play one faction off against the other. The growth of the
leftist influence points to Kurds who are disillusioned with
traditional tribal organizations as well as a likelihood that
in the future Kurdish demands may be oriented more towards a




Kurds at Sanandaj fought Iranian troops on 18 March 1979.
Initial causes were a desire for autonomy and anti-Shi-ite
sentiments. The two main Kurdish leaders were named as reli-
gious Sheikh Ezzedin Husseini and the KDPI leader Abdul Rahman
Qassemlu. Ayatollah Khomeini's response to the Kurds was that
they were "acting against Islam" and were "foreign agents".
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single Koran." John Kifner, "Kurdish Tribesmen Battle Iranian
Troops , " New York Times , March 20, 1979, p. 3.
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Exploit Iran Turmoil," Manchester Guardian , Dec. 16, 1979, p. 8.
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PERTINENT TREATIES AND AGREEMENTS
1. Treaty of Peace and Frontiers (Erzerum) : The Ottoman
Empire and Persia 17 May 1639 (excerpts)
:
The result of the discussions on both Parties has been
written down and is as follows: Tzanan, Bedrie, Mendelgeen,
Derteuk and Dernai, in the Pashalik of Baghdad, will remain
under the authority of our august Padishah, who will also
take possession of the Plains between Mendelgeen and Derteuk,
and the Mountain will remain under the authority of the Shah,
Serminil is fixed as frontier between Derteuk and Dernai.
That part of the country of Haronia, occupied by the Tribes
of Djaf and Zilja Uddin, will belong to the Sultan. Pezai
and Zerdony remain to the Shah. The fortress of Zindjir,
which lies on the top of the Mountain, shall be demolished;
the Sultan will take possession of the Villages lying
westward of it, and the Shah will take possession of those
lying eastward. The villages on the Mountain above Sailm
Cale, near Chehrezor, will be in the possession of the
Sultan, and the Villages lying on the East, will be in the
possession of the Shah, who will also keep the Castle of
Orman with the Villages which are dependent on it. The
defile leading to Chehrezor has been established as a fron-
tier. The fortress of Cotour (Kotur) and Makoo on the
frontier of Van, and the fortress of Magazberd towards
Kars and Van, will be demolished by the two Parties, and so
long as the Shah will not have molested the fortresses of
Akiskha, Kars, Van, Chehrezor, Baghdad, Bassora, and other
Places within the limits, such as fortresses, forts,
Districts, lands, hills and mountains and no such horrible
act as provoking to rebellion shall have been committed by
Him, on their part also His Majesty our Great Padishah will
respect this Peace, and no molestation shall, contrary to
Treaty, be done to the places which remain within the limits
of the other side.
2. Treaty of Peace (Erzerum): The Ottoman Empire and Persia
28 July 1823 (excerpts)
:
Art. I. The Two High Powers do not admit each other's
interference in the internal affairs of their respective
States. From this period, on the side of Baghdad and Koordistan
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within the Boundaries, is the Persian Government to inter-
meddle, or authorise any acts of molestation, or to assume
any authority over the present or former Possessors of
those Countries.
And on that frontier, should the Tribes of either side
pass the boundaries for a summer or winter residence, the
Agents of His Royal Highness the Heir Apparent, with the
Pasha of Bagdad, shall arrange the tribute customary to be
paid, the rent of the pasture lands, and other claims, in
order that they may not cause any misunderstanding between
the two Governments
.
Art. III. The Tribes of Hyderanloo and Sibbikee, which
have been the cause of contention between the Two High
Powers, and are now dwelling in the Territory of the Ottoman
Empire, should they from thence transgress the boundary of
Persia, and commit any ravages, the Turkish Frontier
Authorities will endeavor to prevent such proceedings, and
punish the offenders. In case that these tribes continue
to invade and molest the Persian Territory, and the Frontier
Authorities do not put a stop to these aggressions, the
Ottoman Government shall cease to protect them, and should
these Tribes of their own will aid choice return to Persia,
their departure shall not be prohibited nor opposed. But
after their arrival in Persia, should they again desert to
Turkey, the Ottoman Government shall afford them no further
protection, nor shall they be received. In the event of
their return to Persia, should these tribes disturb the
tranquillity of the Ottoman Territory, the Persian Frontier
Authorities agree to use every effort to prevent these
irregularities
.
Source ; Numbers 1 and 2: J. C. Hurewitz , Diplomacy In The Near
and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-19 56 . Princeton,
N. J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., Inc., 1956, Vol. I.
N
3. The Treaty of Sevres: Articles 62-64, 10 August 1920.
Art. 62. A Commission sitting at Constantinople and composed
of three members appointed by the British, French and Italian
Governments respectively shall draft within six months from
the coming into force of the present Treaty a scheme of local
autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas lying east of
the Euphrates, south of the southern boundary of Armenia as
it may be hereafter determined, and north of the frontier of
Turkey with Syria and Mesopotamia , as defined in Article 27,
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II. (2) and C3) . If ananimity cannot be secured on any
question, it will be referred by the members of the Commission
to their respective Governments. The scheme shall contain
full safeguards for the protection of the Assyro-Chaldeans
and other racial or religious minorities within these areas,
and with this object a Commission composed of British/ French,
Italian, Persian and Kurdish representatives shall visit the
spot to examine and decide what rectifications, if any,
should be made in the Turkish frontier, where, under the pro-
visions of the present Treaty, that frontier coincides with
that of Persia.
Art. 63. The Turkish Government hereby agrees to accept and
execute the decisions of both the Commissions mentioned in
Article 62 within three months from their communication to
the said Government.
Art. 64. If within one year frcm the coming into force of the
present Treaty the Kurdish peoples within the areas defined in
Article 62 shall address themselves to the Council of the
League of nations in such a manner as to show that a majority
of the population of these areas desires independence from
Turkey, and if the Council then considers that these peoples
are capable of such independence and recommends that it should
be granted to them, Turkey hereby agrees to execute such a
recommendation, and to renounce all rights and title over
these areas.
The detailed provisions for such renunciation will form the
subject of a separate agreement between the Principal Allied
Powers and Turkey.
If and when such renunciation takes place, no objection will be
raised by the Principal Allied Powers to the voluntary adhe-
sion to such an independent Kurdish State of the Kurds in-
habiting that part of Kurdistan which has hitherto been inclu-
ded in the Mosul Vilayet.
4. Treaty of Friendship: Persia and Russia, Article V,
26 February 1921:
V. The two High Contracting Parties undertake-
1. To prohibit the formation or presence within their
respective territories of any organizations or groups of
persons, irrespective of the name by which they are known,
whose object is to engage in acts of hostility against
Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia.
They will likewise prohibit the formation of troops or




2. Not to allow a third party or any organisation,
whatever it be called, which is hostile to the other Contrac-
ting Party, to import or to convey in transit across their
countries material which can be used against the other
Party.
3. To prevent by all means in their power the presence
within their territories or within the territories of their
allies of all armies or forces of a third party in cases
in which the presence of such forces would be regarded as
a menace to the frontiers, interests or safety of the other
Contracting Party.
5. Treaty of Friendship: Turkey and Russia, Articles IV and
VIII, 16 March 1921:
IV. The contracting parties, establishing contact be-
tween the national movement for the liberation of the
Eastern peoples and the struggle of the workers of Russia
for a new social order, solemnly recognise the right of these
nations to freedom and independence, also their right to
choose a form of government according to their own wishes.
VIII. The contracting parties undertake not to tolerate
in their respective territories the formation and stay of
organisations or associations claiming to be the Government
of the other country or of a part of its territory and
organisations whose aim is to wage warfare against the
other State.
Russia and Turkey mutually accept the same obligation
with regard to the Soviet Republic of the Caucasus.
"Turkish territory," within the meaning of this Article,
is understood to be territory under the direct civil and
military administration of the Government of the Grand
National Assembly of Turkey.
6. Frontier Treaty: The United Kingdom and Iraq and Turkey
Articles 6-12, 5 June 1926.
Art. 6. The High Contracting Parties undertake recipro-
cally to oppose by all means in their power any prepara-
tions made by one or more armed individuals with the ob-
ject of committing acts of pillage or brigandage in the




Art. 7. Whenever the competent authorities designated
in article 11 learn that preparations are being made by one
or more armed individuals with the object of committing acts
of pillage or brigandage in the neighbouring frontier zone
they shall reciprocally inform each other without delay.
Article 8. The competent authorities designated in
article 11 shall reciprocally inform each other as quickly
as possible of any act of pillage or brigandage which may
have been perpetrated on their territory. The authorities
of the party receiving the notice shall make every effort in
their power to prevent the authors of such acts from cross-
ing the frontier.
Article 9. In the event of one or more armed individuals,
guilty of a crime or misdemeanour in the neighbouring fron-
tier zone, succeeding in taking refuge in the other frontier
zone, the authorities of the latter zone are bound to arrest
such individuals in order to deliver them, in conformity
with the law, to the authorities of the other party whose
nationals they are, together with their body and their arms.
Article 10. The frontier zone to which this chapter of
the present Treaty shall apply is the whole of the frontier
which separates Turkey from Iraq and a zone 75 kilometres in
width on each side of that frontier.
Article 11. The competent authorities to whom the execu-
tion of this chapter of the Treaty is entrusted are the
following: -
For the organisation of general co-operation and respon-
sibility for the measures to be taken :-
On the Turkish side: the military commandant of the
frontier;
On the Iraq side: the mutessarifs of Mosul and of Arbil.
For the exchange of local information and urgent communi-
cations : -
On the Turkish side: the authorities appointed with the
consent of the Valis;
On the Iraq side: the kaimakams of Zakho, Amadia, Zibar
and Rowanduz
.
The Turkish and Ira q Governments may, for administrative
reasons, modify the list of their competent authorities, giving
notice of such modification either through the permanent fron-
tier commission provided for in article 13 or through the
diplomatic channel.
Article 12. The Turkish and Iraq authorities shall refrain
from all correspondence of an official or political nature
with the chiefs, sheikhs, or other members of tribes which are
nationals of the other State and which are actually in the
territory of that State.
They shall not permit in the frontier zone any organisation
for propaganda or meeting directed against either State.
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7. Treaty of Guarantee and Neutrality: Persia and the USSR,
Article 4. 1 October 1927.
Art. 4. In view of the obligations laid down in Articles 4
and 5 of the Treaty of February 26, 1921, each of the Con-
tracting Parties, being determined to abstain from any inter-
vention in the internal affairs of the other Party and from
any propaganda or campaign against the Government of the
other Party, shall strictly forbid its officials to commit
such acts in the territory of the other Party.
Should the citizens of either of the Contracting Parties
in the territory of the other Party engage in any propaganda
or campaign prohibited by the authorities of this latter
Party, the Government of that territory shall have the right
to put a stop to the activities of such citizens and to im-
pose the statutory penalties.
The two Parties likewise undertake, in virtue of the above-
mentioned Articles, not to encourage or to allow in their
respective territories the formation or activities of: (1)
organisations or groups of any description whatever, whose
object is to overthrow the Government of the other Contracting
Party by means of violence, insurrection or outrage; (2)
organisations or groups usurping the office of the Government
of the other country or part of its territory, also having as
their object the subversion of the Government of the other
Contracting Party by the above-mentioned means , a breach
of its peace and security, or an infringement of its terri-
torial integrity.
In accordance with the foregoing principles, the two
Contracting Parties likewise undertake to prohibit military
enrolment, and the introduction into their territory of armed
forces, arms, ammunition, and all other war material, intended
for the organisations mentioned above.
8. Treaty of Nonagression (Sa'dabad Pact): Afghanistan, Iran,
Iraq and Turkey, Article 7. 8 July 1937.
Art. 7. Each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes to
prevent, within his respective frontiers, the formation or
activities of armed bands, associations or organisations to
subvert the established institutions, or disturb the order or
security of any part, whether situated on the frontier or
elsewhere, of the territory of another Party, or to change
the constitutional system of such other Party.
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9. Pact CBaghdad) of Mutual Cooperation: Turkey and Iraq,
Article 3. 24 February 1355.
Art. 3. The High Contracting Parties undertake to refrain
any interference whatsoever in each other's internal affairs.
They will settle any dispute between themselves in a peace-
ful way in accordance with the United Nations Charter.
Source ; Numbers 3-9: J. C. Hurewitz, Diplomacy in the Near
and Middle East. A Documentary Record: 1914-1956 . Princeton,
N. J. : D. Van Hostrand Co., Inc., 1956, Vol. II.
10. Twelve Point Program for Peace with the Kurds (Synopsis).
29 June 1966.
1. Kurdish nationality would be recognized in the law on decen-
tralization of the administration, in a provisional Con-
stitution then being prepared, and in a future permanent
Constitution
.
2. Kurdish would be recognized as an official language, along
with Arabic, in the predominantly Kurdish areas, and would
be taught at the Baghdad University.
3. Kurdish districts would have their own elected councils,
which would be responsibile for education, health and
municipal affairs.
4. Civil servants in Kurdish areas would be Kurds, unless
local needs required other personnel.
5. Parliamentary elections would be held within a period to be
laid down in the provisional Constitution. The Kurds
would be represented in Parliament, the Cabinet, the Civil
Service, the Judiciary, and the diplomatic and military
services in proportion to their numbers in the population.
6. The Kurds would be free to form their own political organ-
izations and to publish their own newspapers.
7. A general amnesty would be proclaimed after the conclusion
of a cease-fire agreement.
8. Kurds who deserted from the Army and the police force would




The other Kurds under arms would be formed into an ' organ-
ization 1 attached to the Government, which would help them
to return to civilian life.
10. Kurdish civil servants and workers who had been dismissed
would be reinstated in their former posts.
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11. Money being spent on the campaign against the Kurds would
be used for reconstruction of the Kurdish areas, for which
a special ministry would be responsible.
12. The Government would compensate, as far as lay in its
powers, widows, orphans, the disabled and other war victims.
Source; Edgar O'Ballance, The Kurdish Revolt: 1961-1970 . Hamden,
Conn.: The Shoestring Press, 1973.
11. The March 11, 1970 Kurd-Iraq Manifesto (Excerpts)
:
It is public knowledge that the Revolution had taken all
necessary measures for the re-establishment of calm and peace
throughout northern Iraq. The following steps have been taken:
A) Recognition has been given to the legitimacy of the
Kurdish nationality, this being in accordance with the
Resolutions of the Seventh Regional Conference of the Arab
Baath Socialist Party, and the official and press statements
issued by the revolutionary authority. This fact shall be
enshrined in a lasting manner in the Interim Constitution and
the Permanent Constitution.
B) The Revolutionary Command Council has approved the
establishment of a university in Sulaimaniyah and the
establishment of Kurdish academy of letters. It has also
recognized all cultural and linguistic rights of the Kurdish
natianality, prescribing that the Kurdish language be taught
in all schools, institutes and universities, teachers train-
ing institutes, the Military College and the Police College.
The Revolutionary Command Council further prescribed the
wide dissemination of Kurdish literature - scientific,
literary and political - expressive of the national and
nationalist ambitions of the Kurdish people. It ordered
measures to be taken to help Kurdish authors, poets and
writers to form a federation of their own, get their works
printed and afforded them all opportunities and possibilities
for developing their scientific and artistic talents. The
Revolutionary Command Council also ordered arrangements
to be made for founding a Kurdish publishing and printing
house and a directorate general of Kurdish culture, the
publishing of a weekly newspaper and a monthly magazine in
Kurdish and expanding the Kurdish programme on the Kirkuk TV
Station, pending the construction of a TV station broadcast-
ing exclusively in Kurdish.
C) In recognition of the rights of the Kurds to revive
their traditions and national days and to make it possible for
the whole of the people to join in the observance of national
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days, the Revolutionary Command Council has decreed Nawrooz
Day as a National Day in the Republic of Iraq.
D) The Revolutionary Command Council has promulgated the
Governorates Law which provides for the decentralisation of
the local administration and for the creation of the
Governorate of Dohuk.
E) The Revolutionary Command Council has issued a general
amnesty for all civilian and military personnel who has
joined in acts of violence in the North so as to do away with
vestiges of former negative and exceptional conditions and
lay the new national life on solid foundations of pervasive
security and national fraternity.
The Revolutionary Command Council has thus decreed the
following:
1) The Kurdish language shall, side by side with the Arabic
language, be an official language in the areas populated by
a majority of Kurds. The Kurdish languages shall be the
language of instruction in these areas. The Arabic language
shall be taught in all schools where teaching is conducted in
Kurdish. The Kurdish language shall be taught elsewhere in
Iraq as a second language within the limits prescribed by the
law.
2) It has been one of the main concerns of the revolutionary
government to secure participation by our Kurdish brothers
in Government and eliminate any discrimination between Kurds
and other nationals in regard to holding public offices in-
cluding sensitive and important ones as cabinet ministries,
army commands, etc. While endorsing this principle, the
revolutionary government stresses the need of endeavouring
to have the principle achieved in fair proportions with due
care to considerations of merits, the population ratio and the
deprivations experienced by our Kurdish brothers in the past.
3) In view of the backwardness experienced in the past by
the Kurdish nationality in the cultural and educational domains,
a plan should be worked out for the treatment of this back-
wardness. This is to be achieved through:
(a) Implementing expiditiously the resolutions of the
Revolutionary Command Council in regard to the language and
cultural rights of the Kurdish peop.Ve and tying up the pre-
paration and direction of special programmes on Kurdish
national affaire in the radio and TV network to the Directorate
General of Kurdish Culture and Information.
(b) Reinstating students who were dismissed or had to
leave school because of former conditions of violence in the
area. These students should be allowed to return to their
respective schools regardless of age limits or else have a
convenient remedy suggested for their problem.
(c) Building more schools in the Kurdish area, eleva-
ting the standards of education and admitting, at a fair rate,




4) In the administrative units populated by a Kurdish
majority, government officials shall be appointed from among
Kurds or persons wellversed in the Kurdish language as long
as these are available. The principal Government function-
aries - governor, district officer CQaimuqam) , director
of police, director of security, etc. - shall be drawn from
among the Kurds. Steps shall immediately be taken to
develop state organs in the area in consultation within the
framework of the High Committee supervising the implementa-
tion of this Manifesto in a manner insuring its proper en-
forcement and consolidating national unity and stability in
the area.
5) The Government recognises the right of the Kurdish
people to set up student, youth, women and teachers organi-
sations of their own. There organisations shall be affiliated
in the national counterparts in Iraq.
6) (a) The validity of paras (1) and (2) of the
Revolutionary Command Council's Decree No. 59 dated August 5,
1968, shall be extended to the date of the issuance of this
Manifesto. This shall cover all of those who took part in
hositilities in the Kurdish area.
(b) Workers, government functionaries and employees,
both civilian and military, shall go back to service without
this being subject to cadre considerations. The civilian
personnel shall be posted to the Kurdish area within the
limits of its requirements.
7) (a) A committee of specialists shall be formed to speed
up the uplift of the Kurdish area in all respects and provide
indemnities for the affliction of the past number of years,
side by side with drawing up an adequate budget for all of
this. The committee in question shall be attached to the
Ministry of Northern Affairs.
(b) The economic plan shall be drawn up in such a way
as to ensure equal development for various parts of Iraq,
with due attention to the backward conditions of the Kurdish
area.
(c) Pension salaries shall be made available to the
families of members of the Kurdish armed movement who met with
martyrdom in the regrettable hostilities as well as to those
rendered incapacitated or disfigured. This shall be regulated
in a special legislation patterned on the existing laws of
the land.
(d) Speedy action shall be taken to bring relief to
aggrieved and needly persons by means of building housing units
and other projects ensuring work to the unemployed, offering
appropriate aid both in kind and in cash and granting reason-
able indemnities to aggrieved persons who stand in need for
help. This shall be the responsibility of the High Committee,
with the exception of these specified in the above paras.
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3) The inhabitants of Arab and Kurdish villages shall
be repatriated to their places of habitation. As to villagers
whose villages lie in areas requisitioned by the Government
for public utility purposes in accordance with the pro-
visions of the law, they shall be settled in neighbouring
districts and shall be compensated for whatever loss they
might have incurred as a result.
9) Steps shall be taken to speed up the implementation
of the Agrarian Reform Law in the Kurdish area have the Law
amended in such a way as to ensure liquidation of all
feudalistic relationships, handing out appropriate plots
of land to all peasants and waiving for them agricultural tax
arrears for the duration of the regrettable hostilities.
10) It has been agreed to amend the Interim Constitution
as follows:
(a) The people of Iraq are composed of two principal
nationalities: the Arab nationality and the Kurdish national-
ity. This Constitution recognises the national rights of the
Kurdish people and the rights of all nationalities within the
framework of the Iraqi unity.
(b) The following paragraph shall be added to Article
(4) of the Constitution: "The Kurdish language, an official
language in the Kurdish area.
(c) This all shall be confirmed in the Permanent
Constitution.
11) The broadcasting station and heavy arms shall be given
back to the Government - this being tied up to the implementa-
tion of the final stages of the agreement.
12) One of the vice-presidents of the Republic shall be a
Kurd.
13) The Governments Law shall be amended in a way conforming
with the contents of this Manifesto.
14) Following the issuance of the Manifesto (necessary steps
shall be taken in consultation with the High Committee super-
vising its enforcement, to unify the government and administra-
tive units populated by a Kudish majority as shown by the
official census to be carried out. The state 3iall endeavor
to develop this administrative unity and deepen and broaden
the Kurdish people's process of exercising their national
rights as a measure of ensuring self-rule. Pending the
realisation of administrative unity, Kurdish national affairs
shall be coordinated by means of periodical meetings between
the High Committee and the governors of the northern area. As
self-rule is to be established within the fromework of the
Republic of Iraq, the exploitation of the natural riches in
the area shall obviously be the prerogative of the authorities
of the Republic.
15) The Kurdish people shall contribute to the legislative




Source ; Iraq, Ministry of Information, The Kurdish Question
,
Attitudes and Achievements . Documentary Series No. 6Q, Baghdad:
Al-Hurria Printing House, 1977.
12. The National Action Charter - Iraq (excerpts) 15 November,
1971.
D. THE KURDISH ISSUE:
The Kurdish nationalistic issue, for long years, had been
on top of the greater national issues awaiting solution. Due
to the issue being suspended, our people had suffered many
losses and pains and its unity and the unity of the homeland
was endangered.
The July 17 Revolution expressing the principles of the
democratic and human principles of the Arab Ba'th Socialist
Party, has provided wide horizons for a peaceful democratic
and final settlement of this issue. The revolution's efforts,
through cooperation between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, were culminated with the
issuance of the historical March 11 Manifesto.
The March 11 Manifesto is the sound framework for securing
the legitimate nationalistic rights and aspirations of our
Kurdish people, including autonomy, and for security unity
of the homeland and the people and that of its progressive
national and nationalist forces, on the path of struggling
against imperialism, Zionism and reaction.
In order to continue fulfilling all the requirements of
the peaceful and democratic solution of the Kurdish issue, in
accordance with the spirit and provisions of the Manifesto and
under the national joint work for building up the unitary
revolutionary democratic society the Charter defines the
following:
1. The alliance between the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party
and the Kurdistan Democratic Party, an alliance con-
stituting the foundation stone in national coalition
is based, as to premise and far reaching objective,
on the historical revolutionary alliance of destiny
between the Arab and the Kurdish peoples, and in
particular, the Arab and Kurdish toiling masses. It
is based on these masses and represents their
interests and reflects their legitmate aspirations
and ambitions.
2. The Kurdish masses practicing their legimate national-
istic rights, including autonomy, is done within their
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natural scope embodied through, one national policy,
one land and one political regime in the Iraq
Republic. It is also done on the basis of accept-
ing and believing that Iraq is an inseparable part of
the Arab Homeland, and that the potentialities of the
Arab Nation and its energies and legitimate and just
struggle for full liberation from imperialistic
domination and Zionist usurpation, and for the reali-
zation of unity and socialism are historical and sure
guarantees for the freedom of nationalities and
minorities and their legitimate rights.
3. The implementation of the clauses of March 11
Manifesto and acquiring all parts of a peaceful and
democratic solution of the Kurdish national quest is
consolidated deeply with the existing revolutionary
regime and its constant development and consolidating
its bases to confront plotting and intrigue, planned
by imperialistic, Zionist and reactionary quarters.
They are also linked with the struggle for the
liquidation of suspciious and adventurous forces and
elements, moving under the direction of the above-
mentioned quarters.
The relationship between the popular, democratic
and national revolution, heading towards the attain-
ment of unity and socialism, consolidated by the alli-
ance of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party and the
Kurdish Democratic Party and the union of all progres-
sive national and patriotic forces with the peaceful
and democratic solution of the Kurdish question in an
indivisible dialectal relationship.
Any partitional outlook to such relationship is
liable to serve at the end imperialistic, Zionist and
reactionary schemings to strike at the Revolution and
devastate our Kurdish people's expectations to practice
its legitimate national rights.
4. The revolutionary transitions in all political, economic,
social, and cultural fields in the direction of imple-
menting the tasks of popular democratic stage before the
attainment of socialism, as well as the justification of
the interests of peasants, workers and toiling masses
of the people are but objective assurances of a peace-
ful and democratic solution of the Kurdish question
and to consolidate its progressive content.
5. The responsibility of fulfilling March 11 Manifesto
and the justification of a peaceful democratic solution
of the Kurdish question does not depend on one party,
rather it is a common national responsibility that no
national party can shun and give up.
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6. The ideological and permanent political struggle
against chauvinist, isolationist, superior, and
secessionistic elements and trends is a fundamental
condition to safeguard the peaceful, democratic
solution of the Kurdish question, and its
development on one hand, and to safeguard national
unity and revolutionary transitions aiming at the
attainment of national and patriotic goals on
the other.
13. The Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation -
Articles 8-10. June, 1972.
Article 8. The two high contracting parties will, in
the event of a situation developing which endangers the peace
of either of them or constitutes a threat to peace or a
violation of peace, hold immediate contacts to coordinate
their positions in the interest of eliminating the developing
danger and re-establishing peace.
Article 9. In the interests' of the security of both
countries, the two high contracting parties will continue to
develop co-operation in the strengthening of the defense
capabilities of each.
Article 10. Each of the two high contracting parties
declares that it will not enter into any international alliance
or grouping or take part in any actions or undertakings di-
rected against the other high contracting party. Each of the
two high contracting parties also undertakes not to allow its
territory to be used for any action that might cause military
harm to the other party.
Source ; Numbers 12 and 13: Majid Khadduri, Socialist Iraq .
Washington, D.C." The Middle East Institute, 1978.




(a) Kurdistan Region shall enjoy Autonomy, and it shall




(b) The Region shall be delimited as wherever the Kurds
constitute the majority of it population, and the
general census shall decide the Region's borders
in accordance with the provisions of March 11
Manifesto. The records of 1957 Census shall be
deemed as the basis for defining the national nature
of the absolute majority of population in the places
where the general census shall be performed.
(c) The Region shall be deemed as one administrative
unit which has a body corporate enjoying Autonomy
within the framework of the legal, political and
economic unity of the Republic Of Iraq. Administra-
tion divisions in it shall be performed under the
provisions of Governorates Law and with observation to
the provisions of this Law.
(d) The Region is an inseparable part of the land of Iraq
and its people is an inseparable part of the people of
Iraq.
Article (2)
(a) The Kurdish language shall be, beside the Arabic
language, the official language in the Region.
(b) Kurdish shall be the language of education for Kurds
in the Region. Teaching of Arabic language shall be
compulsory in all educational levels and utilities.
Article (10)
The Legislative Council is the legislative body elected
in the Region; its formation, organization and procedure shall
be defined by a Law.
Article (20)
(a) The President of the Republic is entitled to dissolve
the Legislative Council in case the Council is incapable
of exercising its jurisdictions because of the resig-
nation of half its members, or the quorum is not
obtained during thirty days as from the date the
invitation for convening it is forwarded or because of
not acquiring the confidence stipulated in paragraph
(d) of Article (13) of this Law for more then two con-
secutive times or in case of its nonabiding by the
decisions of the Observation Body stipulated in Article
(19) of this Law.
Source; IRAQ, The Kurdish Question Attitudes and Achievements.
220

15. First Protocol to Iran-Iraq Treaty on International Bor-
ders and Good Neighborly Relations Cexcerpts). , 13 June 1975.
Following is the text of protocol on Border Security
between Iraq and Iran.
Pursuant to the resolutions of the Algiers Agreement
dated March 6th, 1975, and proceeding from the keenness to
consolidate security and mutual confidence along joint borders;
Proceeding from their determination to exercise firm and
effective control along the borders to cease all infiltrations
of a subversive nature and establish close cooperation between
them, with a view to preventing any infiltration or illegal
passage through their common borders, with the purpose of
subversion, rebellion or mutiny;
With reference to the Teheran protocol dated March 15,
1975, minutes of the Foreign Ministers meeting concluded in
Baghdad on April 20, 1975, and minutes of the Foreign Ministers
meeting concluded in Algiers on May 20, 1975;




The two contracting parties shall exchange information re-
lated to the movement of subversive elements which may penetrate
into either of the two countries with a view to committing acts
of subversion, rebellion or mutiny in that country.
The two contracting parties shall take appropriate measures
in respect to the movements of elements referred to in article
one hereof.
Each shall notify the other immediately of the identity of
such persons; it is agreed that they shall utilise all measures
to prevent them from committing acts of subversion.
The same measures shall be adopted against the persons who
gather in the territory of any contracting party with a view
to committing acts of sabotage or subversion in the territory
of the other party.
ARTICLE TWO
Versatile cooperation established between competent
authorities of both contracting parties shall be applicable in
respect to border closure with the purpose of preventing the
penetration of subversive elements, at the level of border
authorities of both countries, through to the highest levels of





1. The two contracting parties undertake to assign
necessary human and material facilities for effective border
closure and control against any penetration of subversive
elements through the passage points specified in Article three
above
.
2. In the case that experts, due to experience acquired on
the subject, consider that more effective measures should be
adopted, means thereof shall be specified through monthly
meetings of border authorities of both countries or through
contacts made, when necessary, between such authorities.
Results of such meetings, together with their minutes,
shall be forwarded to the supreme authorities in each party;
in the case of a dispute between border authorities, competent
heads of department, in Baghdad and Teheran, shall meet to
reach entente and the results of such meetings shall be listed
in special minutes.
ARTICLE FIVE
1. Arrested saboteurs shall be handed over to the
authorities concerned of the party in the territory of which
they are arrested, and shall be subject to the legislations
in effect therein.
2. The two contracting parties shall notify each other of
the measures adopted in respect to the persons referred to in
para. 1 hereof.
3. In the case of border crossings by wanted saboteurs,
the authorities of the other party shall be notified, which
shall taken all necessary measures to help arrest the persons
mentioned above.
ARTICLE SIX
When necessary, by agreement between the two contracting
parties, embargo areas may be specified with a view to prevent-
ing saboteurs from attaining their ends
.
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ANK- Association of Northern Kurdistan, 1930 in Turkey.
Branch of Khoybun , led by Prince Selaheddine.
AOPFLP- Action Organization, Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine. Part of the Palestinian
Rejection Front-opposed to Fateh .
Apocular- Left-wing Kurdish Group. Underground in Turkey.
Founded 1970' s.
ASA- Armenian Secret Army, terrorist.
ASDK-DER- Anti-Colonialist Democratic Culture Organization-
Leftist, underground in Turkey, formed early 1970 's.
ALF- Assyrian Liberation Front, terrorist.
ASRF- Armenian Socialist Revolutionary Front (Dasnak -
zutium ) , headquarted in Geneva in 1925.
Bahoz - Society of Fighters for Kurdistan. Formed 1969, Sweden
Bar-30- Ahmed Barzani, 1930.
Ba'th- Arab Ba'th Socialist Party, founded 1940 ' s by
Michael Aflaq. Active in Iraq and Syria.
BW- Banner of the Workers. Right-wing faction of Communist
Kurds in Iraq. Split from Iraqi Communist Party in 1953.
CKS- Center for Kurdish Studies (Centre d 1 Etudes Kurdes)
,
founded 194 9 by Dr. Emir Kamuran Badr Khan in Paris.
DDHD- Peoples' Revolutionary Culture Association, leftist,
underground in Turkey. Formed late 1960's.
DDKD- Eastern Revolutionary Culture Association, leftist,
underground in eastern Turkey. Formed late 1960's.
DDO- Society of Eastern Hearths, leftist, underground in
Turkey. Formed 1960's.
DG- Dev Gene , leftist student organization in Turkey,
underground.
DPK- Democrat (ic) Party of Kurdistan. Name given to
Komala in 194 4 in Iran. Led by Qazi Mohammed. Also





DPKS- DPK of Syria.
FG- Freedom Group. Mullah Mustafa Barzani's splinter group
from the Hewa in Iraq, 1945.
FK- Feda'i Khalq . The Organization of the Guerrilla Freedom
Fighters of the Iranian People, Marxist, Iran.
Hewa - Hope. Kurdish Youth Group linked to KTJ in Constantinople
in 1908. Also Kurdish nationalist party in Iraq possibly
evolved from KNDO of 1925. Founded 1930 's in Kirkuk by
intellectuals
.
ICP- Iraqi Communist Party.
ISK- International Society Kurdistan. Formed in Amsterdam
in late 1960 's.
IUS- International Union of Students.
Kawa - Kurdish underground group in Turkey. Named after a
Kurdish hero. Formed 197 0's.
KDP- Kurdistani Democratic Party-led by Mullah Mustafa Barzani
and Ibrahim Ahmed in Iraq, founded 1960. Also indicates
KDP in Turkey.
KDPB- KDP Barzani Faction of middle 1960's in Iraq.
KDP-GB- KDP Government Branch, Iraq. Split from KDP 1974.
Led by Aziz Akrawi ,Hashim Hassan, and Ubaidalla
Barzani.
KDPI- Kurdish Democratic Party, Iraq-evolved from Hewa,
RK, FG, and others in 1954. Also indicates Kordestan
Democratic Party of Iran-currently de facto autonomy
leader in Iran .President-Abdul Rahman Qassemlu.
KDPP- KDP Politburo faction in Iraq mid-1960 's. Led by
Ibrahim Ahmed and Jalal Talabani
.
KDP-PC- Kurdestani Democratic Party-Preparatory Committee.
Split from KDP in Iraq in 1976. Led by
Mahmoud Osman.
KDP-PL- Kurdestani Democratic Party-Provisional Leadership.
Remnant of Barzani faction of KDP in Iraq. Probably
led by Idris and Massoud Barzani. Formed 1975.
Khoybun- Kurdish Independence League/Government. Founded




KNDO- Kurdish National Defense Organization, Mosul, 1925.
Komala - Committee for the Resurrection of Kurdistan.
Formed 1942 in Iran. Komala M/L is a new group
in Iran which is Marxist-Leninist.
KPG- Kurdish Progressive Group. Aligned with Ba'th in
Iraq since 1974. Led by 'Abd Allah Ismail
.
KPP- Kurdish Proletarian Party. Leftist, underground
in Turkey. Formed 1970 's.
KRP- Kurdistani Revolutionary Party. Leftist Kurdish
group in Iraq, formed 1974. Led by 'Abd al-Sattar
Tahir.
KSAUS- Kurdish Students* Association, United States.
KSSE- Kurdish Students' Society in Europe-founded 1956.
Exists in East and West Europe.
KSM- Kurdish Socialist Movement. Formed 19 76 in Iraq by
Ali Askari.
KTJ- Kurdish Cooperation Society. Political group formed
in Constantinople in 1908 by Sharif Pasha.
KUFL- Kurdish Union of the Friends of Liberty. Formed 1930
in Turkey, by Prince Selaheddine
.
KUK- Liberation of the Kurdish Nation. Underground, leftist
group in Turkey, formed 1970's.
MFDLRK- Movement for the Defense of Liberty and Revolution
in Kordestan. Leftist group in Iran. Formed 1970*
s
MLL- Marxist-Leninist League. Maoist Kurds in Iraq.
Formed 1976.
MLPLA- Marxist-Leninist Peoples' Liberation Army. Located
in Iraq and Syria. Formed 1970's.
NUKSE- National Union of Kurdish Students in Europe.
Right-wing splinter of KSSE. Founded 1965 in
West Germany.
Paykar - Battle. Marxist Splinter of the Islamic Mujahidin
in Iran, 1979.




PUK- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan. Kurdish leftist, anti-
Ba'th group formed by Jalal Talabani in 1975. Headquartered
in Damascus.
PLO- Palestine Liberation Organization.
PWND- Progressive Wing, National Democrats. Iraq, 1958.
RF- Rizkary . Front of KUK, Kawa , and KDP in Turkey, 1979.
RK- Ruzkary (Liberation) Kurds. Communist faction in Iraq,
formed 1945 from the Shursh group. Ruzkary also has
been used to denote the 1945-46 front between DPK, Hewa
,
and Khoybun .
RKWM- Revolutionary Kurdish Workers' Movement. Leftist organiza-
tion in Iran, 1979.
SAKUK- Society for the Advancement of Kurdistan, United
Kingdom.
Salat - Right-wing and religious group led by Mullahs in
1941-42 in Iranian Kordestan.
Shursh- Revolution Group. Communist Kurds in Iraq of
urban intelligentsia. Formed 1943.
Tudeh- Masses. Communist Party in Iran and Azerbaijan.
TWP/TLP- Turkish Workers' Party/Turkish Labor Party.
UDPK- United Democratic Kurdistan Party. Formed by Ibrahim
Ahmed in Iraq in 1954.
UF- United Front of Iraq, 1958.
USII- United States, Iran, Israel.
VOKSCRS- Kurdistan Soviet Cultural Relations Society.
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